

RETROSPECTIVE IMPACT EVALUATION

SAVE THE CHILDREN'S SPONSORSHIP PROGRAMMING IN WOLISO IMPACT AREA, ETHIOPIA (2002-2010)



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This Retrospective Impact Evaluation (RIE) sought answers to six Key Evaluation Questions (KEQs):

KEQ 1. Core programming implemented & current status: *What SC Sponsorship-funded core programming was implemented in the Woliso impact area from 2002-2010, how relevant was it to the needs of children and their families, how well has it lasted, and how well is it functioning now?*

1. Education (BE, ECCD):

→ p. 19

- a. **21 new community-based schools (CBSs)** and additional classrooms for 8 existing schools were built. This was an extremely high need due to widespread lack of (and inequitable) access to education. Early CBSs were built from wood and mud and are severely damaged by termites and cracking. Later CBSs were much more durable and are in generally in good repair. All CBSs are crowded as school enrollments have grown but school expansions have not kept up.
- b. **Desks, chairs and blackboards** were provided to all CBSs. This was high need to make the CBSs usable. Only 5 of 12 sampled kebeles still had furniture and equipment in good or excellent condition. Government had replaced some furniture in a small number of kebeles. Learning materials and resources were particularly problematic, with many now outdated, damaged, lost, or too few for current enrollments.
- c. Approximately **130 young high school graduates were trained to teach in the new CBSs** and later supported to obtain teaching degrees. This was a very high need as there were no teachers available for these CBSs. Some still work in impact area schools; many have advanced into government positions. Impact area schools are now staffed with a mix of SC-trained and other teachers, all employed and paid by the government.
- d. **SC trained about 140 to 150 Parent Teacher Association (PTA) members** for the 21 new CBSs. The need was high for strong PTAs to support and sustain the quality of education, maintain the buildings and equipment, and solve school problems. The vast majority of PTAs were still functioning in 2019. For those struggling, the biggest challenges were keeping up maintenance on buildings and furniture, especially when they needed replacement rather than repairs.

2. Health and Nutrition (SHN):

→ p. 37

- a. **122 water supplies were installed across 32 kebeles.** This was an extremely high need given the lack of clean water and the high prevalence of waterborne illnesses. About 59% of the 80 water supplies in the kebeles we visited were still functional in 2019 and water supplies overall were Good (or better) in quality and adequacy for 7 of the 11 sampled kebeles. SC also trained water caretakers, who were still maintaining water schemes in about half of the visited kebeles.
- b. **2,000 to 3,000 latrines were installed in up to 35 kebeles.** This was a very high need – open defecation had been the norm. Since SC exited, communities, with the support of Health Extension Workers (HEWs), have erected many more latrines (exact numbers unknown). 7 of the 11 visited kebeles had Excellent access to and use of latrines; 3 were in a Good situation.
- c. **Water, sanitation and health (WASH) committees were established in about 32 kebeles and training on hygiene, food safety and nutrition was also provided.** This was a high need – oversight and fundraising for water and sanitation were important for sustainment; also, knowledge and skills in hygiene and nutrition were very low. WASH committees were still active in all the kebeles we visited, supported by HEWs. Some have been more successful than others; finding funding for things the community can't afford have been one of the major challenges.

- d. **Two community health insurance schemes (involving about 100 to 120 women) were set up in two urban kebeles** within the Woliso municipality. With a precarious public health system, these financial safety nets were of high need. Only one of these schemes was reported to be still functioning. Both were reported only to have been partly successful because they did not adequately meet the needs of members, which led many people to quit the schemes.

3. Adolescent Development (AD):

→ p. 54


- a. **Two Adolescent Development Centers (ADCs) were established in two kebeles.** These were a moderately high need – at the time there were no opportunities for the impoverished youth to gather and engage in initiatives to develop entrepreneurial and business skills. The evaluation team was able to locate one of these ADCs, which had not been operational for many years. Location (built on a polluted site) and weak programming (youth left to their own devices) were reported to be the two major issues affecting the sustainment and impact of the visited ADC.
- b. **Almost all of the new 21 CBSs were supported by SC to form school youth clubs** focused on health promotion, culture, minimedia, and sports. This was a moderately high need, complementing in-classroom teaching as well as creating income generating activities. All schools we visited still had some clubs operating in 2019, but all had experienced a drop-off in the number, range, and/or quality of clubs due to a lack of up-to-date resources and materials.

KEQ 2. Outcomes & impacts influenced by SC: *How valuable were the outcomes and impacts of these efforts, especially for children and their families, but also for communities, government agencies and their officials? How well have those impacts been sustained or grown over time? Where and for whom did the most powerful and long-lasting impacts occur, and why?*

1. Education, careers, and livelihoods:

→ p. 67

- a. CBSs had a strong effect on educational access. Students completed an average of **4.5 more years of schooling** than they likely would have if a school had not been constructed by SC.
- b. The effect also **reduced educational access inequalities**. Children who would otherwise have had the least formal schooling (a larger proportion of whom were girls) had the largest boosts.



- c. The ~130 young adults trained by SC to become **education facilitators had the most substantial and life-changing impacts on their careers, incomes, and socioeconomic status**. We also heard several stories of their importance as professional role models for children from their home kebeles, as well as their own children. This was particularly true of the women.
- d. The community members trained as **water caretakers** and who were still engaged in this work were also **making a decent living** maintaining water systems outside their home kebeles.

2. Health and wellbeing: → p. 68

- a. **Closer access to clean water** had a *very substantial impact* on people's lives and health due to (i) children and family members getting sick less often, and (ii) time/energy saved fetching water.
- b. **Access to latrines, showers, and clothes washing facilities** had a *very substantial impact* on people's lives and health due to: (i) children and families getting sick less often and feeling better for feeling cleaner; (ii) privacy, particularly for girls and women and especially during menstruation; and (iii) people were happy to be living in open defecation free environment.
- c. One **negative outcome**: due to shortages in the water supply, there have sometimes been arguments about how much water each household is allowed to collect.
- d. **Knowledge, skills, and practice of good hygiene and food safety** improved, on average, from Problematic (pre training) to Good (post training) and had been sustained at Good in 2019.
- e. **Knowledge of nutrition and eating a healthy diet** improved, on average, from Problematic (pre training) to mostly Good or OK (post training) and had been sustained at those levels in 2019.

It is important to note that there have been several other organizations and groups that have contributed to these health and wellbeing outcomes, particularly their sustainment.

3. Community Capacity, Empowerment, and Self-Determination → p. 69

- a. In kebeles where community-based schools were constructed and **Parent Teacher Associations (PTAs)** set up and trained to run them, there had clearly been a substantial shift toward community ownership of K-8 education.
- b. **WASH Committees** set up and trained to oversee water, sanitation, and health have also contributed to the shift toward community empowerment and self-determination – with variation in the capacity and success of these committees.
- c. **Income-generating activities (IGAs)** for youth (through school youth clubs and ADCs) had very weak overall effects.
- d. The two **community health insurance schemes** set up in Woliso town with SC's support produced weak to, at best, moderate impact.
- e. Some of the **education facilitators trained by SC** ended up promoted into positions as government officials, which created the possibility for their communities obtain support from the woreda administration through having that personal connection.
- f. With the **water caretakers trained by SC**, the communities now had the expertise to educate and to install and fix most of their own water systems whereas previously they had not.

4. Government Thinking and Action → p. 70

- a. Government took over responsibility for staffing the new SC-supported schools with **government-employed teachers** (the former education facilitators trained by SC).
- b. Government provided support in the form of **HEWs** to collaborate in several SC-led health promotion initiatives and later to support WASH Committees to continue this work.
- c. Some **SC-trained facilitators** moved into senior government roles; their local knowledge of the needs and strengths of the impact area kebeles was helpful for informing government priorities.

- d. Highly likely that SC's early engagement with government and sharing with them the findings of their local **needs assessments** and later on their **intervention strategies** provided useful and practical ideas on how the government could better support these communities.

KEQ 3. Side impacts & ripple effects: *What other actions, reactions, or changes have been inspired or catalyzed by the SC-funded work in the Woliso IA – locally, regionally, and/or nationally – and how important were they, particularly in ways that impacted the lives of children and their families?* → p. 57

At the kebele level, positive side effects related to (i) the development of a **culture of community mobilization** (e.g., saving money to resolve pressing issues in the communities) and (ii) changes in **attitudes towards education, sanitation and hygiene** (e.g., families valuing sending their children to school).

Beyond the impact area, SC's work in Woliso has helped to influence (i) the development of an important **national study** to determine whether schools ensured children read fluently in Grade 3; (ii) the creation of a **national school health and nutrition strategy**; and (iii) (possibly) the creation of a government's community insurance program.

KEQ 4. Value for Investment (Vfi): *Overall, how valuable have the Woliso area impacts been (to children, their families, communities, government agencies and their officials, the region, and beyond) relative to what was invested to obtain them?* → p. 72

SC's US\$22.5 million investment (in 2019 dollars) resulted in several life-changing outcomes and impacts, some of them long-lasting, as described in the answers to KEQs 1, 2 and 3. Just by themselves, it is reasonable to conclude that these changes justify the investment made. However, to provide a more comprehensive answer to this question, the evaluation also included an economic component through the implementation of a Value for Investment (Vfi) analysis. The Vfi study identified three outcomes for which we made estimations of current and future financial benefits for individuals and the society to compare with the financial investment made. The following are the main conclusions:

1. Education Facilitators' Income Streams

SC invested about **US\$1.35 million** to train approximately 130 education facilitators (paraprofessionals) and later support them to obtain teaching degrees. The value of the estimated impacts on past, current, and future income for these former facilitators, plus the value of the plot of land two-thirds of them received from the government, amounted to somewhere between **US\$5.1 and \$6.2 million**. This means that every dollar invested by SC provided a potential return of US\$3.80 in financial benefits to former facilitators in the least optimistic scenario and US\$4.60 for more optimistic scenario.

2. Returns to Investment in Education

SC invested approximately **US\$11.3 million** in Basic Education and Early Childhood Care and Development activities that included building and renovating schools in the Woliso impact area. Our evaluation estimated that having access to the schools built by SC helped ensure additional **4.5 years** of schooling for the children and adolescents who attended those schools. The estimated collective future lifetime additional income for those children/adolescents amounted to **US\$137.5 million**. The conclusion is that for every dollar invested by SC in education there is a potential return of about US\$12 in lifetime financial benefits to the (now) young women and men who attended the schools built by SC.

3. Returns to Investment in Water and Sanitation

SC invested about **US\$4.7 million** in building and maintaining water schemes and sanitation facilities in the kebeles covered. With no primary or secondary data available on the outcomes of this investment, we turned to a WHO study that calculated a return of US\$2.7 to every dollar invested in water and sanitation in sub-Saharan Africa, from: (i) health care savings, (ii) reduced productivity losses, (iii) time saved fetching water, and (iv) premature deaths averted. To avoid overestimation, we discounted a 41% loss for water schemes that were no longer working. We estimated a return of **US\$7.5 million** equivalent in benefits. This equated to an expected value of US\$1.59 in benefits for every dollar that SC invested.

KEQ 5. Sustainability: *What made the greatest difference in ensuring how well core programming outcomes and their long-term impacts were sustained after close-out? What were the gaps or challenges that limited sustainment?* → p. 75

What helped solutions, outcomes, and impacts to last?

1. Durable solutions with availability of materials and parts to repair and maintain them.
2. Sound training of community members in the expertise needed to run and maintain them.
3. Financially sustainable business models to allow their expertise to be used in home kebeles (e.g., water caretakers earning viable incomes from work outside the kebele).
4. Community committees and groups empowered with the knowledge, skills, know-how, and confidence they needed to effectively oversee and manage what had been put in place.
5. Practical support (e.g., HEWs supporting WASH) and some financial support from government.
6. Effective succession planning to pass on knowledge, skills, organization, and commitment.
7. Community determination, commitment, and engagement to keep up the work.
8. SC-trained facilitators in government leadership positions effectively supporting their kebeles.

What limited how long solutions, outcomes, and impacts lasted?

1. Solutions with short expected lifespans and no system for major maintenance/replacements.
2. A lack of future-proofing solutions to meet the needs of future and growing populations.
3. Buildings located in unsafe, polluted, or relatively inaccessible areas (e.g., ADCs).
4. A lack of follow-up support and coaching to ensure effective application of learning (e.g., IGAs).
5. Gaps in the training of maintenance people; certain problems were outside their expertise.
6. Unavailability or unaffordability of spare parts or vehicles needed for repairs and maintenance.
7. A lack of training to help PTAs figure out how to replace learning materials and resources.
8. Communities with very limited capacity to fund repairs, maintenance, and materials.
9. Gaps in the training and support of committees and community groups to help them (i) troubleshoot unexpected challenges; (ii) forge effective collaborative relationships with government agencies; (iii) source funding and support for projects the community cannot afford or effectively implement by themselves; (iv) engage in succession planning; and (v) maintain community engagement and enthusiasm for the ongoing community development work.
10. Weak or patchy government support for ongoing development efforts.
11. High turnover of government support staff and/or committee members (PTAs and WASH committees), resulting in a loss of knowledge, cohesion, relationship quality, and effectiveness.
12. Insufficient numbers trained in ECCD; weak understanding of the importance of this expertise.
13. A lack of ongoing professional learning (refresher training) for teachers and water caretakers.

KEQ 6. Ownership transition and exit: *Looking back, how well did SC’s ownership transition processes work to empower communities to better support children after the conclusion of SC’s work in the Woliso impact area? What factors made a difference for achieving a smooth and supportive transition?* → p. 60

SC did a very good job in contributing to develop the capacity of many key actors within the communities and schools (e.g., WASH committee, water caretakers, education facilitators, PTAs, youth clubs, etc.) so that important changes produced as part of the interventions could be locally owned and maintained after they phaseout. This strategy produced good results – e.g., most WASH committees and PTAs are still active and water caretakers still maintaining the water schemes in several communities.

However, there were some issues highlighted by stakeholders in half of the 12 kebeles visited by the evaluation team indicating that the transition process did not go as smoothly as expected. Some of them were surprised with SC’s exit either because they lacked proper warning (adequate exit conversations with SC staff) or because their kebeles were still in a dire situation on some basic needs.

In the absence of concrete agreements with government authorities and a carefully managed handover process, simply relying on government agencies to take over responsibility to support communities in consolidating and building on the positive changes produced by SC’s interventions did not turn out to be a successful transition strategy.



Figure 1. Adolescents and children in a rural kebele stop to see what’s going on.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

An evaluation of this magnitude and complexity is a collective effort. We would like to recognize here the people without whose support we would not have been able to successfully complete this work. We greatly appreciate the expertise and time they contributed to help ensure the quality, feasibility, thoroughness, use, and influence of this evaluation.

- **Zelalem Adugna Geletu** (Founder and CEO, HANZ Consulting) was our valued local evaluation partner, responsible for managing most of the data collection in Ethiopia with support from his team of local evaluators – **Assefa Bayisa, Seble Fekadu, Dunyat Haile, and Hordofa Gutema**.
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- **Lisa Zook** (InformEd International) brought her considerable GIS and DHS dataset expertise to the evaluation, helping us assess potential data sources and create maps used in the report.
- **Larry Dershem** (former Senior Advisor, Research & Evaluation at Save the Children US) was one of the early driving forces behind the evaluation, an enthusiastic supporter, and provided insightful technical and logistical guidance and feedback throughout all phases of the evaluation.
- **Brad Kerner** (Senior Director, Sponsorship Programs) and **Jenine Kelly** (AVP, Supporter Experience & Global Sponsorship, Marketing, Communications & Fundraising) at Save the Children US gave us a clear understanding of the interests and needs of the various stakeholders who would use or be influenced by this work, which they supported in numerous ways.
- **Alene Yenew** (Head of Sponsorship Programs & Operations), **Ashebir Debebe** (Deputy Country Director), and **Ekin Ogutogullari** (Country Director) in SCI's Ethiopia Country Office kindly facilitated our access to: (i) Ethiopia Country Office information; (ii) many key informants in the impact area; and (iii) important logistical support (accommodation, cars, drivers, and safety) we needed to conduct the site visits. They were also important informants for this evaluation.
- **Mekonnen Soboksa** (former Field Officer, Ethiopia Country Office, SCI) was a "living encyclopedia" about the work done by SC in the Woliso Impact Area. He provided us with vital detail about many aspects of SC's work; used his local knowledge and deep personal connections within the community and government to pave the way for us to have fruitful and productive meetings with a wide range of stakeholders; and supported data collection efforts.
- **Hailu Amare** (Field Officer, Ethiopia Country Office, Save the Children International) not only accompanied us in our second visit to Woliso, but also served as a key informant.
- **Karen Fox** (Special Projects, Global Sponsorship Programs, Save the Children US) did a superb job digging deep into project data archives to identify useful information to help us estimate SC's investment in the Woliso Impact Area.
- **Members of the Evaluation Advisory Group** reviewed and commented on the evaluation plan and/or previous versions of this report, as well as lent their expertise to the evaluation team, providing guidance and insights on certain aspects of the assignment: **Jenine Kelly, Brad Kerner, Laurel MacLaren, Larry Dershem, Eric Sarriot, Jonathan Seiden, Amy Jo Dowd, Hadley Solomon, Alene Yenew, Ashebir Debebe, Bidjan Nashat, and Michael O'Donnell**.
- **Helen Moestue** (MEAL Advisor, Sponsorship, Save the Children International) also provided detailed and insightful feedback on draft versions of this report.
- Most importantly, we wish to thank the **community members, leaders, and educators in Woliso and Goro** who generously shared their time and expertise in each of the 12 kebeles we visited, as well as **leaders and professionals in the woreda offices, health centers, and health posts**.

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INTRODUCTION

WHAT, BRIEFLY, IS SAVE THE CHILDREN’S CHILD SPONSORSHIP PROGRAMMING MODEL?

Save the Children (SC) has spent 100 years in about 30 countries implementing child sponsorship-funded community development programming. Currently (in 2019/2020), SC is working in 30 impact areas in 21 countries around the globe. Engagements are typically for about 8 to 10 years.

Unlike some child sponsorship programs internationally, SC does not pass sponsor donations directly to individual children and their families, but rather pools the money for community-level programming in several broad areas. Figure 2 shows the approximate breakdown for Sponsorship in Woliso.

In general, Sponsorship programming seeks to build community capacity to effect long-lasting change that is designed to benefit both sponsored and non-sponsored children.

It is important to note that when SC worked in Woliso, Sponsorship programming had several components producing high-resource activities such as construction, materials and training and fewer involving low-resource activities such as health campaigns, and advocacy work – which are the most prevalent activities in current programming.




Figure 2. Basic Education and School Health & Nutrition were the biggest Sponsorship investments in the Woliso impact area

WHAT DID WE EVALUATE, AND WHERE?

SC’s first sponsorship-funded effort in Ethiopia was 8 years of programming (2002 – 2010) in the Woliso Impact Area, which encompasses two woredas (districts), Woliso and Goro, in Ethiopia’s largest region, Oromia (see Figure 3). Currently (2019/2020) SC is working in its 4th and 5th impact areas in Ethiopia.




Figure 3. Maps showing the location of Ethiopia (left; source: <https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=8841388>) and of the two woredas (Woliso and Goro) that formed the impact area (right; source: ArcGIS).

At the time of SC Sponsorship’s presence in the area, Woliso and Goro were combined as one woreda. Woredas are divided into kebeles, the smallest administrative unit in Ethiopia, which (in rural communities) typically consist of several hamlets. SC supported a total of 35 kebeles in the area, most of them rural, some in small towns, and one in the largest town, also called Woliso. About 28 of these kebeles still fall within the boundaries of the Woliso or Goro woredas (see Figure 4); the rest (about 7 kebeles) now fall outside these boundaries, which have been redrawn several times since SC left the area.




Figure 4. Map of the Woliso and Goro woredas, showing SC-supported and non-supported kebeles within those woredas.

In 2019, Woliso Town had a population of approximately 50,000 people (38,000 in 2007) and is the capital city for Southwest Showa Zone in the Oromia Region. Despite being geographically located within the Woliso Woreda, it is not administratively connected to the woreda and is not considered a part of it. SC only worked in one Kebele within Woliso Town, the Woliso 03 kebele.

The population of the impact area is relatively homogenous in many respects, with the vast majority in the Woliso woreda (2007 pop. 143,000) being ethnic Oromo (~80%) and Ethiopian Orthodox Christians (67%). In the Goro woreda, the population (currently 67,000) is 70% Muslim and its ethnic majority are the Kebena people.

Woliso is a high-altitude area, more than 2km above sea level, with an average annual rainfall of 1250mm (49in), most of which falls in May to September. Temperatures are comfortable, with highs around 25°C (75°F) in warm months and 21°C (70°F) in cool months; year-round lows are typically about 10°C (50°F).



Figure 5. A typical scene in the rural kebeles within the Woliso impact area (IA).

WHAT WERE THE PURPOSES OF THIS EVALUATION?


With this evaluation, SC sought to:

- (1) Assess the long-term intended and unintended, both positive and negative, outcomes and impacts of child sponsorship programming in the Woliso Impact Area;
- (2) Gain insights for future child sponsorship programming to improve immediate and sustainable outcomes and impacts for children, families, and communities in current and future impact areas; and
- (3) Provide an exemplar for future RIE, that is, how they can and should be done for Sponsorship and programs facing similar constraints on the availability of evidence and on the funds available for evaluation.

The evaluation was designed to support both sponsorship programming and marketing, i.e., to inform programming decisions and to communicate to donors about Sponsorship impact and its value.

WHY DO A RETROSPECTIVE EVALUATION NOW?

Save the Children's projects always aim to help communities build on their own strengths and create *change that lasts for a long time*. How long did the changes in Woliso and Goro last? What might have helped them last even longer? The best way to answer these important questions is to come back after several years, visit the communities, look for evidence of change, and ask the people.



Before making the decision to commission a retrospective impact evaluation, SC first conducted a series of evaluability assessments/RIE scoping exercises to determine which of their early Sponsorship efforts would be best positioned for an RIE.

A copy of Save the Children’s Retrospective Impact Evaluation Scoping Guide is available online at <https://resourcecentre.savethechildren.net/library/retrospective-impact-evaluation-scoping-guide>

WHAT WERE THE KEY EVALUATION QUESTIONS?

Six high-level Key Evaluation Questions (KEQs) were used to guide this Retrospective Impact Evaluation (RIE), covering the following categories:

1. Core programming implemented and current status
2. Outcomes and impacts influenced by SC
3. Side impacts and ripple effects
4. Value for Investment (Vfi)
5. Sustainability
6. Ownership transition and exit

These KEQs were developed after consultations with key leaders and experts in Save the Children’s USA (CT and DC) offices and the Ethiopia Country Office, as well as a selection of local Woliso community and school leaders, administrators, health workers, and others.

The Key Evaluation Questions were as follows:

KEQ 1. Core programming implemented & current status

What SC Sponsorship-funded core programming was implemented in the Woliso impact area from 2002-2010, how relevant was it to the needs of children and their families, how well has it lasted, and how well is it functioning now?

KEQ 2. Outcomes and impacts influenced by SC

How valuable were the outcomes and impacts¹ of these efforts, especially for children and their families, but also for communities, government agencies and their officials? How well have those impacts been sustained or grown over time? Where and for whom did the most powerful and long-lasting impacts occur, and why?

KEQ 3. Side impacts and ripple effects

What other actions, reactions, or changes have been inspired or catalyzed by the SC-funded work in the Woliso impact area – locally, regionally, and/or nationally – and how important were they, particularly in ways that impacted the lives of children and their families?

KEQ 4. Value for Investment (Vfi)

Overall, how valuable have the Woliso area impacts been (to children, their families, communities, government agencies and their officials, the region, and beyond) relative to what was invested to obtain them?

KEQ 5. Sustainability

What made the greatest difference in ensuring sustainability of the core programming outcomes and their long-term impacts after close-out? What were the gaps or challenges that limited sustainability?

KEQ 6. Ownership transition and exit

Looking back, how well did SC's ownership transition processes work to empower communities to better support children after the conclusion of SC's work in the Woliso impact area? What factors made a difference for achieving a smooth and supportive transition?



Figure 6. Lead evaluators Drs. Thomaz Chianca (left) and Jane Davidson (right) with MEAL expert and SC's Head of Sponsorship in Ethiopia, Alene Yenew, and former lead of SC's Water and Sanitation work in the Woliso Impact Area Mekonnen Soboksa.

METHODOLOGY

The following are some of the main highlights of and rationale for the approach used, the main sources of data, and the strategies for analyzing the evidence and reaching evaluative conclusions. Further details about important aspects of the methodology are included in several of the Appendices of this report.

WHAT IS A RETROSPECTIVE IMPACT EVALUATION?

The term “impact evaluation” is used across different sectors and organizations with slightly different definitions (see Rogers and Peersman quote¹), so it is important to clarify how we are using the term here.

First, we take the broadest definition of impact evaluation as *an evaluation that evaluates impact*. We do not narrowly limit this to any specific methodology (such as RCTs). However, good impact evaluation must include causal inference.

What are “impacts”? Essentially, they are synonymous with “outcomes,” which are changes that happen to (or are prevented from happening to) people, communities, organizations, and the environment and that are caused, influenced, or catalyzed by whatever is being evaluated.

In the international development sector, “outcomes” typically refer to short- to medium-term effects, while “impacts” refer to longer-term effects. In Save the Children, “outcomes” refer to the effects that occur within the timeframe of the program, while “impacts” refer to changes that are evident after Save the Children has transitioned out of the area.

A “retrospective” impact evaluation, also known as an “ex post” impact evaluation, is one that is conducted entirely *after* the program or intervention is completed.

Save the Children’s definition is as follows: “A retrospective impact evaluation (RIE) is an ex post evaluation of an evaluand to assess its value, worth, and merit, with a special focus on examining the sustainability of intended results as well as unintended impacts.”²

“The broadest view of impact evaluation is any evaluation which evaluates impact – even if it is not labelled as an impact evaluation, and has elements of other types of evaluation as well, such as needs assessment, and process evaluation. ... A slightly narrower definition is anything which is primarily focused on evaluating impact and which is labelled as an impact evaluation. Even narrower is to only include evaluations which have used counterfactual approaches to causal attribution, or only randomised controlled trials (RCTs).”

– [Rogers & Peersman \(2015\), BetterEvaluation.org](https://www.betterevaluation.org)

¹ Rogers, P. J., & Peersman, G. (2015). Impact evaluation: Challenges to address. BetterEvaluation. https://www.betterevaluation.org/en/blog/impact_evaluation_1

² Source: <https://resourcecentre.savethechildren.net/library/retrospective-impact-evaluation-scoping-guide>

WHAT WAS THE EVALUATION APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY – AND WHY?

This evaluation uses a **Rubrics-Enhanced Evaluation** approach (Davidson, 2005, 2012, 2020)³. This means that it is guided by a set of *explicitly evaluative* Key Evaluation Questions (KEQs) which are answered in an explicitly evaluative way using rubrics methodology to guide evaluative reasoning. “Explicitly evaluative” means that the KEQs ask about – and the answers deliver – not just insights into *what* happened but *how good, valuable, and important* those things were. This is what evaluation (in contrast with non-evaluative research, for example) is fundamentally about.

Why this approach? Asking and answering *evaluative* questions is what makes evaluation useful and actionable because it delivers succinct answers to the questions that are of the greatest relevance to those who will use the evaluation – in this case, to (a) inform decisions about Sponsorship programming and (b) convey to donors what value their donations are likely to produce for children and their families.

Evaluation rubrics methodology guides and makes explicit the evaluative reasoning⁴ by which evidence is synthesized and interpreted to deliver explicitly evaluative answers to the KEQs. Not only does this enhance the transparency, validity, and credibility of the conclusions; it also helps build evaluative thinking capacity in those who engage with the evaluation.

The evaluation approach and methodology also infuses several other elements, which we used together to deliver the most valid and useful insights possible within the constraints we faced. The following is a brief outline of the main elements of note:

1. To help maximize the relevance, usefulness, and focus of the evaluation, a succinct set of six high-level *explicitly evaluative* **Key Evaluation Questions (KEQs)** was used to guide the RIE (see p. 4 for the complete list).
 - a. These KEQs covered the most important information needs of the primary intended users of the evaluation (Ethiopian Country Office leaders and staff, as well as US-based and key global SC leaders), while also reflecting the values and interests of the Woliso impact area community.
 - b. “Explicitly evaluative” means that the KEQs asked not just *what* the results were, but *how good, valuable, and/or important* they were.
 - c. Balancing the competing priorities of evaluation depth and coverage, *the emphasis was on providing approximate but robust answers to the key evaluation questions* using the best available evidence rather than the high level of precision that might be possible if the scope were narrower (e.g., focused on narrower evaluation questions and a small set of easily measurable variables).
2. **To assess impact in the absence of robust baseline data**, we used the following strategies:
 - a. We drew on records and key informant accounts to *reconstruct baselines* (i.e., to ascertain what the situation was like before Save the Children came into the area) and then to determine the approximate magnitude of any changes. Drawing on the available

³ Davidson, E. J. (2005). [Evaluation methodology basics: The nuts and bolts of sound evaluation](#). Sage.

Davidson, E. J. (2012) [Actionable evaluation basics \[minibook; available in Spanish, French, Japanese ebooks\]](#).

Davidson, E. J. (2020). *Rubrics-enhanced evaluation*. [Book manuscript in preparation; [online learning minicourse](#).]

⁴ Davidson, E. J. (2014). [Evaluative reasoning](#). *Methodological Briefs: Impact Evaluation 4*. Florence, Italy: UNICEF Office of Research.

evidence for each important outcome/impact area, we used evaluation rubrics to rate the situation in each community at baseline, at the time SC exited, and currently (see Appendix 1: Evaluation Rubrics, p. 78).

- b. For causal inference (i.e., to ascertain whether SC was a substantial contributor or catalyst for the documented changes, so that they could therefore validly be listed as outcomes and impacts), we used *a mix of causal inference strategies* drawn from BetterEvaluation’s extensive list (see Appendix 2: Causal inference , p. 93).
 - c. *Given the particular data challenges for this RIE, the most feasible and practical causal inference strategies were as follows* (note: all or most of these were used for each major outcome/impact area):
 - i. Ascertaining whether other NGO or government support was (or was likely to have been) forthcoming over the time period in question.
 - ii. Ascertaining whether any of the changes made could have been initiated by communities themselves at the time (i.e., did they have the knowledge and resources, as well as the community organizing capacity to make it happen).
 - iii. Documenting directly observed instances of causation and the explanations that support them (e.g., construction of schools increasing education access, based on accounts from education leaders and parents about students who had not previously been attending school but then enrolled at the SC-constructed school – including parents’ reasons for now allowing them to attend).
 - iv. Searching for and documenting alternative or additional explanations for any observed changes, including the contributions of other factors, organizations, groups, or individuals (e.g., Health Extension Workers continuing to work with communities to install latrines after SC had helped with the first few).
 - v. Checking the timing of outcomes and impacts to see whether they could plausibly have been influenced by SC’s work and/or other factors.
 - vi. Using key informant interviews to construct a current counterfactual (e.g., asking individuals what they would be doing now if they hadn’t participated in SC programming; asking what other peers and siblings are currently doing, if they did not participate).
 - vii. Triangulating key informant accounts with expert-estimated counterfactuals (e.g., asking educators, leaders, and social and educational change experts what a typical life/career/income situation would be for young people growing up in the impact area).
 - viii. Searching for disconfirming evidence and following up on exceptions (e.g., individuals or communities where the results were different or much smaller or larger, to find out why).
3. A high priority was to ensure that the evaluation was **culturally and contextually responsive** and authentically told the stories of people and the communities without imposing inappropriate cultural frames or assumptions or missing crucial nuances. In addition to soliciting advice from our Ethiopian evaluation partners and key stakeholders in SC’s Ethiopian country office and in the Woliso impact area, the evaluation plan for this RIE went through a human subject ethics review and was approved by SC’s internal Ethics Review Committee as well as by the Oromia Region Education Bureau in Ethiopia.

In an ideal world (with a much more substantial budget and longer timeline), the preferred approach would have been a very high-involvement community-driven collaborative/empowerment evaluation approach. However, resource and timeline constraints made this option unfeasible. Instead, we used the following culturally responsive evaluation (CRE) approaches to try to ensure the evaluation was authentic and responsive to local worldviews:

CRE Approach	Description
a. Start by gaining as strong as possible an understanding of community lived reality, values, hopes, & aspirations	Before key evaluation questions were formulated, the evaluation designed, or data collection instruments drafted, the lead evaluators first visited the impact area to meet with key local stakeholders. This included a visit to the village where the first SC school was constructed, accompanied by someone deeply connected with this community, to get as clear a sense as possible of the lived reality, values, hopes, and aspirations.
b. Collaborate with a senior, experienced local evaluator with the needed cultural and contextual expertise	At this time, we also identified a senior Ethiopia-based evaluation partner with a strong reputation and significant expertise and experience in this kind of work. HANZ Consulting, led by Mr. Zelalem Adugna Geletu, collaborated with us on the development of the evaluation plan and the evidence capture approach and protocols.
c. Work with a gender balanced data collection team with strong cultural and contextual expertise, plus skills to interpret nuanced evidence	Interview, data collection, and evidence synthesis tools and protocols were developed in Ethiopia, in collaboration with Zelalem and a carefully selected team of four local researchers, two men and two women, all junior academics strong in qualitative methods (not just enumerators), all local to the Oromia region and fluent in Afaan Oromo (specifically, the local Woliso dialect), three of whom had grown up in small villages similar to the ones SC supported.
d. Field test instruments and refine before finalizing	All seven of us (plus local guides) then traveled to the field to complete several days of data collection, during which time the instruments and protocols were field tested, critically evaluated, and refined in the field based on feedback from our extended team.
e. Ensure women's voices and perspectives are heard and reflected in the evaluation	Our experience was that men tended to step forward and speak for the community, so it was important for our team to be quite insistent about asking to speak with women. Where possible, the women on our team interviewed the women.
f. Ensure the perspectives and experiences of those who have experienced marginalization were heard and reflected	We deliberately included in our sample communities with the highest proportions of religious and ethnic minority groups, as well as several villages in geographically challenging locations, e.g., several that were particularly remote from towns and one with a hotter climate. In case we were not being given good access to marginalized groups for direct interviews, we also spoke with Health Extension Workers and others who worked closely with communities and could tell us about the lived reality of those experiencing significant challenges.

CRE Approach	Description
g. Sensemaking and cross-checking	After preliminary analyses, a selection of draft findings was shared with stakeholders in Woliso/Goro, as well as in Save the Children’s Ethiopia country office, to seek their feedback about how accurately and authentically the findings reflected the realities of the context and the relevant values.

- Value for Investment (VFI) is an approach that uses evaluative reasoning and mixed methods to answer evaluative questions about the merit, worth and significance of resource use (King, 2017)⁵. The VFI approach accommodates economic methods of evaluation (such as cost-benefit analysis [CBA]) without limiting the evaluation to economic methods and metrics alone (King, 2019)⁶. For this evaluation, given its time, budget and data constraints, we decided to adopt the simplest and yet powerful strategy, closely aligned to CBA. The main objective was to provide SC and other primary intended users for this evaluation a reasonable idea on whether estimated financial benefits from a few selected outcomes could partially or fully offset the investment made by SC throughout their eight years of work in the Woliso impact area in collaboration with local communities and government.

Without being able to draw on any reliable longitudinal data on key outcomes (e.g., education, health, income, etc) for the specific geographic area SC intervened, we identified three outcomes for which we could collect primary data on current and future financial benefits for individuals and society. They were: (i) current and future earnings from school facilitators trained and supported by SC; (ii) additional years of schooling for children that attended schools built by SC; and (iii) stream of potential societal benefits from people’s access to clean water and sanitation facilities.

Primary data came from interviews with 19 former educational facilitators trained by SC and 45 young adults who attended SC’s supported schools and/or their parents. Information on water schemes came from a spreadsheet provided by SC, and interviews with key informants at the Woreda government offices and at the 12 kebeles visited by our evaluation team. Due to the time lapse since SC exited from Woliso and a few problems with data keeping, information about SC’s actual expenditures in Woliso were not available. Therefore, we had to base our estimates on information from budget proposals. More details are presented later on section “How were “quality,” “value,” and “importance” defined?” (p. 15).

Dr. Julian King, who has pioneered, written numerous papers on, and has vast experience with Value for Investment methodology, was our main consultant for this specific study. Information about the VFI study is presented (in increasing levels of detail) in the Methodology (p. 15) and in Appendix 4 (p. 97).

⁵ King, J. (2017). [Using Economic Methods Evaluatively](#). *American Journal of Evaluation*, 38(1), 101–113.

⁶ King, J. (2019). *Evaluation and Value for Money: Development of an approach using explicit evaluative reasoning*. ([Doctoral dissertation](#)). Melbourne, Australia: University of Melbourne.

WHAT SECONDARY DATASETS WERE EXPLORED?

Having access to quantitative data from relevant, trustworthy quantitative outcome/impact datasets could, certainly, have helped strengthen the evaluation. For that reason, we systematically searched for and assessed possible sources of quantitative data that could have provided historical information on key outcomes connected to the work by Save the Children in the Woliso impact area. SC did not gather such data as part of its monitoring at the time, so we turned to other sources of secondary data. However, after a thorough and time-consuming search, all datasets turned out not to be of any use.

By far the most promising dataset for health outcomes was the USAID-funded Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), which surveyed households across Ethiopia in 2000, 2005, 2011, and 2016. We were able to obtain these datasets and also the geodata files showing approximately where the clusters were located. Unfortunately, due to geomasking to protect the identity of respondents (GPS coordinates were typically randomly shifted up to 5km in any direction for rural kebeles), we could not be sure of the exact survey locations. There were only three clusters that *could* have come from SC-supported kebeles within Woliso woreda (see clusters # 191, 286, and 528 with 5km radii in Figure 7), but essentially there were none from Goro.




Figure 7. GIS map of the only DHS clusters that could have come from one of the SC-supported kebeles in Woliso woreda⁷

The northeastern Woliso kebeles that *might* have been part of clusters #191 and #286 were not supported until about 2007, which means that the only possible post-support outcomes would have come from cluster #528, a 2011 survey that was likely (but not certain) to have been conducted in one of three SC-supported kebeles. Unfortunately, even if we knew where the surveys were conducted, the sample size was too small to be of any use (10 children in cluster #528).

The other secondary datasets explored and found not useful to the evaluation were: (i) Save the Children's datasets on global education indicators (GEI); (ii) the Young Lives Study; (iii) the World Inequality Database on Education (WIDE); (iv) WHO's summary of health outcomes for Ethiopia (2002-2015); (v) the Humanitarian Data Exchange (HDX); (vi) the Ethiopian Central Statistical Agency's population projects and other datasets; and (vii) EMIS (Ethiopia's Education Management Information

⁷ Note: the kebele spellings pulled from GIS sources to create this map were not accurate.

System), from which we attempted to obtain information such as school enrollments, attendance, and achievement. Unfortunately, despite investing considerable time trying to obtain these, in the end they were not forthcoming.

WHAT SOURCES OF EVIDENCE WERE USED?

In the absence of useful secondary outcome data, our main sources of evidence were as follows:

- Save the Children records
- Direct observation & photos
- Key Informant Interviews
- Information from Woreda & Kebele offices
- Information from Health Centers & Health Posts

Interviews with key informants in the impact area revealed that people had reasonably good memories of the changes that had happened in their communities and in children's lives. Those who were children at the time are now young adults and were able to share their experiences with us. In other words, despite the lack of a usable secondary dataset to analyze for outcomes, there was still plenty of worthwhile evidence to be gathered, certainly sufficient to deliver credible answers to the evaluation questions.

A list of impactees and stakeholders interviewed and documents/records reviewed may be found in Appendix 3: Interviewees and documents/files reviewed (p. 95).



Figure 8. Young men, including current and former students of SC-built schools, splitting logs for firewood (Warabu Bariho kebele)

- **Geography/climate:** Most parts of Woliso and Goro enjoy relatively cool/pleasant temperatures. One exception was Bukasa Keta kebele, which was included in the sample because it is a little hotter. Also, the dominant religion in Bukasa Keta is Muslim (cf. the dominant religion in the rest of the area, which is Ethiopian Orthodox Christian).
- **Distance and direction from the main town (Woliso):** Sampled kebeles ranged from 5km to 22 km from Woliso Town, and in various directions.
- **Distinctive demographics:** Many of the kebeles SC worked in are largely similar in many respects. We deliberately included a number of kebeles with distinctive demographic compositions (e.g., particularly low socio-economic status, greater ethnic or religious diversity).
- **Dose/intensity of Save the Children support:** Although SC built new schools and trained teachers in most of the supported kebeles, there were some where SC added classrooms and renovated buildings in an existing school and did not train any additional teachers. We included one such kebele, to help gain insights into how the impacts differed for kebeles such as these.

Due to delays in the process of obtaining ethics approval from SC and the Oromia Regional Education Authority, the main data collection effort was conducted in the Ethiopian rainy season (August-September 2019). Because of this, a small number of supported kebeles were not considered as part of the sample due to accessibility issues (flooding and/or road access).



WHAT ABOUT COMMUNITIES THAT DID NOT RECEIVE SUPPORT FROM SAVE THE CHILDREN?

From a methodological standpoint, it would have been helpful to also visit a number of communities within the impact area that had not received SC support. This would have allowed useful comparisons to be made and would have helped with causal inference by generating a kebele-level counterfactual.

This option was discussed with SC Ethiopia Country Office leadership and a decision was made not to visit those communities. Visiting communities that had not received SC support was highly likely to create an expectation that SC was finally coming to help them and that resources and support would be forthcoming. That would have been highly problematic for SC and potentially distressing for these communities to have their hopes raised and then dashed.

For these reasons, data collection from comparison kebeles was not included in the evaluation design.

HOW WERE “QUALITY,” “VALUE,” AND “IMPORTANCE” DEFINED?

Determining “quality”, “value” and “importance” is at the heart of any sound evaluation process. Throughout this RIE, we have systematically assessed how good, worthwhile and/or significant were SC’s efforts in the Woliso impact area. **Evaluative reasoning and rubrics methodology** were the main strategies we used to tackle the issues of “quality” and “importance.”

Throughout the report, mixed method evidence has been synthesized and interpreted using evaluation rubrics, which allow us to provide succinct evaluative conclusions. These rubrics were developed based on a range of documentation and research, incorporating the lived experiences and realities of community members as well as the observations and expertise of those who worked closely with them. The rubrics were developed collaboratively by Real Evaluation and our Ethiopia-based evaluation team (most of whom had grown up in similar kebeles in the general area) and were further refined after testing in the field. The detailed rubrics used in this evaluation may be found in Appendix 1 (p. 78).

“Value” was mostly addressed in the answer to KEQ 4. A **Value for Investment (Vfi) analysis** was conducted to answer the question of how financially valuable some of the outcomes produced by SC interventions in the Woliso impact area were relative to the investments made to produce them.

The first step for the Vfi was to identify and, for most cases, **estimate the total investment made by SC** in the main projects they implemented in education, health and nutrition, water and sanitation, and early childhood care and development. Given the time that had passed since the investments were made and some issues with record keeping, accurate information about SC’s expenditures in Woliso was not available. Therefore, we had to rely on our second-best option: information from budget proposals for each year. For this, we had the inestimable support from Karen Fox (at SCUS office in Connecticut) to carefully dig into past databases to find the best available information to support our estimations. Even then, the information available did not have enough detail about the projects for some of the years. We had to adopt several strategies to estimate the missing data based on partial data or data from other years. All costs have been converted to 2019 US dollars, taking proper measures to adjust for inflation and exchange rates.

Given the wide range of initiatives and efforts that formed part of Sponsorship programming, a complete analysis would have been prohibitively expensive and of questionable utility given the sheer volume of information. To make the best use of the evaluation resource, we focused the Vfi analyses by identifying the **three most substantial outcomes/impacts from SC’s work that would lend themselves to reasonably robust estimations of financial returns to individuals and to society.**

The first outcome/impact included the 130 young high-school graduates that were trained to become **education facilitators** for the rural schools that had been newly built by SC. The government did not have teachers available to staff the new rural schools. SC agreed with the government to train and pay the facilitators’ salaries for the initial years until they obtained (with SC support) their teacher’s degrees. Then the government would hire those teachers as permanent employees.

In this Vfi study, we have estimated the cost for training the facilitators (including obtaining their degrees as teachers) and we looked at the difference in current and future (lifetime) incomes since they became civil servants. Information on past and present income came from face to face in-depth interviews with 19 former facilitators in the kebeles sampled for this evaluation. All future income was estimated applying a discount rate of 2%.

The second outcome/impact was related to the **additional years of schooling** obtained by the children and adolescents that attended the schools built by SC. The investment made by SC to build and maintain the schools was estimated. From 45 face to face in-depth interviews with former students or their parents, we gathered information about their current educational status and asked what would probably be their (or their children's) educational status had SC not built the school in their kebele. Based on this information, we estimated the probable additional years of schooling gained through access to SC schools.

To estimate the potential lifetime additional income for the children and adolescents who spent more years at school, we drew on previous research to find the most appropriate percentage multiplier to apply to the income they would otherwise have received. The figures, calculations, and assumptions used are briefly summarized in the Findings section (p. 23), with more details about the calculations in Appendix 4. Value for Investment (p. 97).

The third outcome was the return on investment for **water and sanitation**. Since we did not have primary or secondary data available for Woliso on the possible financial benefits from access to clean water and sanitation facilities, we instead used an approximation from the strongest available piece of previous research. A major WHO study assessed the return on investment in water and sanitation for sub-Saharan African countries.⁸ After estimating the amount invested by SC in those projects, we applied the 2.7:1 benefit-cost ratio suggested by the WHO study, after discounting for the water systems that were no longer functional in the supported kebeles.

Detailed information about this Vfl study's rationale, methodology, and results can be found in Appendix 4 (p. 97).

LIMITATIONS AND SCOPE BOUNDARIES

As with any evaluation, constraints in data availability, budget and timeline inevitably limit what can be produced. The following are some of the challenges, limitations, and scope boundaries for this RIE.

The first and most obvious challenge is that **significant time had passed** since Save the Children completed its work in Woliso and Goro. This means that we were relying heavily on memories that had faded over time, as well as records that were many years old and harder to find. Some information was unfortunately lost due to a hard drive crash in the Country Office. In addition, this was the very first impact area for the Sponsorship program in Ethiopia. Record keeping at that time was still somewhat patchy and was focused primarily on deliverables rather than outcomes and impacts.

The ideal situation for any impact evaluation (as well as for ongoing evaluative monitoring and adaptive management) is that **baseline data** are gathered on the key outcomes of interest *before* the intervention is implemented and then tracked *during and after* the intervention timeframe. This tracking should ideally be done not only for those who received support, but also for comparable individuals and/or communities that did not.

⁸ WHO (2012). *Global costs and benefits of drinking-water supply and sanitation interventions to reach the MDG target and universal coverage*. Geneva, Switzerland, WHO.

In the absence of a purpose-designed dataset that includes outcomes relevant to the specific supports provided, we turned to two alternative sources of evidence: datasets designed for other purposes and additional primary data collected from the field, primarily from interviews and observation.

The USAID-supported DHS datasets were our strongest potential source of secondary outcome and impact data. Unfortunately, two issues prevent us from using these data: (1) very small sample sizes and (2) geomasking (randomly displacing the GPS coordinates by ~5km), which made it impossible to tell whether the results related to a kebele where SC had provided support or a neighboring kebele that received no such support. Full details about this are provided elsewhere in this report (p. 11).

With quantitative evidence availability being thin, a substantial portion of the outcome evidence was gathered via primary data collection (interviews and observation) in the field. Ideally, such data collection would also cover several **comparable kebeles where Save the Children did not provide support**, to use in the construction of counterfactuals for causal inference. We discussed with the Ethiopia Country Office the pros and cons of undertaking fieldwork in non-SC-supported kebeles. The consensus was that entering into these kebeles would create an expectation that SC was finally coming to provide the support they had missed out in 2002-2010. Country Office leadership considered this to be an unwise risk. It was therefore decided that we would not be doing any primary data collection in comparison kebeles. Instead, we used reconstructed baselines and expert-estimated counterfactuals as part of this evaluation, especially in some of the Value for Investment studies: (i) education facilitators' Income Streams and (ii) Returns to investment in education, with the accompanying limitations mentioned above.

Another possible limitation for this evaluation was the need to make extensive use of **interviews**, which are often susceptible to **general positive and/or social desirability bias**. This occurs when interviewees provide the answers they believe are desired by the interviewers (or by SC) and/or that would be viewed favorably by others. If not carefully managed, this can result in over-reporting what was "good" and/or under-reporting the "bad" or undesirable results. To reduce the risk of these biases, we designed our interview questions to ask for specific evidence of positive and negative effects (not just opinions); to deliberately probe for aspects that could have been better; and to make use of appreciative inquiry techniques, which help frame areas for improvement as opportunities rather than negatives. We also hired Ethiopian professionals to conduct most of the interviews. We made sure the researchers had proper training (master's degrees in sociology and/or anthropology, plus training with the lead evaluators before heading into the field and for the first several days of data collection); understood the local context, culture, and language (Afaan Oromo, including non-verbal cues); as well as ensuring that the team had a gender balance (two women and two men).

There are many approaches that might have been employed for the **Value for Investment study**. Based on the discussions we had with the primary intended users for this evaluation, we decided that studies closely aligned to cost-benefit analysis would be more credible and powerful to the audience. This choice was also based on limitations in the timeframe and data available.

In closing, it is important to note that this RIE seeks to answer a number of broad, high-level key evaluation questions within a **compressed time frame** of less than 12 months and with **budgetary constraints and data challenges**. Although we had hoped to make significant use of existing quantitative outcome and impact data, SC Sponsorship unfortunately did not gather such evidence at the time. This

left secondary datasets as the only affordable alternative, but unfortunately none of the many datasets we considered were usable for this evaluation (see What secondary datasets were explored? p. 11).

By way of comparison, the only other large RIE conducted on child sponsorship has been the 2013 Wydick et al. evaluation of Compassion International’s Child Sponsorship programming. Because Compassion International’s model invests directly in sponsored children (rather than more broadly in building community capacity, as SC does), this allowed sponsored and non-sponsored children to be compared – an option that was not available or relevant for this SC RIE. Because they were not dealing with these broader, more diffuse outcomes, the Wydick et al. study focused only on a relatively narrow set of research questions of a yes/no hypothesis testing nature, covering a limited number of individual-level outcomes (years of formal schooling; completion of primary, secondary, and tertiary education; employment, white collar employment; community and church leadership). The Wydick study used an almost exclusively quantitative approach from household survey data gathered from over 10,000 households in 19 villages over the course of two years (plus analysis and write-up time).

In contrast, the scope for this RIE of SC’s sponsorship-funded work in Woliso and Goro was significantly broader than the Wydick study, asked more nuanced and challenging evaluation questions (such as Value for Investment), had access to much less evidence, and was completed in a substantially shorter time frame (12 months).

To ensure the findings are as robust as possible within the constraints, we have combined qualitative and quantitative evidence to do a mixed method evaluation. The emphasis was on providing **approximate but robust answers** to the key evaluation questions rather than the high level of precision that might be possible if the scope were narrower (e.g., focused only on a small set of very specific variables) or the data all quantitative.



Figure 10. An interview with the principal of Maru Sombo school, who was showing us a classroom with furniture still in a relatively good condition (Sombo Yabeta kebele)

FINDINGS

The following sections present a summary of the evidence, reasoning, and answers to the six Key Evaluation Questions (KEQs) stated in the Introduction. Although we usually structure our findings using the KEQs as the main sub-headings, stakeholder feedback highlighted that an easier-to-follow and more useful evaluative story could be woven if we structured this section by programmatic area.

We have organized this section under five headings: 1. Basic Education (BE) & Early Childhood Care and Development (ECCD), 2. School Health & Nutrition (SHN), 3. Adolescent Development (AD), 4. Ripple Effects, and 5. Ownership Transition & Exit.

We come back to the KEQs later and use them as the framework to synthesize our findings in the Conclusions section (p. 62). The KEQs also serve as the basis for structuring the Executive Summary (p. i).

EDUCATION (BE & ECCD)

Although Save the Children (SC) separates out Basic Education (BE) and Early Childhood Care and Development (ECCD) as two different programming areas, we have combined these here because in the Woliso Impact Area, much of the investment was closely intertwined (e.g., young people trained as educational facilitators to teach classes in SC-built schools were also offered the opportunity to complete ECCD training), as were many of the outcomes (e.g., many of the same children benefited from ECCD and BE combined rather than one or the other).



Schools as the entry point. Consistent with SC’s primary focus on children, Sponsorship’s primary entry point into each impact area is typically schools. Initial efforts focus on identifying children to be sponsored by donors, which then helps with the money-raising efforts that fund community development.

‘Sponsored’ children in Woliso. For this very first impact area in Ethiopia back in 2002, the current SC system for identifying large numbers of sponsored children and matching them with donors was not in place. Instead, *just two children* were selected to be the faces and personal stories of the Woliso impact area, and donor money was raised to support their community as a whole. From a methodological standpoint, this ruled out the possibility of looking for any differences between sponsored and non-sponsored children.

Education needs in the impact area. A situational analysis involving the SC Sponsorship team and community representatives identified access to schools within a reasonable and safe distance as one of the most relevant challenges for their communities. Parents were reluctant to send their young children, especially girls and children with disabilities, long distances to school for fear of traffic accidents, rape and other assaults, abductions, and harassment. For example, children in Sombo Yabeta kebele typically had to walk about 6km to school, including crossing a busy road. We heard stories of children who had been killed while trying to cross roads to get to school.

The lack of nearby schools was seriously affecting equitable access to education. The vast majority of parents we spoke with in these communities said that, due to the dangers, they were previously not allowing their boys to attend school until they were about 10 years old, while girls were often held back until age 13. Not surprisingly, many children felt awkward starting a lower grade at an older age, so it was difficult to keep them in school once they started.

now in the Woliso woreda, SC constructed 14 (29%); of the 24 schools now in the Goro woreda, SC constructed 6 (25%).

Additional classrooms for existing schools. Woreda officials also confirmed that SC constructed additional classrooms for one school in a Goro woreda town (Gurura). SC records list that additional classrooms were also constructed for existing government schools in 7 other kebeles or towns in the Woliso woreda (Darare Ebicha, Dilela Town, Doyo Kora, Karo Simala, Kile, Leman Ayetu, and Sodo Garbo); however, this information was not confirmed by woreda officials, so is not included in Figure 11. Note that 4 of these 7 locations also got new schools; therefore, 3 of the locations (if SC records are accurate) got additional classrooms only, added to existing government schools.



Figure 12. Maru Sombo, the first school built in the impact area in 2003, used local construction materials (Sombo Yabeta kebele; photo taken in January 2019)

Would the government or another NGO have built some or all of these schools if Save the Children had not? This is a difficult question to answer with any level of certainty. However, our interviews and observations suggest that government funds for school construction were (in 2002-2010) and continue to be very thin relative to kebele populations and needs. Rural kebeles in particular struggle to get government support for *any* kind of infrastructure (water supplies, roading, schools, electricity). There was no other significant education-related NGO activity in the area at the time SC was there. Based on the available evidence, our view is that the vast majority of schools built by SC would not have been built by anyone else; at best, a small number *might* have been built years later, but likely only after SC's exit from the area.

It is important to recognize, however, the fact that communities have managed to save money together and engage in collective efforts to build additional classrooms for most of the SC-built schools. Based on

the sample of 9 community-based schools visited by the evaluation team, we have estimated that SC built, approximately, 63% of the existing classrooms. See more details on Appendix 4 (p. 97).

From a causal inference standpoint, this means that any educational, career, and/or income outcomes (changes relative to a plausible, evidenced counterfactual – i.e., what these students’ situation would likely have been had the school not been constructed and staffed) may reasonably be attributed to SC’s investment as the primary (although not the only) cause.

With respect to school construction, the most important outcome for children was “equitable access to education in well-constructed, well-maintained schools.” Note that this outcome also encapsulates the part of KEQ 1 that asks about the current state of core programming implemented – in this case, the current state of the buildings constructed (technically, an output rather than an outcome).

Equitable access to education was the strongest and most striking outcome of SC’s school construction investment. On average, **students who attended SC-constructed schools completed an average of 4.5 more years of schooling** than they likely would have if a school had not been constructed by SC.

Further detail is provided in Figure 13, which shows that the most dramatic difference (data points highest above the counterfactual line) was for children who were unlikely to have received any formal education (about 17% of our sample). These young people ended up with an average of 12 years of formal education instead of none.




Figure 13. Education completed by boys and girls who attended SC-constructed schools, cf. the likely levels completed had the school not been built (counterfactuals estimated by parents and young people/former students; N = 45, 18 girls, 27 boys)

A substantial number of young people would have completed little more than “first cycle” of elementary school (i.e., 4th grade). These young people completed an average of 6 years more than what they probably would have completed otherwise. Impacts were more modest for students who said they would have received a reasonably high level of education (e.g., high school or more).

Several of these young people were still engaged in education at the time we spoke with them (or their parents), so “years of schooling completed so far” will underestimate education eventually completed.

The other pattern in the data is that **the impact on educational access was particularly marked for girls.** We spoke with 18 young women/ former students of SC schools and/or their parents. Without the SC-constructed school, 10 (56%, cf. 40% of boys) would have completed 4th grade or less (for four, no schooling at all) and the most common response to the “What would you be doing now?” question was full-time parent. With the new SC schools providing access to education, 14 (78%) of the girls had completed at least some high school, with half of those (7) going on to higher education at a TVET (technical and vocational education and training institute) or university.

An additional factor that appears to have positively influenced school attendance for girls was the availability of separate latrines for girls in the SC schools. This was mentioned in several interviews with former students, parents, teachers, and principals. Feedback from SC staff suggested that as many as one-third of girls would drop out of school once their period started and more than 30 days of school are likely to be missed by girls due to having no segregated toilets at school. Although we were not able to confirm these figures with our own evidence or previous research, they are broadly consistent with the accounts we heard during interviews.

What was the Value for Investment of those 4.5 additional years of schooling? The children and young people who have gained these additional years of schooling at SC-constructed schools are still quite young and few have completed their studies and started working. So, it was too early to directly ascertain any effect on lifetime earnings.



Instead, we turned to the strongest and most closely relevant previous research available to estimate the average private marginal returns to each additional year of schooling in rural Ethiopia (14.43%; Desalegn, 2018). For a student who receives 4.5 additional years of schooling and who would otherwise have had a low income such as subsistence farming (a conservative figure to use for the calculation), **this translates into an average increase over the average working lifetime of US\$9,840 per student.** For the Vfl analysis, all monetary figures have been converted to 2019 US dollars.

Our best estimates were that, **across the 20 SC-constructed schools in very poor rural areas, nearly 14,000 students would have benefited** from those increased years of schooling – naturally, some having gained more and some less. Collectively, they would have gained approximately **US\$137.5 million** in [discounted] future additional lifetime earnings.

SC’s investment in school building construction plus teacher training, educational materials and equipment (covered later in this section) was about **US\$11.3 million**. We can therefore conclude that **for every dollar invested by SC in education, the estimated return will be at least 12 dollars in lifetime financial benefits** to the (now) young women and men who attended the schools built by SC. [We say

“at least” to indicate that these estimates are based on the most conservative figures at each step of the calculations.]

Further details about the calculations made here, and the reasoning and assumptions behind them, may be found in Appendix 4. Value for Investment (p. 97).

What other important outcomes and impacts resulted from SC school construction, and how well have they (and the buildings themselves) lasted? SC’s investment in school construction (along with the supply of furniture, teaching resources, teacher training, and other support) was intended to provide children with access to education *in an environment conducive for learning* (well-constructed, well-maintained schools). For this outcome, we combined what we learned about educational access with an assessment of the state of the buildings and classrooms (based on site visits, photographs, and interviews with principal/teachers and PTA).

In the 12 kebeles we sampled, the vast majority faced a “dire” situation on this outcome prior to SC’s arrival, with the nearest school being too far away for young children to safely attend (see Figure 14). At the time SC exited the area, all 12 were in a “good” or “excellent” situation on this outcome. In 2019, that outcome had been sustained by 2/3 of those communities, while the other 1/3 had experienced slip-backs due to deteriorating school buildings.



Figure 14. Equitable access to education in well-constructed, well-maintained schools: before SC constructed schools (initial), when they transitioned out of the communities (at SC exit), and in 2019 (current)

Rubric-based ratings were based on a range of evidence: direct observation, photographic evidence, and interviews with parents, teachers, principals, the PTA, and Save the Children staff who oversaw the work. This evidence was **synthesized by our field team using a situation analysis rubric** that they helped

construct, field test, and refine while working alongside the lead evaluators (for more detail, see the strategies we used to help ensure the evaluation was culturally and contextually responsive, p. 8).

What do the ratings mean? The full Rubric: Equitable access to education in well-constructed and well-maintained schools may be found on p. 79. For example, “Good” was defined as follows: “There are one or two schools in the kebele located at a reasonable distance from most villages but may be more than 30 minutes’ walk for a 7-year-old from some locations. Construction is reasonably durable, but needs a few minor repairs, and is barely large enough to serve the child population of the kebele (class sizes are big). The school has water and segregated latrines, making it a conducive environment for girls as well as boys. Dropout rates are low.”

Why did the situation deteriorate in 4 of the kebeles? Early school constructions in the impact area used local materials (mud and wood), based on the reasonable rationale that villagers would already have the skills to help build and maintain such buildings. Another probable reason was to lower the cost for construction and increase SC’s ability to build more schools. Unfortunately, these building materials are low on durability and susceptible to damage from termites and from expansion and contraction in wet and dry seasons (see Figure 15, below, as well as Figure 12, p. 21).



Figure 15. Termite damage to a SC-constructed school that used traditional building materials (Warabu Bariho kebele)

SC noticed this sustainability issue at the time and changed building practices. Later buildings were constructed from more durable materials (e.g., concrete block, Figure 16; see also Figure 23, p. 30) and have lasted much longer.



Figure 16. A classroom constructed from much more durable concrete blocks (Gambela Goro kebele)

2. Supply of school furniture, equipment, and learning materials

For each of the new schools and additional classrooms constructed, SC also provided desks, chairs, blackboards, and a selection of learning materials and resources (the exact details varied by school). This greatly helped a typically Dire initial situation, but things have fallen into disrepair in many schools (Figure 17).




Figure 17. Availability & quality of school furniture, equipment, & learning materials before SC arrived (initial), when they exited each kebele (at SC exit) and in 2019 (current)

Rubric-based ratings were based on a range of evidence: direct observation, photographic evidence, and interviews with parents, teachers, principals, the PTA, and Save the Children staff who oversaw the work. The evidence was **synthesized by our field team using a situation analysis rubric.**

What do the ratings mean? The full Rubric: Availability, quality and adequacy of school furniture and teaching resources may be found on p. 80. For example, “Good” was defined as follows: “There are enough or almost enough chairs, tables, books and blackboards in the school, and they are in reasonably good repair. There is usually enough chalk and a few good teaching resources to help engage the students.”

Why did school furniture, materials, and equipment fall into disrepair or become inadequate?

Schools that still had good to excellent furniture, materials, and equipment tended to be: (a) schools located in towns; (b) government schools to which SC added additional classrooms and where government has taken responsibility for maintenance; and (c) in one case, a rural school with an active PTA successful in getting the community involved in both repair and purchase of replacements.

Many communities say they have been unable to maintain all of the furniture due to a lack of wood and other materials for repairing desks and chairs. However, the first schools built by SC (and their furniture) were 16-17 years old in 2019, which in reality is beyond a reasonable lifespan for school furniture (see Figure 18).⁹



Figure 18. A rural school with 17-year-old furniture struggles to find the materials to maintain the pieces that are particularly damaged (Sombo Yabeta kebele)

The unrest of 2016 in the Oromia region brought great damage in the school. Most tables, chairs, blackboards, and teaching materials were damaged. Repairing the damaged furniture is currently beyond the school's capacity.


– Field researcher summary

Not all furniture damage has been gradual deterioration. At times, local political unrest has spilled into schools, damaging property.

A lack of availability of books and other teaching resources is another issue that communities are unable to solve without funding. Rural communities we spoke with were typically receiving little or no support or resources from government in this area and seemed not have the know-how or access to the right channels to obtain it.

3. Training of facilitators/teachers to teach in the new schools

There was an immediate need for teachers to staff the new schools built by SC, particularly in rural kebeles. To address this quickly while also providing opportunities to local young people, SC asked each kebele to identify about 7 young people who had completed at least 10th grade, who were currently not employed, and whom they thought would make good teachers.



It was not possible to confirm exact numbers because accurate records were not kept. Our best estimate is that **130 young people were trained**, although some accounts suggest 200+.

These local young people were trained, initially in a 21-day intensive course as “facilitators,” after which they taught junior classes at their local community school.

After gaining some experience in teaching, these facilitators were then sponsored by SC to complete a formal teaching qualification. SC negotiated with the government to ensure they were guaranteed positions on completion of their qualifications. Many came back to work at their local kebele schools.

⁹ Useful new work on design and procurement guidelines for sustainable school furniture in developing countries is being done by UNICEF: https://www.unicef.org/innovation/innovation_81586.html

With respect to teacher training, the key relevant outcomes were: (a) quality of teaching, particularly in the SC-constructed schools where these teachers initially worked and (b) enhanced career paths and earnings of the young people trained as facilitators and teachers. To assess these outcomes, we interviewed 19 of these facilitators, as well as young people who were students at the time, parents of current and former students, and PTA members. Our field research teams gathered sufficiently complete evidence to make rubric-based ratings at 3 time points for 8 of the kebeles sampled.

Results for **quality of teaching** are shown in Figure 19. Based on the mix of evidence, the initial situation in most kebeles was rated Dire because there was no school available in the kebele. If there was an existing school already, the initial rating was a little higher. With SC-supported training completed, teaching at all schools was rated Good. In most cases, it was still rated Good in 2019 (“Current”).




Figure 19. Quality of teaching (including student:teacher ratio) available in kebeles where SC trained facilitators/teachers

What do the ratings mean? These ratings were made using the rubric on p. 81. For example, “Good” was defined as follows: “There are enough teachers and/or facilitators to accommodate the students, and class size is reasonable (typically about 40 to 60 students per class). Teaching staff are generally well trained and supported (by leaders and the community), and the quality of teaching and learning are good. Students are mostly engaged; enrollments are strong, and dropout rates low.”



Figure 20. Students in a SC-constructed concrete block school in Gambela Goro kebele

To give these ratings some context, we asked parents and former students how the quality of education in their local SC-constructed school compared with that in the local government school. Of the 40 who responded, the vast majority said that the **SC schools provided better education** (Figure 21). The main reasons? **Different and more effective teaching methods and more engaging resources.**

The teaching quality is relatively good when compared with the nearby town elementary school.

There are even parents who reside in the town but prefer to send their children to [the SC-built] school.

– Field researcher summary

The vast majority of parents and former students said the quality of education was higher at SC than govt schools




Figure 21. Parent & former student views about the quality of education in SC vs. government schools

What has caused the drop in quality since SC left the area? Although few parents said so, many other stakeholders agreed that educational quality had dropped in several kebeles since SC had left.

The main reasons were:

- Crowded classrooms caused by rising rolls but too few teachers and classrooms. [Some schools were reporting 80 to 120 students in some classes; most classes were around 50.]
- The superior teaching resources and books supplied by SC are no longer available, out of date, or damaged.
- Teachers who are teaching subjects outside their areas of expertise and interest, or multiple grades in one class.
- Untrained teachers (e.g., some have only completed 10th grade and have had no training in subject matter or pedagogy)
- High teacher turnover.

Compared to the books prepared by SC, the current books do not match students' level.

Teachers are assigned not based on school needs but availability. They are obliged to teach subjects out of their field of study.

– Field researcher summary

Part of SC's professional development investment for educators included **training in Early Childhood Care and Development (ECCD)** for those teaching kindergarten. Records were too sketchy to ascertain the numbers trained, but interviews suggested one to three people of the facilitators trained in each kebele also took advantage of the ECCD training. Based on this, we estimated that **about 40 facilitators were trained in ECCD**, along with a small number of government teachers.

We interviewed parents, PTA members, principals, and teachers to find out what the early learning situation was like in their kebeles before SC arrived, when they exited, and currently (2019). Based on these responses and independent evidence (such as observation of the facilities and teaching materials), field researchers synthesized the evidence using rubric-based ratings – see Figure 22.

Access to high quality early learning was lifted from Dire to Good thanks to SC training. However, quality has declined since SC transitioned out of the area.




Figure 22. Mixed method assessment of 10 kebeles’ access to high quality early childhood education before SC came to the kebele (initial), at the time SC exited, and the situation in 2019 (current)

The evidence showed that **the establishment of ECCD with trained early childhood educators lifted an initially Dire situation (no ECCD offered) to Good** in the 10 kebeles where SC invested in ECCD.

What do the ratings mean? Ratings were made using the full mix of available evidence and were guided by the Rubric: Adequacy and quality of Early Childhood Care & Development initiatives (p. 82). For example, “Good” was defined as follows: “Well-trained early childhood educators deliver good ECCD programming in well-designed facilities, covering not just academic learning but other development activities for young children. There may be some minor room for improvement (e.g., more emphasis on play, better resources, more up-to-date teaching practices, better recruitment and/or attendance).”



Figure 23. School buildings in Gurura Town (Goro woreda)

The evidence also showed that **all 10 kebeles experienced a drop in the quality and/or availability of ECCD** after SC's departure.

What caused the drop in ECCD quality and/or availability?

- **Untrained teachers:** Of the 10 schools we visited where SC had provided ECCD training, only 2 still had a trained/qualified person teaching ECCD. 2 other schools had ECCD-trained teachers on staff, but they had been pulled into teaching other classes due to a shortage of teachers. 7 schools mentioned having an untrained person teaching ECCD (in many cases, not trained in teaching at all), typically at a very low pay rate (US\$10 to \$20/month).
- **ECCD teaching and play resources** provided by SC are out of date and/or no longer functional and have not been replaced.
- **Demand for ECCD outstrips many schools' capacity** to offer classes. In one case, a lottery system was used to decide which 70 students would be offered a place, out of 300+ applicants. In another, the school only offers KG1 classes now; previously it was KG1 and KG2.

Previously, SC provided materials like flash cards, desks, playing and teaching materials, and there was continuous training for ECCD staff.

Currently there is no teacher who is trained in ECCD.

– Field researcher summary

Digging a little deeper, **there seems to be a gender issue in play here.**

Previously two women were trained in ECCD, but currently they are teaching other courses.

Current KG staff is unqualified and paid just 500 ETB/month (US\$17).

– Field researcher summary

- Each kebele was asked to choose the small group of young people who would be offered training as facilitators. Although we were unable to obtain the exact numbers for all 20 kebeles, 4 of the 6 kebeles that shared the gender balance of the facilitators had chosen only one woman (the other two were evenly balanced). Across the 6 kebeles, **71% of the facilitators had been men, 29% women**. This is in sharp contrast with the gender balance of current teaching staff across 10 kebeles that shared this information (55% women, 45% men). Given the emphasis on men as the financial providers for the family in rural Ethiopia, it seems likely that community members felt that such a huge opportunity would be more important for boys than for girls.
- When we asked about ECCD in schools, it was frequently mentioned that the trained teachers were women; **we did not see a single mention of a man who had taken ECCD training**. If only about 29% of all facilitators were women, then this would naturally lead to very low numbers of ECCD-trained teachers in the first place.
- ECCD is traditionally seen as women's work – less skilled and of lower importance than other teaching – not just in Ethiopia but in most societies. As a result, **ECCD is erroneously thought not to be a particularly important part of a child's education**. In Woliso, this became clearly evident when teaching resources were stretched – qualified teachers were assigned to higher grades and a low-wage unqualified person was dropped into the ECCD role. As a teacher, the move to a higher status role (possibly on higher pay) would presumably be attractive.

Impact of educator training on the trainees and their families

Although the primary purpose of the SC-sponsored educator training was to enhance access to and quality of education for children at the new SC-constructed rural schools, an important and valuable side impact was enhancing **the career paths and lifetime earnings of those who received the training.**

We interviewed 19 of the 130 facilitators trained by SC and asked them how this opportunity had impacted their lives. We asked for their career/promotion and salary history, as well as an estimated counterfactual – what they likely would have been doing for a living had they not received the training.

The impact on the careers, incomes, and socioeconomic status of the young people trained by SC as facilitators was the most substantial and life-changing impact experienced by anyone in the impact area.

These were young people who had completed some high school but were unemployed at the time and did not have many options. SC’s facilitator training was a huge break for these young people, along with the initial teaching experience in the SC school, and later teacher training.

The most common response to the “*What would you be doing now if you hadn’t received this training?*” question was subsistence farming; most other occupations mentioned had a similarly low and unstable income (street trader, seasonal worker, full-time parent, criminal).



Figure 24. This former facilitator/teacher (right), pictured here with his mentor, used his SC-supported training, education, and experience to move into a successful government career and is now head of transportation for the Woliso woreda. His current salary is 5 times that of a farmer, which is what he would otherwise be doing (“or a robber,” he said). He is married with one son and owns his own home in Woliso town.

Prior to my recruitment by SC, I had already quit my education and started to help my parents in farming. It was SC that opened up the window of opportunity to join a school again as a facilitator. Since then, I have been teaching and also learning (current: studying for a Bachelor of Management)

– SC-trained facilitator/teacher

Figure 25 shows how [undiscounted] income has climbed over the years for these trainees, in comparison with what they would have been earning as subsistence farmers (or a similar income).




Figure 25. Annual income of young people trained by SC as educational facilitators and later supported to complete formal teacher training – relative to the most common counterfactual occupation they mentioned (subsistence farming)



Figure 26. Farmers taking “false banana” leaves to market (Warabu Bariho kebele)

In addition to salary and the highly prized job security that comes with government employment, teachers in the Woliso woreda also received a 105-200m² plot of land, a standard benefit for government employees, with an estimated value of between US\$8,500 and \$13,800 (2019 value). This scheme is reportedly about to begin in the Goro woreda soon.

A theme we heard several times in interviews with a wide range of stakeholders was that **the pedagogical and communication skills learned in the SC facilitator training were particularly valuable**. They made the SC-trained facilitators sought-after as teachers and in the various other careers many moved into later on.



What was the Value for Investment of training these educators? Based on figures provided by SC, training and supporting **130 young adults** to become government-employed teachers represented **an investment by SC of about US\$1.35 million** (in 2019 dollars). This included the intensive initial training, several refresher courses, and the support provided for facilitators to attend the Teacher Training Institutes and obtain their teaching degrees.

We conducted in-depth interviews with a sample of 19 of these individuals and asked about their income trajectories in the years since they began that training. We then compared these with the incomes they would have received from the most common occupation they expected they would have been engaged in, subsistence farming. On average, **these facilitators had already earned between US\$5,100 and US\$9,700 more income in the 10 to 14 years since they had completed their training**.

An estimated two thirds of the former facilitators, those based in the Woliso woreda, had also received **plots of land as a benefit of being government employees**. Those in the Goro woreda are expected to receive these in the next few years, but this has not yet happened, so we did not include this as a benefit for them. Depending on size and location, these plots of land were **valued at between US\$8,600 and \$13,700** (2019 value). We then extrapolated these figures out to estimate the eventual increase in value of that plot of land plus the gains in likely lifetime earnings over the former facilitators' working careers. The **average lifetime financial benefit ranged from US\$39,500 to \$47,500 per person** (in 2019 dollars).

Based on these analyses, **SC's outlay of US\$1.35 million resulted in collective financial benefits of between US\$5.1 and \$6.2 million** for former facilitators. In other words, **every dollar SC spent on training these educators generated US\$3.80 to \$4.60 of financial benefit** for those who received training.

This is in addition to the **inevitable ripple effects**. Now in their early 30s, almost all facilitators we spoke with had spouses and children. Children in particular would certainly benefit from being raised in higher-income, more educated households with a professional parent as a role model, access to much better resources, and higher income security.



Figure 27. The current principal of Maru Sombo school in Sombo Yabeta kebele (right), pictured here with his vice principal, was one of the facilitators trained from his kebele. He came back as a teacher and has since been promoted to principal.

In addition to the benefits to themselves and their families, **the value of these young people as role models for children from the same kebele** was also substantial. Our interviews suggested that this was especially true for young women teachers, who had reportedly been a source of great inspiration to girls aspiring to pursue professional careers.

Detailed calculations for this Value for Investment study are presented in Appendix 4. Value for Investment (p. 97).

4. Support for communities to form PTAs for the new schools

An important investment in the long-term success of the new schools was SC’s work to set up Parent Teacher Associations (PTAs) and provide community members with training and support in school governance. The training covered community and school relationships, how a PTA functions, how to keep peace and order in schools, how to manage and use school budgets, and how to increase student enrolment.

Records were sketchy regarding the numbers of people trained, but almost all of the rural kebeles we visited had had 7 PTA members trained, typically 2 women and 5 men. Therefore, our best estimate is that **SC trained 140 to 150 PTA members (overall, about 80% men)** for the 21 new schools.

We asked PTA members and school leaders about the kinds of activities in which PTAs were actively involved. Typical examples included: repairing school buildings, furniture, and fences; auditing; solving problems in the school; and mobilizing the community to send children to school. **A clear majority of the communities we visited still have well-functioning PTAs** (Figure 28), which suggests that **skills and knowledge are effectively being passed on to new members** who did not receive the original training.

Previously, the teachers always let the students play rather than teaching them. But after PTA’s comment the teaching approach got better.

– PTA member

SC’s training and support worked well to create engaged, effective PTAs to support new schools, the vast majority of which are still functioning well.




Figure 28. Mixed method assessment of PTA engagement and effectiveness in a sample of 8 communities where SC helped establish PTAs and train members

What do the ratings mean? Ratings were made using the full mix of available evidence, guided by the full Rubric: PTA level of engagement and effectiveness (p. 83). For example, “Good” was defined as follows: “The PTA is active and generally healthy, with mostly positive relationships. There are a few minor problems or areas for improvement.”



Figure 29. One of our field researchers interviews a community member at the local school

What happened for the schools where PTA engagement and effectiveness declined? In one case, it appears that the PTA was not particularly effective from the beginning. They failed to mobilize the community to stay on top of building and furniture maintenance. As a result, things fell into disrepair quite quickly, which then made the situation both overwhelming and very difficult to fix.

In the second case, the knowledge and skills gained from the original training has been lost due to turnover and a lack of succession management. Currently there are 7 PTA members, but none received the SC training, and they have not learned how to run an effective PTA from the former members.

SCHOOL HEALTH & NUTRITION



Despite the name of this programming area, not all health and nutrition initiatives were school based. Rather, SC looked at each kebele's needs and considered the support to offer that would best address those needs, particularly the needs of children.

This section covers the various initiatives that were primarily intended to enhance children's health and nutrition. These included: (1) installation of water supplies and training of water caretakers to maintain them; (2) installation of latrines and sanitation facilities; (3) nutrition, health, and hygiene training and the establishment of water, sanitation and health (WASH) committees; and (4) community health insurance schemes.

1. Water Supplies and Water Caretakers



One of Save the Children's first tasks in the Woliso Impact Area was to understand the needs and priorities in the various kebeles. In the School Health and Nutrition (SHN) area, an important and urgent cause of childhood and family illness was a lack of access to clean water in many of the kebeles. Accordingly, the vast majority of the early projects prioritized the installation of water supplies as one of the first forms of practical support.

According to SC records, **122 water supplies were installed or expanded across 32 kebeles and towns** in the impact area. 20 of these still lie within the boundaries of the Woliso and Goro woredas and are shown in Figure 30.




Figure 30. SC installed or expanded 122 water schemes in 32 kebeles and towns, 20 of which still fall within the current boundaries of the Woliso and Goro woredas (shown here)

Of the 12 kebeles we visited, one (in the Woliso municipality) got no water supply and is not included in our analysis. The remaining 11 kebeles, in rural areas and small towns, were all experiencing a “Dire” water situation prior to SC’s arrival – see the Initial time point in Figure 31.

SC had installed 80 water schemes in the 11 kebeles we visited. Some got just one water supply (often installed for a school that SC constructed); others got several – up to 14 water schemes. So, the kebeles in our sample happened to include several that received more water schemes than most.

What kinds of water schemes were installed? [total in all 32 kebeles]

- 52 hand dug wells
- 42 boreholes
- 19 springs
- 8 extensions or expansions of existing schemes
- 1 roof catchment




Figure 31. Quality and adequacy of water supplies before and after receiving SC support

At the time SC exited the kebeles, the vast majority had Good water supplies (see Figure 31). In 2019, most had maintained this level, and one had even improved on it. However, **by 2019, just 47 of the 80 (59%) SC-installed water schemes were still functioning in the 11 sampled kebeles.** Taking this into account, along with information about any additional water supplies installed since, plus water quality and other considerations, our mixed method assessment showed that **4 of the 11 kebeles we visited had experienced deterioration in the quality and adequacy of their water supplies since SC left.**

What do the ratings mean? Ratings of the quality and adequacy of water supply (from Dire to Excellent) were made by the evaluation team after their visits to each kebele, using the Rubric: Quality and adequacy of water supply (p. 85). For example, a “Good” water situation was defined as follows: “Most people had access to clean water year-around from a close by source at the community; the ones that did not have access to clean water were able to properly treat their water at home (e.g., chlorine, boiling); very few cases of chronic diarrhea among children and no outbreaks.” Ratings were made using a mix of evidence, including interviews with water caretakers, kebele leaders, and families, as well as observation and photos of a sample of the water systems in each kebele.

Why did water supplies deteriorate? These were the most common reasons mentioned (they varied by kebele and water system):

- **wells having dried up** (i.e., reached the end of their lifespan)
- unavailability of **spare parts*** needed to repair and maintain water supplies
- **lack of funds** to undertake major repairs or replace/add water supplies
- **lack of skills and equipment** to maintain more complex water systems (such as boreholes)
- **unavailability of large vehicles** to transport large equipment to and from town for repair or replacement

"[Out of 5 water schemes installed by SC], currently only one hand dug well is functional in this kebele. Others are not functional due to unavailability of spare parts. It also has bad odors, visible worms, termites and ants. Only 10 liters of water is allowed per household; we are forced to still collect water from river as this is not enough for my family. We also collect rainwater for drinking. My wife goes to the river to collect water early in the morning before animals such as dogs go and drink that water."

– Water caretaker

*When SC exited the area, they donated their **spare parts** for water systems to a small business that was started in Woliso town, so that the community could buy spare parts at a reasonable price. The demand was high, and the business ended up supplying many other water systems as well. Unfortunately, the parts were not restocked (either for financial reasons, weak management, or both) and the business eventually closed. Woreda officials commented that they could have managed the spare parts supply better. At this point, **no-one seems to have picked up the opportunity to address the need for spare parts; the shortage continues to be a major issue for the sustainment of water supplies.**

The WASH committee knew what was necessary for maintaining the water system (although some of it was beyond their capacity – the caretakers could not maintain the boreholes, only the hand dug wells; they didn't have vehicles to transport the equipment, not even at the woreda level, and spare parts were not available).

– Field Researcher's Kebele Summary

A key initiative intended to support the sustainability of water systems was the **training of water caretakers**. Approximately 8 or 9 of the kebeles we visited had received training for water caretakers. Two or three had not – one was in Woliso town (a municipality with its own water systems); in the other two kebeles there was just one water system installed at a school, but water caretakers were not trained to maintain it. Not surprisingly, neither of these water systems was functional when we visited.

To better understand how water caretaker training contributed to the sustainment of water supplies, we used a range of evidence (including interviews with key stakeholders) to assess the quality and availability of water caretakers initially (before SC came), at the time SC exited the area, and currently (2019). We had sufficiently complete evidence to make ratings in 9 of the 11 kebeles where water systems were installed. As Figure 32 shows, in kebeles that were left with good or excellent water system maintenance capacity, that has been well maintained in the years since.




Figure 32. Mixed method assessment of the situation in 9 of the kebeles we visited showed that the quality and availability of water caretakers has remained strong in just over half of the kebeles.

What do the ratings mean? Ratings of the quality and adequacy of water caretakers (from Dire to Excellent) were made by the evaluation team after their visits to each kebele, using the Rubric: Availability and quality of water caretakers (p. 89). For example, a “Good” water caretaker situation was defined as follows: “There is a local person who was properly trained as a water caretaker and has the basic abilities and commitment to do his or her job properly; water problems are resolved most of the time with durable solutions.” Ratings were made using a mix of evidence, including interviews with water caretakers and kebele leaders, as well as observation and photos of a sample of the water schemes.

What caused poor or deteriorating situations for water caretaking?

- In two kebeles, water systems were installed without training *any* caretakers, hence the Dire ratings for water caretaking at all three time points. These systems quickly fell into disrepair.
- In the two kebeles where the initial improvement was moderate and followed by a decline, water caretakers said that the training in their kebeles was not sufficiently thorough in the first place (e.g., it did not give people the skills to maintain some of the water system(s) installed).
- In these and some other kebeles, many of the SC-trained water caretakers were no longer actively engaged in water system maintenance, nor had they trained others to do the work.

To illustrate, the following are **examples from two rural kebeles** that *each* received 10 or more water schemes: Lead water caretakers told us that, out of 18-20 water caretakers originally trained by SC at *each* of their kebeles, only one per kebele was still actively engaging in maintaining the water schemes. The others had gone back or moved on to other occupations (e.g., teaching, farming, or trading). One of these kebeles’ water supply situation had slipped into a problematic situation because of this, despite having trained up 4 more young people to do the work. In the other kebele, the caretaker had trained an additional 6 young people in the necessary skills, and between them they were able to do most of the maintenance. They sometimes called on water caretakers from neighboring kebeles to come and help with the more complicated repairs.

What sustained the quality and availability of water caretakers? In short, it was water caretakers who stuck with their occupations and passed on their skills to the next generation.

Our interviews suggested that many of the water caretakers who stuck with the work did so because they were **able to earn money outside their home kebeles** maintaining water systems elsewhere (they were expected to maintain their home kebele water schemes for free). Some of them work as contractors for the government and/or for other kebeles, using their skills to create thriving businesses – **a significant economic impact for water caretakers and their families.**

One water caretaker we interviewed has earned around 60,000 ETB (about US\$2,000) so far working as a subcontractor to install water schemes in different kebeles of the Bantu woreda, which is next to Woliso woreda. He is also maintaining the water schemes of other kebeles as a business.

He constructed his own house in the kebele and he is helping his children to attend school. Since he is retired from the army with no pension, he would be on the street if hadn't received SC's training as a water caretaker.

– Water Caretaker interview notes

"If I hadn't taken the [water caretaker] training, I would now be a daily laborer with low income. But now, I am earning 60,000 ETB (US\$2,000) annually. My life has changed a lot. I am teaching my children; two are married. I even use my skills to work in another kebele, and in another woreda." – Water Caretaker

Sustainment of water supplies was also helped when **water caretakers passed on their skills** to young people in their kebeles, providing opportunities for them and building a succession plan for when they were no longer able to maintain existing systems and install new ones (e.g., see Figure 33).



Figure 33. A water caretaker installs a new system in his own yard, passing on his SC training to local youth as he does so (Tombe Anchebi kebele).

How substantial a difference did the clean water make to the lives of children and their families?

We asked parents what difference (if any) access to cleaner water had made to their lives. The two most mentioned benefits were the **prevention of water-borne illnesses** and the **time and energy saved not having to walk a long distance to collect water** (see Figure 34).




Figure 34. Top benefits of the SC-built water systems, according to parents interviewed on this topic (N = 35, from 7 kebeles)

How substantial was the impact on families' health of having closer access to cleaner water supplies?

Here's what parents told us:

- 77%** Very substantial impact on life/health
- 23%** Noticeable (but not large) impact
- 0%** Little or no impact

How much time was it taking to get water every day? This varied by kebele and also within kebeles, depending on the location of homes/hamlets and water supplies. In Chancho Soyoma, we heard of women who used to wake at 3am to go and get water from the river before animals started using it. They were spending 3-4 hours per day collecting water, so when water started getting piped into (or closer to) the hamlets, it saved them enormous time and energy. In Maru Bebeli, we heard this task was taking 1½ hours per day. In Sombo Yabeta, one of the water schemes was in the same location as the pond they had used previously, so there was no time saved for those using that particular water source. Other water sources were much closer than before and therefore much bigger time savers (e.g., Figure 35).

Were there any negative impacts? The one negative outcome we heard was that, due to shortages in the water supply, there have sometimes been arguments about how much water each household is allowed to collect. Many water, sanitation and health (WASH) committees impose a kebele-wide limit per person; some may not.



Figure 35. Former head of SC's Water and Sanitation work in the Woliso Impact Area Mekonnen Soboksa tastes the spring water in Sombo Yabeta kebele.

2. Latrines & Sanitation Facilities

The installation of latrines in the supported kebeles was by far the most popular health and nutrition-related Sponsorship initiative. It is impossible to say how many were installed with the help of SC because records were not kept. Our interviews suggest it was at least 2,000 to 3,000 in total. The installation of latrines was embraced enthusiastically by communities and the government, and the work continued well after SC transitioned out of the area. Health Extension Workers have taken a lead on this, improving the situation further (see Figure 36).



“Previously there were no latrines, so people used to defecate in plastic bags and throw it on house roofs. Some used to defecate near fences, in yards...”

– Field researcher summary




Figure 36. Access to and use of latrines in communities where SC installed latrines - before SC came, at exit, and in 2019

What do the ratings mean? Ratings of access to and use of latrines (from Dire to Excellent) were made by the evaluation team after their visits to each kebele, using the Rubric: Access to and Use of Quality Latrines (p. 86). For example, a “Good” latrine situation was defined as follows: “Public latrines of good quality (including hand-washing facility) available to most people, and some latrines at the household or shared household level; open field defecation is a minor problem; very few cases of diarrhea or worm-caused abdominal bloating especially among children and no outbreaks.” Supporting evidence included interviews with water caretakers and kebele leaders, as well as observation and photos of a sample of the water systems in each kebele.

Community members we interviewed were proud to say that their kebeles were now “**open defecation free**” and therefore much more pleasant surroundings to live in (hence the Excellent ratings in Figure 36, p. 43). The other major benefit of the latrines was **privacy**. Segregated latrines were also installed at the new schools. Evidence from our interviews suggested that this made a substantial

“Previously, in the times before Save, we defecated in the field ...in the ‘inset’ [crop]. After Save taught us about latrines and provided us the materials, we constructed and are using them. Other members of the community who didn’t have the chance of getting the materials started to construct their own latrines by observing ours. We are also constructing new latrines at our own cost when the one which was constructed during Save becomes full or damaged. Now the kebele is free of stool and there is no bad smell in the inset farm”.

– Community member/parent

difference to girls in particular, many of whom had avoided school during times of menstruation due to the lack of a private place to change sanitary products.

The early design of SC-constructed latrines was durable but basic, featuring corrugated iron exteriors and concrete slabs (see Figure 37). Locals in this kebele, Sombo Yabeta, spoke with us about improving on the SC design (adding more sheets of corrugated iron to make the latrines more spacious) and working with Health Extension Workers to build even better-designed latrines throughout the kebele. Current estimates are that 400 latrines have been constructed there, to serve just over 7,000 residents.



Figure 37. Latrines at the first SC school, Maru Sombo, were basic in design but appreciated (Sombo Yabeta kebele).

Most latrines we visited throughout the impact area were similar to this original design; the examples in Figure 38 are among the few that differed. The latrines at the Warabu Bariho school, which were built after SC exited the area, are reportedly the most salubrious in the impact area, thanks in part to strong connections between the kebele and the woreda water and sanitation office. In Chancho Soyoma (pop. 3,510), the Health Extension Workers (HEWs) reported that, after SC supported building the first 50 latrines, the HEWs have continued this work and helped ensure that all households now have their own latrines.



Figure 38. Later latrine designs, in Warabu Bariho (left) and Chancho Soyoma (right) kebeles.

SC also installed **clothes washing facilities** in some of the kebeles. These have been much less successful, with all of the examples we viewed being disused, putting the clothes washing situation in a dire or problematic state (see Figure 39). Having said this, a lack of clothes washing facilities is much less problematic than a lack of latrines.




Figure 39. Access to and use of clothes washing facilities at three time points.

What do the ratings mean? Ratings (from Dire to Excellent) by the evaluation team after visiting each kebele were based on a mix of evidence, including interviews with water caretakers and kebele leaders and observation/photos of a sample of the water systems in each kebele. The evidence was synthesized using the Rubric: Quality and adequacy of clothes washing facilities (p. 87). For example, a “Good” clothes washing situation was defined as follows: “Several public clothes washing facilities are available in accessible locations, but there are some structural, design, or water supply issues that prevent some people from using them; clothes are washed reasonably frequently, when there is enough water.”

The construction of the clothes washing facilities was durable (see Figure 40). The main reason why they were not being used was a lack of water. More on this shortly.



Figure 40. Disused clothes washing facilities like these were found wherever they had been installed.

A similar problem occurred with the **shower facilities** that SC installed in some kebeles. Although these were popular initially, they fell into disuse (see Figure 41 & Figure 42).




Figure 41. Access to and use of showering/bathing facilities at three time points.

What do the ratings mean? Ratings were made using the available evidence and guided by the full Rubric: Quality and adequacy of shower facilities, which defines what the levels mean (p. 88). For example, “Good” access to and use of showering/bathing facilities was defined as follows: “Several public shower facilities are available in accessible locations, but there are some structural or design issues that prevent some people from using them (e.g., maintenance issues); people shower frequently, but sometimes there is lack of water.”

Like the clothes washing facilities, shower facilities were generally well constructed (albeit lacking in privacy) and seemed to be in good repair (see Figure 42). However, they weren’t being used.



Figure 42. Disused shower facilities (Sombo Yabeta kebele).

Why did the clothes washing and shower facilities fall into disuse?

The primary problem was that, for the vast majority of kebeles, **water supplies are inadequate even for supplying enough drinking water for all households**. Using precious clean water to wash clothes or shower is therefore not an option, and most communities went back to using the local rivers instead. Unfortunately, many of the rivers are polluted with animal feces.

There are two springs used as sources for the 13 public pipe waters [in this kebele]. One spring source now is only partially working because it was broken and is still not repaired. The main reasons for it not being repaired are low budget and unavailability of spare parts. As a result, the WASH committee purposely closed the shower and clothes washing facilities.

– Field researcher summary



Figure 43. Clothes are typically washed in creeks and rivers. This kebele has clean water for washing from a water scheme constructed by SC.

How substantial a difference did the latrines and sanitation facilities (and relevant knowledge) make to the lives of children and their families? We asked parents what difference (if any) access to latrines, showers, and clothes washing facilities had made to their lives. The two most mentioned benefits were children and families getting sick less often and feeling better for feeling cleaner (Figure 44).

It is important to note that there have been several other contributors to these outcomes in addition to SC, particularly with the latrines and ensuring they are used properly. These include the Water and Sanitation arms of local government, Health Extension Workers, and the community members themselves (particularly the WASH committees, which SC set up). However, SC's initial work was most certainly the original source of these efforts, which others then picked up willingly.




Figure 44. Parents mentioned health and cleanliness as the two most important benefits of the SC-constructed latrines and sanitation facilities (N = 35 interviewees from 8 kebeles)

How substantial was the impact on families' health of having access to latrines and sanitary facilities?

Here's what parents told us:

- 73%** Very substantial impact on life/health
- 15%** Noticeable (but not large) impact
- 12%** Little or no impact

What was the situation for parents who said there had been little to no impact? One mentioned that their household was far from the nearest facilities, so they seldom used them. Some others who responded this way were in the Woliso municipality, where there is a higher density of people and just a few public latrines shared among many families.

What was the Value for Investment of water and sanitation services? Save the Children invested approximately **US\$4.7 million** (2019 value) to build and maintain water schemes and sanitation facilities such as latrines, showers and clothes-washing facilities in the kebeles covered by their interventions. In addition to the reported (but somewhat intangible) benefits already documented, what was the value of those benefits, particularly to children and their families?



A full cost-benefit analysis for this question would require a large dataset that tracked the main benefits associated with easy access to clean water and proper sanitation facilities, which include: (i) health care savings (people seek less health care), (ii) reduced losses of productive days due to disease, (iii) time savings resulting from more convenient drinking-water and sanitation services, and (iv) values of premature deaths averted (based on discounted future earnings). No such dataset was available; nor was there enough budget or time to allow a major primary data collection effort.

To get an approximate answer to this question, we turned to the strongest and most relevant previous research, which was a WHO study¹⁰ of the return on investment (ROI) in water and sanitation services in sub-Saharan Africa. That research calculated an ROI of US\$2.70 for every dollar invested.

To ensure we weren't overestimating the value in this case, we built in the observed sustainability of the Woliso impact area water schemes, 41% of which are no longer functional (e.g., because wells dried up or there were no spare parts to make repairs). We have applied this figure across the entire investment (latrines, showers, and clothes washing facilities as well) because the water supplies were the largest investment, and to ensure our estimates would be conservative rather than inflated.

Taking these considerations into account, SC's **US\$4.7 million investment in water and sanitation facilities is still likely to yield at least US\$7.5 million in economic benefits**, of the type listed above, (i) to (iv). This translates into **an estimated return of \$1.59 for every dollar invested**.

Caveat: This analysis rests heavily on an assumption that the SC investment is substantively similar to the mid-range of WHO-studied initiatives with regard to their: context, level of investment, cost of inputs, intervention approaches, baseline conditions, as well as nature and extent of effects.

3. Nutrition, Health, Hygiene, & Food Safety Training and water, sanitation and health (WASH) Committees

A key element of SC's Sponsorship programming is empowering communities with knowledge, skills, and collective capacity to drive their own change. For the SHN efforts in the Woliso impact area, the key elements were the establishment of WASH Committees and education/training in health, nutrition, hygiene, and food safety.



The **WASH committee's** role is to ensure that community members have a good understanding of clean water and hygiene, including what causes contamination, proper hand washing, safe food handling practices. Ideally this includes running regular community health campaigns and screenings, as well as obtaining external funding and support for larger WASH projects.

No records were available documenting the details of SC's WASH training and we found only some kebeles had any idea of the numbers of WASH committee members trained. Estimates ranged from 5 to 70 people in each of the four kebeles where any estimates were offered at all.

In our visits to kebeles, we found that **WASH Committees are still active**, although some are more effective than others. Of great importance to the WASH Committees has been the strong support of Health Extension Workers (HEWs), who collaborate with them on the construction of latrines and educating the community. The **biggest challenges for WASH Committees** are finding funding for things the community can't afford, such as replacing dried up water supplies or making major repairs or upgrades to pumps and pipes.

¹⁰ WHO (2012). *Global costs and benefits of drinking-water supply and sanitation interventions to reach the MDG target and universal coverage*. Geneva, Switzerland, WHO.

An important and impactful part of the efforts is the ongoing **education and training in hygiene and food safety**, which SC helped initiate while it was in the impact area. Community memories of SC’s initial training were patchy, with some saying SC did some training directly with community members; some saying SC trained HEWs, who then trained community members; some saying the training happened through school-based clubs; and others saying it was another NGO that had completed the training. Virtually none could estimate the numbers trained and SC kept no records of these numbers. Despite the confusion about who did the early training, it is clear that multiple actors have contributed, and SC’s efforts were certainly a part of that, especially early on.

“Me and my family get clean water, we now don’t get sick. When we visit relatives that live in a kebele where there is no access to clean water: we don’t drink the water, we just eat food and get back to our house.”

– Community member/parent

How substantial a difference did this education and training make and how well is it being sustained?

To answer this question, we interviewed community members, WASH Committee members, HEWs, Health Center professionals, and woreda Water and Sanitation officials. More specifically, we asked about the strength of community members’ awareness, understanding, skills, and practice of food safety, hygiene, and sanitation at three time points.

As Figure 45 shows, the initial levels of hygiene and food safety knowledge, skills, and practice were problematic in almost all the kebeles we visited. By the time SC exited the area, most were Good, and in 2019 we found that things had improved further, thanks to the efforts of both the HEWs and the WASH Committees.




Figure 45. Mixed method assessment of community knowledge, skills, and practices of hygiene and food safety.

What do the ratings mean? Our field researchers used the available evidence to draw conclusions guided by the Rubric: Basic hygiene and food safety knowledge and practice, which defines what the levels mean (p. 90). For example, “Good” knowledge, skills, and practice of hygiene and food safety was defined as follows: “Most people had enough knowledge about basic hygiene and food safety, and the majority of them put into practice their knowledge; very few cases of food-borne diseases and chronic diarrhea among children and no outbreaks.”

Memories were similarly foggy regarding **SC training on nutrition and healthy eating**. There was some recollection of the training, but given the time that had passed, accounts varied as to how and where the training happened. At least some of the training seems to have happened through the schools, as part of a School Health and Nutrition program. Health Extension Workers (HEWs) were also involved in this initiative, so they have contributed to these outcomes and are the primary driving force behind sustaining the change.

How substantial a difference did this education and training make and how well is it being sustained?

To answer this question, we interviewed community members, HEWs, and Health Center professionals. More specifically, we asked about the strength of community members’ knowledge of nutrition and healthy eating practices at three time points. A total of 7 kebeles provided sufficient evidence.

As Figure 46 shows, the initial levels of nutritional knowledge and healthy eating were problematic in almost all the kebeles we visited. By the time SC exited the area, most were OK or Good, and in 2019 we found that all but one kebele was at the Good level. The one at OK level was one of the first kebeles supported, where we understand SHN may not have been implemented; that started later on.




Figure 46. Mixed method assessment of community knowledge of nutrition and healthy eating practices (7 kebeles).

What do the ratings mean? Our field researchers draw on the available evidence to make ratings guided by the Rubric: Nutrition knowledge and habits (p. 91). For example, “Good” was defined as “Most people had enough knowledge about good nutrition habits, and the majority of them put into practice their knowledge; very few cases of malnutrition or obesity in the kebele.”

SC educated the community on nutrition; the community is planting different types of vegetables in their yard and eating a variety of food types. SC also trained the school community about nutrition so that they could disseminate the knowledge to the wider community. Accordingly, the students were provided with different vegetable seeds that enabled them to cultivate them in the school compound. Then they sold it for the surrounding community. Now, however, the school is not participating in such activities because there is no follow up from the responsible bodies.

– Field researcher summary

As with hygiene and food safety, the SC initiatives helped get the change started by training a few individuals in key positions in each kebele. However, it is the HEWs who have been the driving force behind building community-wide knowledge of nutrition and healthy eating habits. Two other NGOs were mentioned as contributors in this area – ISHDO and GSI.

How well are nutrition, health, hygiene, and food safety knowledge and behaviors being passed on to new generations? We interviewed WASH committee members, HEWs, and parents to find out. As Figure 47 shows, a clear majority of the kebeles were doing well on all four of the key things we rated.




Figure 47. Mixed method assessment of how well key health-related knowledge and practices were being passed on to new generations (ratings from 8 kebeles we visited)

What helped ensure that knowledge and behaviors were passed on? HEWs were mentioned often as key to supporting the passing on of health-related knowledge and practices. Vaccinations and deworming were very much driven by HEWs, hence the strong success in those areas.

What was the issue where there were significant gaps? The most mentioned one related to nutrition and healthy eating.

Although community members had learned about this, they often couldn't put it into practice because many healthy foods were either unavailable or unaffordable. Early on, SC had provided seeds to the children as part of a school-based SHN initiative, but the supply of seeds has not continued, so the growing of vegetables has dwindled.

The community is well aware about the issue and is passing the knowledge to the next generation. The role of HEWs is significant. The community's awareness has generally improved due to the health education by the HEWs. The main job of the HEWs in Ethiopia for the last 15 years has been the provision of hygiene and education to the public. – Field researcher summary

4. Community Health Insurance

SC established a group of about 100 to 120 women in Woliso town and helped them set up and run a community health insurance project. They were given 20,000 ETB to get started, and members also contributed some money. According to those we spoke to in Woliso town, this took the form of two community health insurance schemes in two kebeles. One of these is still running and one is not.

When we asked locals why these schemes were not entirely successful, we heard that they didn't fulfill the needs of the members, which led many to quit the scheme. One issue, for example, was that members would not get reimbursement for treatment at a private clinic.

We asked about community health insurance in every kebele we visited, to see whether the idea might have been propagated more widely. However, outside of Woliso town, everyone said there had been no such scheme in their kebeles.



Figure 48. In the streets of Woliso town.

ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT (AD)

In this section, we cover standalone Adolescent Development Centers (ADCs) and school clubs.

1. Adolescent Development Centers

SC established two Adolescent Development Centers (ADCs) in two different kebeles. We visited one but were not able to locate the second one. **The one we visited was in Woliso Town and was found not to be operational.** To find out what happened, we interviewed local officials and tracked down a community elder who had been there when the ADC was established and while it was running.

The ADC was established in Woliso 03 kebele, an impoverished part of the town with no good facilities for young people. Several buildings were constructed by SC, including a main youth center with a small cafeteria, a library, latrines, and a security building. The youth center had a TV and reading materials. The original buildings were constructed by SC in 2005 using traditional materials (mud). After SC left, in about 2011, the government renovated the buildings with more durable construction materials. UNICEF also supported the ADC by providing different materials.



Figure 49. The main building of the Adolescent Development Center in Woliso 03 kebele

About 40 youth were initially registered at the center, put into groups, and given seed money and a bank account to engage in **income-generating activities (IGAs)** such as fattening cattle and selling coffee. Unfortunately, these activities did not turn out to be profitable.



Figure 50. Street traders in the Woliso 03 kebele

We asked if there had been any success cases from among the youth; our interviewees could not think of any. At least 3 of the youth are still in town and working as street traders (e.g., see Figure 50). This is a typical occupation for people in this area; therefore, **we were not able to detect any lasting impacts of the ADC's work.**

The ADC had closed altogether several years ago (date unknown) and had not been operational for some time when we visited. The buildings are locked and a security guard is on site. We understand that books and other resources are being held elsewhere for safe keeping.

What could have helped the ADC last longer and have better impact? We found that two major issues affected the sustainment and impact of the ADC – location and the structure of the programming.

Location. The ADC was built on a very polluted site, with sewage flowing through it (see Figure 51).

This was apparently known back in 2005 when the center was built. However, the local government was very keen to have the land reclaimed and used for something positive.



Figure 51. The ADC was built on a polluted site, with sewage present.



Figure 53. Access to the ADC is via unlit walkways through polluted areas.

To provide some context, this ADC was built in a very impoverished part of Woliso town, where most people are on very low incomes and many live in subsidized government housing. Most houses have no access to latrines; residents use plastic buckets and then empty them into the roadside ditches.

The site is also quite far from residential housing and must be accessed via unlit walkways through polluted areas (see Figure 53). Parents were reluctant to let their youth, especially girls, walk through the area after dark.



Figure 52. A community elder recalls the history and decline of the ADC in Woliso town.

Programming: Those familiar with the program described it as a “set and forget” model. After the initial training and setting youth up with bank accounts and seed money, youth were largely left to their own devices. Those people we interviewed felt that the lack of coaching while youth were working on their projects seriously limited the likelihood they would succeed. Their view was that money spent on infrastructure (buildings) would have been better spent on adults to coach the groups of young people as they tried to develop their income-generating activities. The evaluation team concurs. However, it is important to note that SC’s AD model and other strategies have evolved significantly since the work in the Woliso Impact Area. More appropriate models might now be in place, producing better results.

2. Support for the formation of school clubs

To enhance the education and wellbeing of children in the impact area, SC provided support to set up school clubs, which included providing training and educational materials/resources. Although SC did not keep records of which clubs were set up in which schools, the kebeles we visited had clubs for: school health and nutrition (SHN), adolescent sexual and reproductive health (ASRH), Red Cross, HIV/AIDS, environmental conservation, a girls' club, Afaan Oromo culture, minimedia, and sports.

In most kebeles, stakeholders told us that SC had helped set up all or most of these clubs initially. However, in 4 of the kebeles, SC set up the SHN club only, and the schools later added more clubs on their own. Of the 12 kebeles we visited, 11 received new schools and had no pre-existing clubs. In the remaining kebele, SC did not help set up the clubs, but provided training and materials (such as first aid kits), which enhanced what the clubs could offer. Although all clubs were functioning well when SC transitioned out of the area, there has been a drop-off since that time (see Figure 54).




Figure 54. Mixed method assessment of school clubs (particularly ASRH clubs) in the 12 sampled kebeles at three time points – before SC arrived, when they left, and in 2019 (current). One school already had active clubs; the rest did not. Missing data on the current (2019) situation for one kebele.

What do the ratings mean? Drawing on the full mix of available evidence, ratings were guided by the full Rubric: Adequacy and quality of school adolescent clubs and adolescent sexual and reproductive health teaching (p. 84). For example, “Good” was defined as follows: “School clubs are alive and well, being run by well-trained teachers, and have good attendance, as well as good engagement of parents. There are some aspects that could be improved, but adolescents mostly have the knowledge they need about ASRH, and may take that home to influence their parents and siblings.”

Why did the quality and/or activity of school clubs drop off? The most common reason was that resources and materials were out of date and/or not available. For example, the Red Cross clubs initially had bandages and first aid kits; the SHN clubs had seeds for planting; sports clubs had balls; etc. Without these resources, the club’s activities are limited.

RIPPLE EFFECTS

What other actions, reactions, or changes have been inspired or catalyzed by the SC-funded work in the Woliso impact area – locally, regionally, and/or nationally – and how important were they, particularly in ways that impacted the lives of children and their families?

RIPPLE EFFECTS OF SC'S WORK AT THE KEBELE LEVEL

There was a number of positive changes inspired by SC's work that took place without been originally planned or expected as an intentional effect. They are, mostly, changes that happened at the kebeles level, even though a few were reported beyond the geographic area covered by SC.

It is important to note that SC's current Theory of Change already includes as pathways to change most or all of the strategies that resulted in the outcomes here reported as ripple effects. According to the current TOC for SC they would be considered expected outcomes.

Table 1 indicates the ripple effects identified by the evaluation team at the kebele/community level. To facilitate communication, they have been organized by main categories that have emerged from the analysis.

Table 1. Positive side effects at the kebele level included the development of a culture of community mobilization and changes in attitudes towards education, sanitation and hygiene

Categories	Detail
Culture of community mobilization	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Based on the experience by the WASH committees supported by SC in the kebeles to manage the water schemes and sanitation facilities, the communities established or strengthened a culture of collective organization. One of the main things they started to do was to saving money collectively to resolve some of the problems afflicting them. Some examples of such mobilization include the construction of additional school blocks, fencing the school compound, maintaining water schemes and building latrines.• In two of the kebeles visited by the evaluation team, the community even worked together to build a house for the teachers.• In two of the kebeles visited by the evaluation team, the community members even have saved money to build a road and are still saving together to maintain it.• Communities became better organized also to put pressure on the government to help meet their needs. One example from the visited kebeles is the community going together and obtaining from the woreda government the construction of a farmer training center by the kebele school built by SC. In two other kebeles, the communities were able to get support from the government to extend their schools to cover until grade 8, since SC schools were only until grade 4.

Categories	Detail
Changes in attitudes towards education, sanitation and hygiene	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Building schools in neglected/very poor kebeles, created greater awareness among community members of the importance for sending their children early to school, especially girls. • SC’s initiatives on sanitation and hygiene have inspired and developed the capacity of several community members in the kebeles covered by SC to build their own private latrines and showers using the models adopted by SC. • In of the visited kebeles, a water caretaker trained by SC have built a hand dug well to serve his family. In another kebele, more than 40 households have built their own water scheme inspired by SC’s work. • Open defecation used to be a common practice in the kebeles, now it is seen as a shameful practice in virtually all kebeles visited.

RIPPLE EFFECTS BEYOND THE WOLISO IMPACT AREA

We have identified two examples of how SC’s work in Woliso have helped influence the development of an important national study in education and the creation of a national school health and nutrition strategy.

In 2008, Save the Children established a partnership with USAID's Educational Quality Improvement Program 2 (EQUIP2) to conduct a study of school effectiveness in Ethiopia.¹¹ It aimed at determining whether community and government schools provided adequate opportunities to ensure that children learn to read fluently in Grade 3. The study concluded that few children at the start of Grade 3 had learned to read fluently enough to ensure comprehension. Being the first of its kind in the country and have been implemented with such high quality provided credibility and the needed evidence to convince the government to conduct a national study – the Early Grade Reading Assessment (EGRA). This national study was supported by USAID in 2010 and implemented in seven different official languages. The results from the national study were similar to what was found by the Woliso study and has, since then, influenced the establishment of government efforts to improve the quality of education in the country.

SC pioneered the work on School Health and Nutrition (SHN) in Ethiopia through their initiatives in the Woliso impact area. For many years, remained as the only agency implementing SHN in the country and was the first to implement strategies to push the government to develop a National SHN strategy. As a recognition of their important efforts, SC was invited to be an active member of the National School Health and Nutrition Taskforce that in 2012 wrote the first national SHN Strategy for Ethiopia¹². Both these national initiatives have their roots in efforts started with SC’s work in the Woliso impact area.

¹¹ DeStefano, J. & Elaheebocus, N. (2010). Using Opportunity to Learn and Early Grade Reading Fluency to Measure School Effectiveness in Woliso, Ethiopia. EQUIP2. Washington DC : USAID. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/273041031_CASE_STUDY_Using_Opportunity_to_Learn_and_Early_Grade_Reading_Fluency_to_Measure_School_Effectiveness_in_Woliso_Ethiopia

¹² The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (2012). National School Health and Nutrition Strategy: To Be Healthy to Learn and to Learn to be Healthy. Ministry of Education, October 2012, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. https://www.iapb.org/wp-content/uploads/Ethiopia_National-School-Health-Nutrition-Strategy.pdf

There was a third possible area where SC might have influenced at this level, which was the development of a couple of Community Health Insurance schemes in Woliso Town. According to SC staff, the government's community insurance program came some years after SC did this initiative. However, no evidence was found by the evaluation team or provided by SC staff that the insurance program by the national government was inspired in SC's model. The evaluation team consistently asked about the SC community health insurance schemes to check whether they were still active in Wolsiso Town or if they had spread to rural kebeles. No interviewee indicated they had heard about them.

In all of our initial meetings with primary intended users for the RIE, in the documentation we received, and in our various visits to Ethiopia, higher level policy-level/advocacy work by SC was either not listed or not at all prominent in documentation, nor in discussions with our key informants, with the exception of a couple of vague mentions in passing. It sounds as if the emphasis on this kind of work is more present in SC's current Sponsorship work, and it does not appear to have been significant for the work in Woliso back in the early 2000s.

UNANTICIPATED NEGATIVE EFFECTS

The evaluation team had specific strategies to search for negative and/or undesired effects. All data collection instruments targeting groups participating or affected by SC's work had questions specifically designed to elicit conversations about aspect of the work done by SC that could have produced negative side impacts. Such questions were raised in all interviews with government officials, kebele leaders, school principals and PTA members, families of children/youth who attended the schools supported by SC and the former educational facilitators trained by SC.

In general, some interviewees complained about the fact that SC did not provide their kebeles with the same amount or quality of support that other kebeles received. It usually included aspects related to the same number or type/quality of water schemes, latrines, or schools. Also, a few government officials indicated their discontentment about SC discontinuing completely any additional support to the Woliso impact area. They expected SC would still be present in the region providing at least technical guidance and encouragement for them to continue the work started. There was also a specific complaint that government officers have not been able to access SC's country director to talk about issues of relevance to the local administration.

However, there is no evidence that the expressed frustrations and discontentment with SC have actually created any relevant negative side impacts such as a decrease in community mobilization/motivation or greater inefficiency by local government officials.



Figure 55. One of our field researchers interviews a community member in one of the rural kebeles

OWNERSHIP TRANSITION & EXIT

Looking back, how well did SC's ownership transition processes work to empower communities to better support children after the conclusion of SC's work in the Woliso impact area? What factors made a difference for achieving a smooth and supportive transition?

In general, SC took proper measures and was successful in empowering individuals, schools and communities to ensure continuity of some important changes produced by the work done in the Woliso impact area, including maintenance of water schemes and latrines, basic and early childhood education activities, community water, sanitation and health (WASH) committees, and school PTAs governance and activities. However, there were important issues not properly resolved in the exit strategy. These include lack of proper conversations with some communities and/or exiting kebeles that were still on dramatic social conditions.

SC did a very good job in contributing to develop the capacity of many key actors within the communities and schools (e.g., WASH committee, water caretakers, education facilitators, PTAs, youth clubs, etc.) so that important changes produced as part of the interventions could be locally owned and maintained after they phaseout. As already shown in previous sections (especially in answers to KEQs 1, 2 and 5), this strategy produced good results – e.g., many WASH committees and PTAs still active and water caretakers still maintaining the water schemes in several communities.

However, there were some issues appointed by key stakeholders from half of the 12 kebeles visited by the evaluation team indicating that the transition process did not go as smoothly as expected. Some of them were surprised with SC's exit either because they lacked proper warning (adequate exit conversations with SC staff) or because their kebeles were still in a dare situation on some basic needs.



Figure 56. Street traders in Woliso town

Some interviewees indicated they expected their kebeles to receive the similar support SC was providing to neighbor kebeles such as access to clean water and to minimally adequate sanitation & hygiene facilities. In the initial kebeles, where SC built the schools with local materials (clay and wood), the buildings were already showing severe damage by termites in walls and doors a couple of years after construction. In these kebeles, the communities expected the schools to be repaired or rebuilt before SC exited.

Although SC had been involved in installing water schemes and latrines in the neighboring kebeles, it didn't do the same in Bukasa Kata kebele other than constructing school. This made the community members furious against the exit of SC. even, the government officials (at woliso woreda) were not happy in the SC's decision to leave the area. Because, the school was built in poor quality and the latrines and water scheme installed were started malfunctioning earlier before SC's exit. Due to this, there was a miscommunication (disagreement) between the community and SC that made the transition very hard. –

Field researcher summary

Communities felt they were left alone completely after a relatively long partnership. No visit was ever conducted again or no contact channel with SC staff was left open. They did not expect to receive additional financial support. Rather, they wish they could have been in touch in SC staff and specialists to get guidance when specific, more challenging issues came up. They also felt a visit by SC leaders once and a while could contribute significantly to keep the continuous commitment of local leaders and communities around some of the key outcomes produced by SC interventions around education, health, water, sanitation, hygiene, etc.

SC also engaged in conversations with Goro and Woliso woredas government authorities to take responsibility in supporting the communities to consolidate and further the positive changes produced by their interventions. This strategy, however, did not turn out very successful. The government indeed kept their commitment to pay the salaries of the teachers working in the schools built by SC and in rare occasions even assigned additional teachers to fulfill school needs in a few kebeles.

Unfortunately, the local governments have chronic lack of resources to invest in the kebeles. Their budgets are usually just enough to cover the salaries of their civil servants. There is not enough money left for maintaining what is already in place, and even less to invest in new projects or buildings.

There were many reports from interviewees indicating they could rarely rely on the government to provide support to maintain the positive outcomes from SC's interventions. Examples included no spare parts to fix water schemes (especially for the boreholes) and repairing school buildings or latrines.

The government promised to assume responsibility for supplying teachers and doing maintenance. With the water, the WASH committee knew what was necessary for maintaining the water system (although some of it was beyond their capacity – the caretakers could not maintain the boreholes, only the hand dug wells; they didn't have vehicles to transport the equipment, not even at the woreda level, and spare parts were not available). –

Field researcher summary

CONCLUSIONS

To bring the findings back to the big-picture level and draw overall evaluative conclusions, we have used as our framework the Key Evaluation Questions that guided this evaluation.

KEQ 1. CORE PROGRAMMING IMPLEMENTED & CURRENT STATUS

What SC Sponsorship-funded core programming was implemented in the Woliso impact area from 2002-2010, how relevant was it to the needs of children and their families, how well has it lasted, and how well is it functioning now?

Core programming fell into **three broad categories** – Education (BE and ECCD); School Health and Nutrition (SHN); and Adolescent Development (AD). We cover these separately in the following sections.

EDUCATION (BE & ECCD)

Table 2 provides a summary of SC Sponsorship-funded core programming implemented in education (BE and ECCD), its relevance and current status.

Table 2. Education (BE & ECCD-related) core programming implemented, relevance to needs, and current status

CORE PROGRAMMING	WHAT WAS IMPLEMENTED	RELEVANCE TO NEEDS	CURRENT STATUS
1. Community-based school (CBS) construction	21 new community-based schools constructed, all but one in rural kebeles. Additional classrooms were also constructed for up to 8 existing government schools in rural kebeles and small towns.	<u>Extremely high.</u> Many children were not attending school at all or were receiving only a very basic elementary education (4 years) due to the dangers of sending young children long distances and across rivers and busy roads to the nearest school (often 6-10km away).	<u>Early CBSs</u> were built from local materials (wood and mud); these are <u>still being used but have been severely damaged</u> by termites and expansion/cracking (with rainy/dry seasons). Many are at or past the expected lifespan of a building of this construction. <u>Later CBSs</u> were constructed from much more durable concrete blocks and are in generally in good repair. <u>All CBSs</u> are experiencing much more crowded classrooms as communities and school enrollments have grown but school expansion has been non-existent or too slow to keep class sizes down.

CORE PROGRAMMING	WHAT WAS IMPLEMENTED	RELEVANCE TO NEEDS	CURRENT STATUS
2. Supply of school furniture, equipment, and learning materials	<p>Desks, chairs, blackboards in all SC-constructed schools and classrooms</p> <p>Learning materials and resources for both BE and ECCD</p>	<p><u>High</u>. These additions were essential to make the new schools and classrooms usable for teaching and learning.</p>	<p>Only 5 of 12 sampled kebeles still had <u>furniture and equipment</u> in good or excellent condition; the rest had fallen into disrepair (due to age; only some was still usable).</p> <p>Government had replaced some furniture in a small number of kebeles; most still had the originals, up to 17 years old.</p> <p><u>Learning materials and resources</u> are particularly problematic, with many now outdated, damaged, lost, or too few for current enrollments.</p>
3. Training of facilitators (para-professional teaching staff) / teachers to teach in the new CBSs	<p>Approximately 120 to 140 young people given 21-day intensive training to work as facilitators in new CBSs.</p> <p>About 40 to 45 of these facilitators (likely all or almost all women) were also trained in ECCD.</p> <p>All facilitators were later supported to complete their full teaching degrees at Teacher Training Institutes.</p> <p>Refresher courses were provided while SC was in the impact area.</p>	<p><u>Very high</u>. No teachers were available to staff the new schools; the only alternative would have been to staff schools with completely untrained adults, which would have greatly diminished the quality of education.</p>	<p>Some SC-trained facilitators are still teaching in or leading impact area schools; however, many have advanced into more senior government positions.</p> <p>Impact area schools are now staffed with a mix of SC-trained and government-trained teachers, all of whom are employed and paid by the government.</p>

CORE PROGRAMMING	WHAT WAS IMPLEMENTED	RELEVANCE TO NEEDS	CURRENT STATUS
4. Support to communities to form PTAs for the new CBSs	All 21 new CBSs were supported to form PTAs, typically 2 women and 5 men each Overall SC trained about 140 to 150 PTA members for the 21 new CBSs	<u>High</u> . Strong PTAs have been important for maintaining the quality of education; maintenance of buildings and equipment; and solving problems in the schools.	In sampled kebeles, the vast majority of PTAs were still functioning well. For those that were struggling, the biggest challenges were keeping up maintenance on buildings and furniture, especially when they needed replacement rather than repairs.

SCHOOL HEALTH AND NUTRITION (SHN)

Table 3 provides a summary of SC Sponsorship-funded core programming related to School Health and Nutrition (SHN), its relevance to the needs of children and their families, and current status.

Table 3. School Health and Nutrition (SHN) core programming implemented, relevance to needs, and current status

CORE PROGRAMMING	WHAT WAS IMPLEMENTED	RELEVANCE TO NEEDS	CURRENT STATUS
1. Installation of water supplies; training of water caretakers to maintain them	122 water supplies installed across 32 kebeles: 52 hand dug wells 42 boreholes 19 springs 8 extensions or expansions of existing schemes 1 roof catchment On average, about 6 people were trained per kebele (range 0 to 20); estimated total 150 to 200 caretakers.	<u>Extremely high</u> . An important and urgent cause of childhood and family illness was a lack of access to clean water in many of the kebeles in the impact area.	In visits to 11 kebeles in which a total of 80 water systems had been installed by SC, we found that just 47 (59%) were still functioning. In the 11 kebeles we visited, a clear majority (7) had a Good (or better) quality and adequacy of water supply; the other 4 had experienced various levels of deterioration since SC transitioned out of the impact area. Of the 9 kebeles where we had sufficient evidence to assess: 5 still had Good or Excellent quality and availability of water caretakers; for 2 kebeles this was Problematic; for the remaining 2 it was Dire (no water caretakers trained at all). Reasons for the deterioration in water supplies and water caretakers since SC's exit are covered under KEQ 5. Sustainability (p. 75).

CORE PROGRAMMING	WHAT WAS IMPLEMENTED	RELEVANCE TO NEEDS	CURRENT STATUS
2. Installation of latrines and sanitation facilities	<p><i>Approximately 2,000 to 3,000 latrines installed with SC's help (in collaboration with Health Extension Workers (HEWs) and the communities) in up to 35 kebeles.</i></p> <p>11 showers and 11 clothes washing facilities installed in 5 kebeles</p>	<p><u>Very high.</u> Prior to SC's construction of latrines, the norm was open defecation in fields, among crops, and (in the town) into plastic bags thrown onto rooftops – a serious health hazard.</p>	<p>Virtually all SC-constructed latrines we viewed had solid (if basic) construction and were in reasonably good working condition.</p> <p>Since SC exited the impact area, community members in most kebeles (with the support of HEWs) had erected many more latrines (exact numbers are not known).</p> <p>As a result, most (7 of 11 visited) kebeles now had Excellent access to and use of latrines and 3 were in a Good situation. The one exception was in Woliso town.</p>
3. Nutrition, health, and hygiene training and establishment of water, sanitation and health (WASH) committees	<p>WASH Committees established in about 32 kebeles (included training for an unknown number of members)</p> <p>Education and training in hygiene and food safety in an unknown number of kebeles</p> <p>Education and training in nutrition and healthy eating in an unknown number of kebeles</p>	<p><u>High.</u> Oversight and fundraising for water and sanitation facilities was an important element for sustainment. Knowledge and skills in hygiene, food safety, nutrition, and healthy eating were generally low and an important cause of food- and water-borne illnesses.</p>	<p>WASH committees were still active in all the kebeles we visited, although some have been more successful than others, particularly with major challenges such as finding funding for things the community can't afford.</p> <p>Memories of SC's training of WASH committees was sketchy; only 4 kebeles were able to estimate how many members were trained, and the range was wide (from 5 to 70 people).</p> <p>Community members' memories of SC education and training in hygiene, food safety, nutrition, and healthy eating were similarly foggy. Some recalled it as direct training; some as a "train the community trainer" model; some as training of HEWs.</p> <p>The current situation is that WASH Committees collaborate with HEWs to share these different kinds of knowledge and skills with the community.</p>

CORE PROGRAMMING	WHAT WAS IMPLEMENTED	RELEVANCE TO NEEDS	CURRENT STATUS
4. Community health insurance scheme	Two community health insurance schemes (involving about 100 to 120 women) were set up in two kebeles within the Woliso municipality; included seed money of ETB20,000	<u>High need.</u> The two kebeles where these schemes were implemented were very impoverished areas of Woliso town, where health setbacks would cause serious hardship and many could not afford care.	Currently just <u>one</u> of the two community health insurance schemes is still running in Woliso town. Locals told us that the schemes had been only been partly successful because they did not adequately meet the needs of members, which led many people to quit the schemes. One example was that the scheme did not reimburse for expenses incurred at private clinics.

ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT (AD)

Table 4 provides a summary of SC Sponsorship-funded core programming related to Adolescent Development (AD), its relevance to the needs of youth and their families, and current status.

Table 4. Adolescent Development (AD)-related core programming implemented, relevance to needs, and current status

CORE PROGRAMMING	WHAT WAS IMPLEMENTED	RELEVANCE TO NEEDS	CURRENT STATUS
1. Construction and set-up of Adolescent Development Centers (ADCs), including income-generating activities (IGAs)	Two ADCs were constructed, one in Woliso town, one in a rural kebele (location could not be established). The Woliso ADC was built on a polluted site with untreated sewage and dimly lit, muddy access. It was originally set up with a TV and reading materials. Youth were put into groups and given seed money and a bank account for income-generating activities (IGAs) such as fattening cows and selling coffee.	<u>Moderately high need.</u> The ADC in the Woliso 03 kebele was in a particularly impoverished part of the community with very few opportunities for youth. Initial enthusiasm was high; enrollments were about 40 youth. Unfortunately the location of this ADC was not safe, and the design and implementation of its IGAs did not effectively address the needs of youth.	The original SC-built ADC in Woliso was a mud construction (2005); in 2011, government renovated it with more durable materials. When we visited in 2019, the ADC still had well-constructed buildings in good repair, including a cafeteria and library, but had not been operational for several years. A security guard was located on site and resources were reportedly being held in storage off-site. Enrollments dwindled and the site had fallen into disuse for two reasons: (i) its unsafe location, on polluted land with raw sewage; and (ii) the youth did not receive enough support to be able to effectively run their IGAs (e.g., coaching would have been useful; instead the approach was mainly initial training and seed money with no support afterwards).

CORE PROGRAMMING	WHAT WAS IMPLEMENTED	RELEVANCE TO NEEDS	CURRENT STATUS
2. Support for the formation of school clubs	Almost all of the new CBSs were supported to form school clubs, typically in school health and nutrition (SHN), adolescent sexual & reproductive health (ASRH), Red Cross, HIV/AIDS, environmental conservation, a girls' club, Afaan Oromo culture, minimedia, and sports. SC provided training, materials, and resources.	<u>Moderately high need</u> . School clubs engaged students and provided knowledge and skills in relevant areas that complemented in-classroom teaching. Some of the clubs also implemented income generating activities (IGAs; e.g., vegetable garden proceeds) to support youth activities.	All schools we visited still had some clubs operating in 2019, but all had experienced a substantial drop-off in the number, range, and/or quality of clubs since SC exited the area. The most common reason for this post-SC-exit decline was that resources and materials were now out of date, had dwindled, or were no longer available. For example, the Red Cross clubs initially had bandages and first aid kits; the SHN clubs had seeds for planting; sports clubs had balls; etc. Without these resources, the club's activities are limited.

KEQ 2. OUTCOMES & IMPACTS INFLUENCED BY SC

How valuable were the outcomes and impacts of these efforts, especially for children and their families, but also for communities, government agencies and their officials? How well have those impacts been sustained or grown over time? Where and for whom did the most powerful and long-lasting impacts occur, and why?

The outcomes and impacts influenced by Sponsorship core programming fall into four broad categories: (a) education, career, and livelihoods; (b) health and wellbeing; (c) community capacity, empowerment, and self-determination; and (d) government thinking and action.

EDUCATION, CAREERS, AND LIVELIHOODS

Access to education was the strongest and most striking outcome of SC's investments in community-based schools (construction, training, furniture and teaching materials, clubs, and PTAs). Students who attended SC-constructed schools completed an average of **4.5 more years of schooling** than they likely would have if a school had not been constructed by SC.

Improved equality of access to education was strongly evident (see Figure 13, p. 22):

- The less formal education children were likely to have received otherwise, the greater the impact (boost in number of years of formal education).
- Improved gender equality was somewhat evident – more girls were among those who would otherwise have received much less education.
- Robust qualitative evidence supports and explains these findings, as well as likely effects for children with disabilities and those living in extreme poverty.

The impact on the careers, incomes, and socioeconomic status of the young people trained by SC as facilitators (paraprofessionals, and later teachers) was the most substantial and life-changing impact experienced by anyone in the impact area. These were young people who had completed some high school but were unemployed at the time and did not have many options; most would otherwise have been subsistence farmers or similarly low-paid occupations. In 2019, some were still teaching, while others had been promoted into leadership positions in schools or in government agencies. A summary of the economic benefits is presented under KEQ 4. Value for Investment (Vfi), p. 72.

In addition, we identified several important **ripple effects, especially for these former facilitators' own children**, who were being raised in higher-income, more educated households with a professional parent as a role model, access to much better resources, and higher income security. The value of these young people as **role models for children from the same kebele** was also substantial. Anecdotally, this was especially true for young women teachers, who had reportedly been a source of inspiration to girls aspiring to pursue professional careers.

One more group that experienced career and income benefits from SC's investment were **water caretakers**. Although many who were initially trained later moved to other occupations, those who stuck with the work were able to **earn money maintaining water systems outside their home kebeles** (they were expected to maintain their home kebele water schemes for free). These water caretakers work as contractors for the government and/or for other kebeles, using their skills to create and run thriving businesses – a substantial socioeconomic impact for them and their families.

HEALTH AND WELLBEING

The key aspects of Sponsorship core programming that contributed to health and wellbeing outcomes and impacts were: (1) the water systems and sanitation facilities and (2) education and training in hygiene, food safety, nutrition, and healthy eating. A 3rd possible contributor was in Woliso town, where the one surviving community health insurance scheme presumably contributes to health and wellbeing outcomes for its members; however, we were not able to secure enough interviews or evidence to estimate this impact.

The health and resulting economic benefits of **access to clean water and sanitation facilities** have been well documented in the literature. We draw on these to answer KEQ 4. Value for Investment (Vfi), p. 72. To get a sense of which of these benefits were most life-changing for children and their families in the Woliso impact area, we interviewed parents/ community members to find out.

- 77% said **closer access to clean water** had had a *very substantial impact* on their lives and health. The most mentioned benefit (89%) was children and family members getting sick less often; the second (80%) was the time and energy saved fetching water.
- 73% said **access to latrines, showers, and clothes washing facilities** had had a *very substantial impact* on their lives and health. The most mentioned benefits were children and families getting sick less often (85%) and feeling better for feeling cleaner (71%). Many also mentioned privacy, particularly for girls and women and especially during menstruation. People were happy to be living in open defecation free environment, which was not the case before.

- The one **negative outcome** we heard was that, due to shortages in the water supply, there have sometimes been arguments about how much water each household is allowed to collect.

Also contributing to the above outcomes (particularly with respect to water- and food-borne illnesses) were the **education and training** in hygiene (including proper use of latrines), food safety, nutrition, and healthy eating. The other key relevant outcomes were:

- **Knowledge, skills, and practice of good hygiene and food safety** was improved, on average, from Problematic (pre training) to Good (post training). In 2019, all kebeles we were able to rate had sustained this at the Good level or (in one case) improved it to Excellent.
- **Knowledge of nutrition and eating a healthy diet** was improved, on average, from Problematic (pre training) to mostly Good or OK (post training); currently all but one kebele we were able to rate has sustained or improved that to Good, while one has sustained it at an OK level.

It is important to note that there have been several other organizations and groups that have contributed to these health and wellbeing outcomes, particularly their sustainment. These include the Water and Sanitation arms of local government, Health Extension Workers (HEWs), and kebele WASH committees. SC's work was most certainly the driving force initially, and others then willingly picked it up, as SC intended.

COMMUNITY CAPACITY, EMPOWERMENT, AND SELF-DETERMINATION

The key aspects of Sponsorship core programming that could have contributed most directly to community capacity, empowerment, and self-determination were: (1) the SC-supported formation and training of PTAs for each of the community-based schools; (2) the WASH Committees to oversee community water, sanitation, and health; (3) income-generating activities run for youth; and (4) the community health insurance groups set up in Woliso town. We also identified some relevant effects from (5) SC's training of school facilitators and water caretakers.

In kebeles where community-based schools were constructed and **Parent Teacher Associations (PTAs)** set up and trained to run them, there had clearly been a substantial shift toward community ownership of K-8 education. Whereas previously parents had sent children to schools several km away, local PTAs are now empowered to oversee education in their own kebeles. Although not all PTAs are still fully successful (see p. 35), the overall effect has certainly been valuable for the PTAs and the community.

WASH Committees set up and trained to oversee water, sanitation, and health have also contributed to the shift toward community empowerment and self-determination. Again, there is some variation in the capacity and success of these committees (see p. 49) but overall the effects on community capacity, empowerment, and self-determination have been good, enhanced by the ongoing support of HEWs.

Income-generating activities (IGAs) for youth were another part of core programming that had the potential to affect community capacity, empowerment, and self-determination. The most intensive versions of these were implemented as part of the adolescent development centers (ADCs), but some appear to have occurred through some of the school clubs. Despite asking about these in the kebeles we visited, we found only weak traces and memories of IGAs; their overall effect was weak.

Of two **community health insurance schemes** set up in Woliso town with SC's support, only one was still functioning, and has been only partly successful (see p. 53). Evidence that it had built community capacity, empowerment, and self-determination was thin; this impact was weak to moderate at best.

Finally, a more subtle impact on community capacity, empowerment, and self-determination was evident from **SC's training of education facilitators and water caretakers** in the kebeles we visited. At one level, the effect was purely practical, i.e., the community now had the expertise to educate and to install and fix water systems whereas previously it had not.

Later, as some of the facilitators ended up promoted into positions as government officials (e.g., in Water & Sanitation, Transportation, etc.), this created a line of contact with the local woreda offices, which made it more possible to successfully obtain support. A more indirect effect was that these role models were important beacons of hope and possibility, which clearly had had an empowering effect on communities (especially children and their parents) psychologically.

GOVERNMENT THINKING AND ACTION

All of SC's activity in the Woliso impact area needed to be approved by and, in some cases, completed in collaboration with the relevant government agencies. The nature and extent of that collaboration varied quite widely, but there were some clear areas where SC's work served as a catalyst for government action and/or almost certainly influenced thinking:

- At SC's suggestion, government agreed to employ SC-trained facilitators as teaching staff in SC-built community-based schools and/or elsewhere after they had completed their SC-sponsored training at Teacher Training Institutes. Effectively, they took over responsibility for staffing those new schools with government-employed teachers.
- In support of the various SHN initiatives instigated by SC, government provided support in the form of HEWs to collaborate in several SC-led initiatives and later to support WASH Committees to continue this work. The strongest pockets of support we found were HEWs' high involvement in latrine construction and supporting the education and training work of WASH committees.
- With many of the SC-trained facilitators eventually moving into government roles, some of them quite senior, it is clear that these people's local knowledge of the needs and strengths of the impact area kebeles has been helpful for informing government priorities. Although we were not able to explore this deeply, there were cases where this knowledge (and connections with the communities) had led to more effective support for particular kebeles. It is highly likely there are many more examples we did not uncover.
- Although this wasn't specifically explored, it is highly likely that SC's early engagement with government and sharing with them the findings of their local needs assessments provided useful information to government kebele and woreda offices. In addition, seeing SC's actions and their effects would have given examples of useful and practical ways to support these communities.

KEQ 3. SIDE IMPACTS & RIPPLE EFFECTS

What other actions, reactions, or changes have been inspired or catalyzed by the SC-funded work in the Woliso impact area – locally, regionally, and/or nationally – and how important were they, particularly in ways that impacted the lives of children and their families? (more details: p. 57)

A number of positive changes were inspired by SC's work without having been originally planned or expected as an intentional effect. Most of these happened at the kebeles level, even though a few were reported beyond the Woliso impact area.

At the kebele level, positive side effects related to:

- (i) the development of a culture of community mobilization – examples included saving money collectively to resolve pressing issues in the communities and getting better organized to put pressure on government to help address important need;
- (ii) changes in attitudes towards education, sanitation and hygiene – examples include families valuing sending their children to school, especially the girls, and open defecation being considered a shameful practice.

Beyond the impact area, SC's work in Woliso has helped to:

- (i) Influence the development of an important national study in education to determine whether community and government schools provided adequate opportunities to ensure that children learn to read fluently in Grade 3 – the Early Grade Reading Assessment (EGRA). This study has influenced the establishment of government efforts to improve the quality of education in the country.
- (ii) Create a national school health and nutrition (SHN) strategy. SC's pioneering work on SHN influenced the National School Health and Nutrition Taskforce to developing the first national SHN Strategy for Ethiopia.
- (iii) [Possibly] influenced the creation of a government's community insurance program, based on the experience SC pioneered in Woliso. Causal inference is thin here, however. Even though the government's insurance program started after SC's experience, the evaluation team was not able to delve deep enough to find robust evidence that the government's program was in fact inspired by SC's model. However, it most certainly could have been.



Figure 57. Kebele administrative offices in the Woliso 03 kebele (Woliso town)

KEQ 4. VALUE FOR INVESTMENT (VFI)

Overall, how valuable have the Woliso area impacts been (to children, their families, communities, government agencies and their officials, the region, and beyond) relative to what was invested to obtain them?

SC's estimated investment in the Woliso Impact Area between 2002 and 2010 was of, approximately, US\$22.5 million, adjusted to 2019 US dollars. This amount was invested in different programmatic areas (BE, ECCD, SHN, AD and other) and non-programmatic support (HQ and local office staff, travel, rent, telecommunications, office equipment and supplies, etc.) as shown in Figure 58.





Figure 58. SC's estimated investment in the Woliso Impact Area (2002-2010) by area of support

This investment resulted in several significant changes as described in the answers to KEQs 1, 2 and 3 above. For the Value for Investment (Vfi) analysis, we identified three outcomes for which we collected primary data on current and future financial benefits for individuals and the society. They were: (i) current and future earnings from school facilitators trained and supported by SC; (ii) additional years of schooling for children that attended schools built by SC; and (iii) stream of potential societal benefits from people's access to clean water and sanitation facilities.

EDUCATION FACILITATORS' INCOME STREAMS

During the course of several years in the Woliso impact area, SC trained about 130 recent high-school graduates to become education facilitators for the 21 new schools they built. The government agreed to hire those facilitators after they received formal training through the teachers' training institutes. All Facilitators completed their training after, approximately, three years with support from SC, and were hired by the government to continue to work in the SC built schools. Besides paying for their salaries, the government also provided a plot of land for the Facilitators working in the Woliso woreda (about 87)

Comparing the resources invested by SC in training and supporting young adults to become government employed teachers (some progressed to higher government positions) and the monetary returns already achieved and future estimated gains, we can state with confidence that **this investment was worth it**. With an investment of about **US\$ 1.35 million**, the current and future monetary return for the former facilitators plus the estimated value for the plot of land received amount to, approximately, between **US\$ 5.1 and \$ 6.2 million**.




This means that for every dollar invested by SC provided a potential return of US\$ 3.80 in financial benefits to former facilitators in the least optimistic scenario and US\$ 4.60 for more optimistic scenario.

RETURNS TO INVESTMENT IN EDUCATION

The potential future economic return to children and adolescents (and their families) who, because of the availability of schools built by SC in their communities, ended up pursuing further education was another venue explored. In average, the **children that went to the schools built by SC spent 4.5 more years in school** than they would have if the SC schools had not been built.

SC invested, approximately, **US\$11.3 million** in Basic Education and Early Childhood Care and Development activities that included building and renovating schools in the Woliso impact area. Our evaluation estimated that having access to the schools built by SC helped ensure additional **4.5 years** of schooling for the children and adolescents who attended those schools. The estimated collective future lifetime additional income for those children/adolescents would be **US\$137.5 million**.



The ultimate conclusion here is that **for every dollar invested by SC in education there is a potential return of about 12 dollars in lifetime financial benefits** to the (now) young women and men who attended the schools built by SC.

RETURNS TO INVESTMENT IN WATER AND SANITATION

SC invested, approximately, **US\$4.7 million** in building and maintaining water schemes and sanitation facilities in the kebeles covered. With no primary data available on possible benefits resulting from this investment, we turned to the strongest and most relevant previous research. A WHO study calculated that the return on investment in water and sanitation services in sub-Saharan Africa is estimated at **US\$2.70 to every dollar invested**.¹⁸

To avoid overestimation, we factored in the observed loss of 41% of the water schemes created and maintained with support from SC. After the discount, we estimate a return of **US\$7.5 million equivalent in benefits** in (i) health care savings (healthier people seek less care), (ii) reduced losses of productive days due to disease, (iii) time savings resulting from more convenient drinking-water and sanitation services, and (iv) values of premature deaths averted (based on discounted future earnings)

Considering the estimated investment and benefits, a **return of US\$1.59 for every dollar invested** is expected.




Figure 59. A large water tank installed as part of the SC-supported upgrade of Goro Town's water supply

KEQ 5. SUSTAINABILITY

What made the greatest difference in ensuring how well core programming outcomes and their long-term impacts were sustained after close-out? What were the gaps or challenges that limited sustainment?

How well solutions, outcomes, and impacts were sustained was covered under core programming (KEQ 1), outcomes and impacts (KEQ 2), and side impacts and ripple effects (KEQ 3). Looking across these findings, we found several themes and patterns around what made for what helped solutions, outcomes, and impacts last longer and (in some cases) improve further over time.

When we refer to something as “**sustainable**,” we are primarily referring to its durability, adaptability, and expandability as a *lasting solution or effect*.

A sustainable solution, outcome, or impact is also one that meets not just immediate but also longer-term needs – including not adversely impacting the rights of future generations to benefit from community resources (natural, human, and other).

This definition encompasses durability/longevity as well as financial and environmental sustainability and community capacity to manage its resources.

What helped solutions, outcomes, and impacts to last and be built upon?

1. Well-designed, durable, environmentally sound solutions with a reasonable expected lifetime, good availability of materials and parts to repair and maintain them, and no adverse impact on the natural environment.
2. Sound training of community members with the professional and technical expertise they needed to run and maintain whatever was implemented (e.g., teachers, water caretakers).
3. Financially sustainable business models that allowed those trained to be able to use their expertise for the good of their home kebeles (e.g., water caretakers being able to earn income by contracting with other kebeles and woredas; trained facilitators being paid by government).
4. Community committees and groups (e.g., WASH Committees, PTAs) empowered with the knowledge, skills, know-how, and confidence they needed to effectively oversee and manage what had been put in place – including collecting contributions from their communities to fund modest ongoing work, plus finding additional support for things they couldn’t solve themselves.
5. Practical support from government to assist committees and communities (e.g., HEWs’ support of WASH Committee work); to stay informed of their successes and needs; and (although this only happened in a limited way) to fund/provide replacements and expansions, particularly of expensive items (e.g., water schemes, school buildings, teachers).
6. Effective succession planning to ensure that knowledge, skills, effective committee structures, and commitment were passed on to new generations.
7. Community determination, commitment, and engagement to keep up the work.
8. SC-trained facilitators being promoted into government leadership positions. There, they could put to good use their deep knowledge of community strengths and needs and their strong connections/relationships to forge effective government-community collaboration and ensure that community needs and aspirations were supported.

What limited how long solutions, outcomes, and impacts lasted and were built upon?

1. Relatively lower-cost, less durable solutions for major items (e.g., buildings, water supplies) with short expected lifespans and no agreements in place for major maintenance and replacements that communities could not possibly afford. [There is a difficult cost/coverage/lifespan tradeoff between meeting the needs of more people in the short term vs. a smaller number of more expensive but longer-lasting solutions that would serve fewer people for longer.]
2. Solutions designed to address the needs of the current population with no plans or agreements in place for how they would be expanded or continued to meet the needs of future and/or growing populations (e.g., water supplies, school building capacity).
3. Buildings located in unsafe, polluted, or relatively inaccessible areas (e.g., ADCs).
4. A lack of follow-up support and coaching to ensure effective application of training (e.g., income generating activities for youth) or support to evaluate and redesign initiatives found to be less effective (e.g., community health insurance schemes).
5. Gaps in the training of maintenance people, so that certain problems were outside their expertise to fix (e.g., more complex water systems).
6. Unavailability or unaffordability of spare parts for repairs and maintenance, or of vehicles (and roads) to transport large items to town for repair.
7. A lack of training or planning to help PTAs figure out how to create or replace learning materials and resources used for school clubs and other activities.
8. Communities with very limited capacity to fund repairs, maintenance, and materials.
9. Gaps in the training and support of committees and community groups to help them (i) troubleshoot unexpected challenges; (ii) forge effective collaborative relationships with government agencies; (iii) source funding and support for projects the community cannot afford or effectively implement by themselves; (iv) engage in succession planning; and (v) maintain community engagement and enthusiasm for the ongoing community development work.
10. Weak government support for ongoing development efforts, particularly for communities who have no strong connections within the various government agencies.
11. High turnover of government support staff working in or with communities (e.g., teachers, health center staff) and of committee members (PTAs and WASH committees), resulting in a loss of knowledge, cohesion, relationship quality, and effectiveness.
12. Insufficient numbers of teachers initially trained in ECCD, coupled with a lack of understanding of the importance of this expertise, as evidenced in the reassignment of ECCD teachers to upper classes and their replacement with untrained teachers.
13. A lack of ongoing professional learning (refresher training) for teachers (SC-trained and others) and water caretakers, including coverage of the valuable skills SC training provided (particularly for those who did not originally receive that training), plus ways to update those skills.

KEQ 6. OWNERSHIP TRANSITION & EXIT.

Looking back, how well did SC's ownership transition processes work to empower communities to better support children after the conclusion of SC's work in the Woliso impact area? What factors made a difference for achieving a smooth and supportive transition?

In general, SC took proper measures and was successful in empowering individuals, schools and communities to ensure continuity of some important changes produced by the work done in the Woliso impact area – e.g. maintenance of water schemes and latrines, basic and early childhood education activities, community WASH committees, and school PTAs governance and activities. However, there were important issues not properly resolved in the exit strategy, including lack of proper conversations with some communities that were still on dramatic social conditions.

SC did a very good job in contributing to develop the capacity of many key actors within the communities and schools (e.g., WASH committee, water caretakers, education facilitators, PTAs, youth clubs, etc.) so that important changes produced as part of the interventions could be locally owned and maintained after they phaseout. This strategy produced good results – e.g., many WASH committees and PTAs still active and water caretakers still maintaining the water schemes in several communities.

However, there were some issues appointed by key stakeholders from half of the 12 kebeles visited by the evaluation team indicating that the transition process did not go as smoothly as expected. Some of them were surprised with SC's exit either because they lacked proper warning (adequate exit conversations with SC staff) or because their kebeles were still in a dare situation on some basic needs.

Relying on government authorities to take responsibility in supporting the communities to consolidate and further the positive changes produced by SC's interventions did not turn out as a successful transition strategy. The government continued to pay the salaries of the teachers working in the schools built by SC and in rare occasions even assigned additional teachers to fulfill school needs in a few kebeles. However, the local governments have chronic lack of resources; usually just enough to cover the salaries of their civil servants. There is not enough money left for maintaining what is already in place, and even less to invest in new projects or buildings.



Figure 60. An extended family's cluster of houses (Warabu Bariho kebele)

APPENDIX 1: EVALUATION RUBRICS

Throughout the report, mixed method evidence has been synthesized and interpreted using **evaluation rubrics**, which allow us to provide succinct evaluative conclusions. The following is a brief explanation of rubrics-enhanced evaluation¹³ theory and methodology.

Evaluation rubrics help us go straight to the core of what evaluation is. Evaluation is the systematic determination of the quality, value, and/or importance of whatever is being evaluated – including its design, implementation, outputs, outcomes, impacts, value for investment, and overall significance. This means that evaluation’s fundamental task is to ask and answer *evaluative questions* about not just what the results were in these various areas, but explicitly stating how good, valuable, and/or important they were – and why.

Evaluation rubrics theory and methodology is a systematic, transparent, and flexible/responsive set of guidelines for defining quality, value, and importance in ways that are relevant, valid, appropriate, and useful for a particular context, culture, and intended use – and for interpreting evidence against those definitions. Rubrics methodology guides how we define “how good is good” and how we use evaluative reasoning to interpret evidence and support evaluative claims.

The rubrics used in this evaluation were developed based on a range of documentation and research, incorporating the lived experiences and realities of community members as well as the observations and expertise of those who worked closely with them. The rubrics were developed collaboratively by Real Evaluation and our Ethiopia-based evaluation team (most of whom had grown up in similar kebeles in the general area) and were further refined after testing in the field.

¹³ Explanations are excerpts (used with permission) from: Davidson, E. J. (2020). *Rubrics-enhanced evaluation*. [Book manuscript in preparation.]

See also: Davidson, E. J. (2005). *Evaluation methodology basics: The nuts and bolts of sound evaluation*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Rubrics-Enhanced Evaluation online learning options: <https://realevaluation.com/learn-how/e-clinic/>

For a low-cost, succinct guide to a KEQs-driven, rubrics-enhanced approach to evaluation, Dr. Davidson’s minibook is available in several languages:


Davidson, E. J. (2012) *Actionable evaluation basics: Getting succinct answers to the most important questions* [minibook]. Auckland, NZ: Real Evaluation.

Davidson, E. J. (2013). *Principios básicos de la evaluación para la acción: Obteniendo respuestas sucintas a las preguntas más importantes*. (P. Rodriguez-Bilella, Trans.). Real Evaluation.


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
RUBRIC: EQUITABLE ACCESS TO EDUCATION IN WELL-CONSTRUCTED AND WELL-MAINTAINED SCHOOLS

 <p>Dire</p>	 <p>Problematic</p>	 <p>OK</p>	 <p>Good</p>	 <p>Excellent</p>
<p>There is no school in the kebele; the nearest school is a significant distance. As a result, parents are reluctant to send their young children, especially girls, because they are susceptible to abduction, rape and various kinds of harassments. As a result, most students do not attend school until they are older, and many students never attend school at all.</p>	<p>A school has been constructed, but the materials/design are not durable. As a result, it is dilapidated, with urgent maintenance issues, many of which are safety hazards. Some buildings may be completely beyond repair or at the end of their lives. These schools are uncondusive for teaching and learning. The school has latrines, but they may be in a state of disrepair, unusable, and/or the water supply is no longer functional.</p>	<p>Schools are constructed, with reasonable quality materials, but there may be several maintenance issues that need attention, but none that are serious safety issues for children. Re: location, they may be far from home for students in some villages. As a result, several students drop out or do not attend school.</p>	<p>There are one or two schools in the kebele located at a reasonable distance from most villages but may be more than 30 minutes' walk for a 7-year-old from some locations. Construction is reasonably durable, but needs a few minor repairs, and is barely large enough to serve the child population of the kebele (class sizes are big). The school has water and segregated latrines, making it a conducive environment for girls as well as boys. Dropout rates are low.</p>	<p>There are one or two schools in the kebele located at a reasonable distance from all the villages, less than 30 minutes' walk for a 7-year-old. Construction is durable, in good repair, and is large enough to serve the child population of the kebele. The school has water and segregated latrines, making it a conducive environment for girls as well as boys. Dropout rates are very low.</p>


RUBRIC: AVAILABILITY, QUALITY AND ADEQUACY OF SCHOOL FURNITURE AND TEACHING RESOURCES

 <p>Dire</p>	 <p>Problematic</p>	 <p>OK</p>	 <p>Good</p>	 <p>Excellent</p>
<p>Either there is no school in the kebele (and no furniture) OR there are no chairs, tables, or black boards OR they are in a serious state of disrepair and almost all unusable.</p> <p>Students are sitting on stones or bring chairs from their home.</p>	<p>There are only a few chairs and tables available, but not enough for all of the students. Due to this, the students are in conflict with one another over the chairs. Blackboards may exist and are somewhat usable, but they may be in poor condition or chalk may be in poor supply.</p>	<p>Almost enough tables and chairs are available for the number of student (although seating may be crowded). Some tables and chairs may need repairs. There are some books but many are out of date or very worn-out.</p>	<p>There are enough or almost enough chairs, tables, books and black boards in the school, and they are in reasonably good repair. There is usually enough chalk and a few good teaching resources to help engage the students.</p>	<p>There are enough chairs, tables, books and blackboards in every classroom, and they are in very good repair and conducive for teaching and learning. There is plenty of chalk, as well as several good teaching resources that help engage the students.</p>


RUBRIC: ADEQUACY OF STUDENT:TEACHER RATIO AND QUALITY OF TEACHING

 <p>Dire</p>	 <p>Problematic</p>	 <p>OK</p>	 <p>Good</p>	 <p>Excellent</p>
<p>There is no school OR there are too few teachers to accommodate all the students, even in a crowded classroom. OR, the conditions for teaching are so difficult or the quality of training so weak that even minimally acceptable quality teaching is not possible. Enrollments are likely to be low and dropouts high.</p>	<p>There are barely enough teachers and/or facilitator to serve the students, so teachers are very overloaded and classrooms crowded (typically >80). Salaries may be problematically low, so that teaching staff need to engage in other income generating activities, which draws their energy from teaching. Due to shortages, some people are teaching outside of their areas of expertise.</p>	<p>There are just enough teachers and/or facilitators to accommodate the students, but class size is quite high (typically about 60 to 80 per class). Most teachers have been well trained and are teaching in their areas of expertise. Salaries are almost adequate, so that teachers only engage in minor additional income generating activities and can focus adequately on teaching.</p>	<p>There are enough teachers and/or facilitators to accommodate the students, and class size is reasonable (typically about 40 to 60 students per class). Teaching staff are generally well trained and supported (by leaders and the community), and the quality of teaching and learning are good. Students are mostly engaged; enrollments are strong, and dropout rates low.</p>	<p>There are enough teachers and/or facilitators, with a good teacher:student ratio (typically fewer than 40 students per class). Teaching staff are well trained in both pedagogy and classroom management, and all are teaching within their areas of expertise. They are well supported by leaders and the community. As a result, students are highly engaged and the quality of teaching and learning is high. Enrollments are high and dropouts very low; children are keen to attend.</p>


RUBRIC: ADEQUACY AND QUALITY OF EARLY CHILDHOOD CARE & DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES

 <p>Dire</p>	 <p>Problematic</p>	 <p>OK</p>	 <p>Good</p>	 <p>Excellent</p>
<p>No pre-primary education at all OR it is available but some subgroups of young children do not have access.</p>	<p>Some pre-primary learning but, because current staff have had no training specifically in ECCD (how to work effectively with very young children). Staff are underqualified and on low pay. Learning doesn't cover a lot of important ECCD content (e.g., just cognitive learning), or the facilities are not conducive (e.g. no classroom), or several children do not have access.</p>	<p>There is some early childhood care and development facility at the school, but not all teaching staff have been well trained in essential ECCD skills such as play-based learning. The unit may be understaffed or the unit may be short on resources; there is significant room for improvement.</p>	<p>Well trained early childhood educators deliver good ECCD programming in well-designed facilities, covering not just academic learning but other development activities for young children. There may be some minor room for improvement (e.g., more emphasis on play, better resources, more up-to-date teaching practices, better recruitment and/or attendance).</p>	<p>Highly effective ECCD offered, covering not just academic learning but play-based development. The ECCD is high quality and highly engaging, and as a result there is very good enrollment and attendance from a wide range of children. Facilities are very good, and the location has good accessibility for all the young children in the kebele.</p>


RUBRIC: PTA LEVEL OF ENGAGEMENT AND EFFECTIVENESS

 <p>Dire</p>	 <p>Problematic</p>	 <p>OK</p>	 <p>Good</p>	 <p>Excellent</p>
<p>Parents are not at all engaged in their children’s education or the school. As a result, children’s attendance is very low and/or several major behavior problems are occurring.</p>	<p>There are a few parents involved with the school (through a PTA or not), but significant numbers are not involved at all. As a result, the school experiences several issues with attendance, behavior, or learning.</p>	<p>There is a PTA, but it is not sufficiently active or productive to make much positive difference in children’s education.</p>	<p>The PTA is active and generally healthy, with mostly positive relationships. There are a few minor problems or areas for improvement.</p>	<p>The PTA is active, healthy, and has positive relationships with good involvement from a wide range of parents. The PTA is highly productive and they have good relationships with teachers and principals, and having a positive influence on the children, their behavior and learning.</p>

RUBRIC: ADEQUACY AND QUALITY OF SCHOOL ADOLESCENT CLUBS AND ADOLESCENT SEXUAL AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH TEACHING

 <p>Dire</p>	 <p>Problematic</p>	 <p>OK</p>	 <p>Good</p>	 <p>Excellent</p>
<p>Whether a youth club or training was ever in existence, the knowledge has not been retained in the community, and parents tend not to talk to their adolescents about these issues. As a result, there are serious problems among adolescents including lack of understanding of menstruation, unsafe sex and/or risky behaviors, resulting in STIs and unwanted pregnancies.</p>	<p>Although parents or others provide some guidance, this is not entirely effective. Many adolescents are still engaging in unsafe sex due to a lack of knowledge of sexual and reproductive health. If a club is running, it is not very effective or has very poor enrollment or attendance. There may not be teachers of both genders running the club.</p>	<p>School clubs are running and have both male and female teachers or facilitators, a dedicated room and at least some resources. Parent engagement may be patchy. Enrollment and/or attendance is likely to be weak, so not enough adolescents are taking advantage of the opportunity.</p>	<p>School clubs are alive and well, being run by well-trained teachers, and have good attendance, as well as good engagement of parents. There are some aspects that could be improved, but adolescents mostly have the knowledge they need about ASRH, and may take that home to influence their parents and siblings.</p>	<p>Well-trained teachers/facilitators teaching ASRH and/or economic opportunities in a well-attended club with many adolescents and their parents actively participating. Club is thriving. High quality tools and resources are available, attractive and useful.</p>

RUBRIC: QUALITY AND ADEQUACY OF WATER SUPPLY

 <p>Dire</p>	 <p>Problematic</p>	 <p>OK</p>	 <p>Good</p>	 <p>Excellent</p>
<p>No water schemes/ systems available; people spent more than 2 hours to fetch water; water quality was bad (people used unsafe water); people did not know how to treat their water at home; a large number of cases of chronic diarrhea especially among children with frequent outbreaks.</p>	<p>Only few people had access to clean water, but still spent a lot of time to fetch water; most people had access to unsafe water from distant sources and most did not know how to treat the water at home; fewer cases of chronic diarrhea especially among children with sporadic outbreaks.</p>	<p>About half of people had access to clean water from a close by source, but many spend a long time to fetch water from unsafe sources; about half of the latter group knew how to treat the water at home; fewer cases of chronic diarrhea especially among children, but no outbreaks.</p>	<p>Most people had access to clean water year-around from a close by source at the community; the ones that did not have access to clean water were able to properly treat their water at home (e.g., chlorine, boiling); very few cases of chronic diarrhea among children and no outbreaks</p>	<p>The vast majority of people had access to piped water in their houses (or yard) year-around from a safe source; no cases of chronic diarrhea.</p>


RUBRIC: ACCESS TO AND USE OF QUALITY LATRINES

 <p>Dire</p>	 <p>Problematic</p>	 <p>OK</p>	 <p>Good</p>	 <p>Excellent</p>
<p>No household or public latrines available; open field defecation with visible faeces and bad smell; a large number of cases of chronic diarrhoea or worm-caused abdominal bloating especially among children with frequent outbreaks.</p>	<p>Few public latrines of poor quality, faeces around the latrines, bad odour issues; open field defecation is prevalent a large number of cases of chronic diarrhoea or worm-caused abdominal bloating especially among children with frequent outbreaks.</p>	<p>Some public latrines of reasonable quality, some people use them; open field defecation is still a problem; fewer cases of diarrhoea or worm-caused abdominal bloating especially among children, but no outbreaks.</p>	<p>Public latrines of good quality (including hand-washing facility) available to most people, and some latrines at the household or shared household level; open field defecation is a minor problem; very few cases of diarrhoea or worm-caused abdominal bloating especially among children and no outbreaks.</p>	<p>Almost all houses had their own well-built latrines with hand-washing facilities; there were also good public latrines available; open defecation free (ODF); no cases of chronic diarrhoea or worm-caused abdominal bloating.</p>


RUBRIC: QUALITY AND ADEQUACY OF CLOTHES WASHING FACILITIES

 <p>Dire</p>	 <p>Problematic</p>	 <p>OK</p>	 <p>Good</p>	 <p>Excellent</p>
<p>No clothes washing facilities; people wash their clothes in a river or stream; clothes are seldom washed given distance of water source</p>	<p>Few public clothes washing facilities are available, but they are seldom used by people because their location is not appropriate, or their structure and design are not good, or there is frequent lack of water.</p>	<p>Some public clothes washing facilities with reasonable quality, but the design is not adequate to all (e.g., too high for short people); located in an accessible position to most people; sometimes there is lack of water; most people like and use them; clothes are washed on reasonable frequency.</p>	<p>Several public clothes washing facilities are available in accessible locations, but there are some structural, design, or water supply issues that prevent some people from using them; clothes are washed reasonably frequently, when there is enough water.</p>	<p>The great majority of people have clothes washing facilities at a convenient location fed by a reliable source of water; clothes are cleaned as frequent as necessary.</p>


RUBRIC: QUALITY AND ADEQUACY OF SHOWER FACILITIES

 <p>Dire</p>	 <p>Problematic</p>	 <p>OK</p>	 <p>Good</p>	 <p>Excellent</p>
<p>No shower facilities; people bath in rivers or streams; They seldom bathe given distance of water source.</p>	<p>Few public shower facilities are available, but they are seldom used by people because their location is not appropriate, or their structure and design are not good, or there is frequent lack of water.</p>	<p>Some public shower facilities with reasonable quality, but there are some problems with structure or design (e.g., tap handle breaks frequently; lack of privacy; safety issues); located in an accessible position to most people; sometimes there is lack of water; most people like and use them; showers taken on reasonable frequency.</p>	<p>Several public shower facilities are available in accessible locations, but there are some structural or design issues that prevent some people from using them (e.g., maintenance issues); people shower frequently, but a few times there is lack of water.</p>	<p>The great majority of people use shower facilities of good quality and design, located at a convenient sites fed by a reliable source of water; people shower as frequent as necessary.</p>


RUBRIC: AVAILABILITY AND QUALITY OF WATER CARETAKERS

 <p>Dire</p>	 <p>Problematic</p>	 <p>OK</p>	 <p>Good</p>	 <p>Excellent</p>
<p>No water care takers available; when there are problems, untrained people try to repair, not always successfully, or just leave the problem unsolved</p>	<p>There are few water caretakers in other communities, but they are far away, or very expensive, or poorly trained; water problems frequently get unresolved.</p>	<p>There is a local person who has some knowledge and skills on water caretaking, but they have never received proper training and lack commitment to do his or her job; water problems are resolved most of the time, but not durable solutions.</p>	<p>There is a local person who was properly trained as a water caretaker, but lack some basic abilities and/or commitment to do his or her job properly; water problems are resolved most of the time with durable solutions.</p>	<p>There is more than one local person who was properly trained as a water caretaker with the necessary abilities and commitment to do their job properly; water problems are always resolved with durable solutions (when proper spare parts are available).</p>


RUBRIC: BASIC HYGIENE AND FOOD SAFETY KNOWLEDGE AND PRACTICE

 <p>Dire</p>	 <p>Problematic</p>	 <p>OK</p>	 <p>Good</p>	 <p>Excellent</p>
<p>Too many people did not know enough about basic hygiene practices (e.g., hand washing after using the restroom or before eating) and food safety (e.g., preserving food, washing fruits before eating them); a large number of cases of food borne diseases and chronic diarrhoea especially among children with frequent outbreaks.</p>	<p>Some people had enough knowledge about basic hygiene and food safety, but very few people put into practice their knowledge; a large number of cases of food-borne diseases and chronic diarrhoea especially among children with frequent outbreaks.</p>	<p>Most people had enough knowledge about basic hygiene and food safety, and about half of them put into practice their knowledge; fewer cases of food-borne diseases and chronic diarrhoea especially among children with sporadic outbreaks.</p>	<p>Most people had enough knowledge about basic hygiene and food safety, and the majority of them put into practice their knowledge; very few cases of food-borne diseases and chronic diarrhoea among children and no outbreaks.</p>	<p>The vast majority of people had appropriate knowledge and put into practice proper basic hygiene and food safety behaviour; no cases of chronic diarrhoea and very few cases of food-borne diseases.</p>

RUBRIC: NUTRITION KNOWLEDGE AND HABITS

 <p>Dire</p>	 <p>Problematic</p>	 <p>OK</p>	 <p>Good</p>	 <p>Excellent</p>
<p>Too many people did not know enough about and did not adopt good nutrition habits (e.g., eating healthier, greater variety, better tasting food); a large number of cases of malnutrition or obesity in the kebele.</p>	<p>Most people had enough knowledge about good nutrition habits, but very few people put into practice their knowledge; a large number of cases of malnutrition or obesity in the kebele.</p>	<p>Most people had enough knowledge about good nutrition habits, and about half of them put into practice their knowledge; fewer cases of malnutrition or obesity in the kebele.</p>	<p>Most people had enough knowledge about good nutrition habits, and the majority of them put into practice their knowledge; very few cases of malnutrition or obesity in the kebele.</p>	<p>The vast majority of people had appropriate knowledge and put into practice good nutrition habits; no cases of malnutrition or obesity in the kebele.</p>

RUBRIC: PARENTS PERCEIVE THEIR CHILDREN HAVE GOOD QUALITY EDUCATION

 <p>Dire</p>	 <p>Problematic</p>	 <p>OK</p>	 <p>Good</p>	 <p>Excellent</p>
<p>Very few parents consider their children have good quality education and present consistent evidence to support their claim.</p>	<p>Some parents consider their children have good quality education; there are major inconsistencies in the evidence presented to support their claim.</p>	<p>Most parents consider their children have good quality education; there are minor inconsistencies in the evidence presented to support their claim.</p>	<p>Virtually all parents consider their children have good quality education; there are minor inconsistencies in the evidence presented to support their claim.</p>	<p>Virtually all parents consider their children have good quality education and present consistent evidence to support their claim</p>



? Understand Causes of outcomes and impacts

Collect and analyze data to answer causal questions about what has produced outcomes and impacts that have been observed.

1. Check the results support causal attribution

How will you assess whether the results are consistent with the theory that the intervention produced them?

Gathering additional data:

Asking Key Informants to Attribute Causality: providing evidence that links participation plausibly with observed changes.

Modus Operandi: drawing on the previous experience of participants and stakeholders to determine what constellation or pattern of effects is typical for an initiative.

Process Tracing: focusing on the use of clues (causal-process observations, CPOs) to adjudicate between alternative possible explanations.

Analysis:

Check Dose-Response Patterns: examining the link between dose and response as part of determining whether the program caused the outcome.

Check Intermediate Outcomes: checking whether all cases that achieved the final impacts achieved the intermediate outcomes.

Approaches: the following approaches combine some of the above options together with ruling out possible alternative explanations:

Contribution Analysis, Collaborative Outcomes Reporting, Multiple Lines and Levels of Evidence (MLLE), Rapid Outcomes Assessment. See below for definitions.

Check Results Match a Statistical Model: comparing results with a statistical model to determine if the program caused the outcome.

Check Results Match Expert Predictions: making predictions based on program theory or an emerging theory of wider contributors to outcomes and then following up these predictions over time.

Check Timing of Outcomes: checking predicated timing of events with the dates of actual changes and outcomes.

Comparative Case Studies: using a comparative case study to check variation in program implementation.

Qualitative Comparative Analysis: comparing the configurations of different cases to identify the components that produce specific outcomes.

Realist Analysis of Testable Hypotheses: Using a realist program theory (what works for whom in what circumstances through what causal mechanisms?) to identify specific contexts where results would and would not be expected and checking these.

2. Compare results to the counterfactual

How will you compare the factual with the counterfactual - what would have happened without the intervention?

Experimental options (or research designs):

Control Group: comparing an untreated research sample against all other groups or samples in the research.

Quasi-experimental options (or research designs):

Difference in Difference (or Double Difference): the before-and-after difference for the group receiving the intervention (where they have not been randomly assigned) is compared to the before-after difference for those who did not.

Instrumental Variables: a method used to estimate the causal effect of an intervention.

Judgemental Matching: a comparison group is created by finding a match for each person or site in the treatment group based on researcher judgements about what variables are important.

Matched Comparisons: participants are each matched with a non-participant on variables that are thought to be relevant. It can be difficult to adequately match on all relevant criteria.

Propensity Scores: statistically creating comparable groups based on an analysis of the factors that influenced people's propensity to participate in the program.

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Sequential Allocation: a treatment group and a comparison group are created by sequential allocation (e.g. every 3rd person on the list).

Statistically Created Counterfactual: developing a statistical model, such as a regression analysis, to estimate what would have happened in the absence of an intervention.

Regression Discontinuity: comparing the outcomes of individuals just below the cut-off point with those just above the cut-off point.

Approaches: Randomized Controlled Trial (RCT): creating a control group and comparing this to one or more treatment groups to produce an unbiased estimate of the net effect of the intervention.

Non-experimental options:

Key Informant: asking experts in these types of programmes or in the community to predict what would have happened in the absence of the intervention.

Logically constructed counterfactual: using the baseline as an estimate of the counterfactual. Process tracing can support this analysis at each step of the theory of change.

3. Investigate possible alternative explanations

How will you investigate alternative explanations?

Force Field Analysis: providing a detailed overview of the variety of forces that may be acting on an organizational change issue.

General Elimination Methodology: this involves identifying alternative explanations and then systematically investigating them to see if they can be ruled out.

Key Informant: asking experts in these types of programmes or in the community to identify other possible explanations and/or to assess whether these explanations can be ruled out.

Process Tracing: ruling out alternative explanatory variables at each step of the theory of change.

Approaches: these approaches combine ruling out possible alternative explanations with options to check the results support causal attribution.

Contribution Analysis: assessing whether the program is based on a plausible theory of change, whether it was implemented as intended, whether the anticipated chain of results occurred and the extent to which other factors influenced the program's achievements.

Collaborative Outcomes Reporting: mapping existing data against the theory of change, and then using a combination of expert review and community consultation to check for the credibility of the evidence.

Ruling Out Technical Explanations: identifying and investigating possible ways that the results might reflect technical limitations rather than actual causal relationships.

Searching for Disconfirming Evidence/Following Up Exceptions: Treating data that don't fit the expected pattern not as outliers but as potential clues to other causal factors and seeking to explain them.

Statistically Controlling for Extraneous Variables: where an external factor is likely to affect the final outcome, it needs to be taken into account when looking for congruence.

Multiple Lines and Levels of Evidence (MLLE): reviewing a wide range of evidence from different sources to identify consistency with the theory of change and to explain any exceptions.

Rapid Outcomes Assessment: assessing and mapping the contribution of a project's actions on a particular change in policy or the policy environment.

Find options (methods), resources and more information on these tasks and approaches online at <http://betterevaluation.org/plan/understandcauses>

APPENDIX 3: INTERVIEWEES AND DOCUMENTS/FILES REVIEWED

NUMBER OF INTERVIEWEES BY CATEGORY:

Families (former students of SC community-based schools and/or their parents)	77
Community leaders	10
Kebele managers	10
School principals, teachers & PTA members	43
Former education facilitators trained by SC	19
Water system caretakers	8
Health Extension Workers	11
Government officials from the woreda offices in Woliso and Goro	15
Save the Children Ethiopia current and former staff	8
Total	201

(about 2/3 of families answered questions on education; the other 1/3 on health-related issues)

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4. Feeny, S., Westhorp, G., Jennings, M., Clarke, M., Donohue, C., Boxelaar, L., Mackintosh, A., Navez- John, K., Nyanhanda, T., Castro, J., and Wheatley, N. (2017). World Vision's Child Sponsorship: An Evaluation of Five Area Development Programmes, Report for World Vision International, May 2017.
5. Government of Ethiopia, Population Census Committee, Central Statistical Agency (2013). Population Projections for Ethiopia 2007-2037. Addis Ababa July 2013.
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12. WHO eHealth country profiles (2016). Ethiopia Country Profile. <http://www.who.int/goe>.
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15. Wydick, B, Glewwe, P & Rutledge, L. (2013). Does International Child Sponsorship Work? A Six-Country Study of Impacts on Adult Life Outcomes. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 121, No. 2, pp. 393-436.
16. SC internal files relevant to this RIE:
 - i. 06 GEI data - Ethiopia.xls (2005)
 - ii. 2007 global ed indicators - Ethiopia.xls (2007)
 - iii. Anex 2-Schools Targeted in Woliso.xls (2005)
 - iv. Annex 1-List of Water points constructed by Save the Children.doc (2008)
 - v. EA Draft Report_Notes by Rubric Area_11.02.17.docx (2018)
 - vi. ECO (Woliso) SHN Proj Descript 2003.doc (2003)
 - vii. Enrollment 2008 Woliso.xlsx (2008)
 - viii. EtCO (Woliso) SHN RF 2003.doc (2003)
 - ix. EtCO AD Baseline 2007.doc (2007)
 - x. EtCO Early Childhood Development Sit Anal 2005.doc (2005)
 - xi. EtCO Primary Education Baseline 2006.doc (2006)
 - xii. EtCO Primary Education Proj Descript 2003.doc (2003)
 - xiii. EtCo Sponsorship M&E Plan.docx (2012)
 - xiv. EtCO(Woliso) SHN-School, Health and Nutrition_ Sit Anal 2002.doc (2002)
 - xv. Ethiopia 05 Ben Count_12.14.xls (2004)
 - xvi. Ethiopia Country Office Phase Over Plan Step II Revised (R).doc (2009)
 - xvii. Ethiopia Country Office Woliso phaseover strategy Step I.doc (2009)
 - xviii. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF WOLISO IMPACT AREA.ppt (2003)
 - xix. NGOs Project Terminal Report.docx (2007)
 - xx. phase out & Suatainabilty plan of WIA, final2.doc (2006)
 - xxi. Results on Key Indicators_Ethiopia FY09 GEI_BE.xls (2009)
 - xxii. Results on Key Indicators_Ethiopia FY09 GEI_ECD_Annex H.xls (2009)
 - xxiii. Results_Annex 1-List of Water points constructed by Save the Children.doc (2009)
 - xxiv. Woliso - ECD & BE-Startegic Objective.xlsx (2011)
 - xxv. Woliso - Goal Indicator-BE pass rate.xlsx (2011)
 - xxvi. Woliso ECD_BE-Sponsorship Program_FY07-10.xlsx (2011)
 - xxvii. Woliso Fianl Program Operation Plan (POP) 2008.xls (2008)
 - xxviii. Woliso Lessons Learned ReportOct 2009.pdf (2009)
 - xxix. Woliso Need assessment report.doc (2001)
 - xxx. Woliso Strategic Meeting Report.doc (2004)
 - xxxi. Woliso Target Population.xls (2004)
 - xxxii. Woliso_IR 1A-ECD Enrollment.xlsx (2011)
 - xxxiii. Woliso-ECD & BE_IR 2, 3 & 4.xlsx (2011)
 - xxxiv. Woliso-ECD-BE_IR 1B 1C 1D-Teachers Parents.xlsx (2011)

APPENDIX 4. VALUE FOR INVESTMENT STUDY DETAILS

This appendix presents detailed information about the Value for Investment analysis. It starts describing how we have estimated the investment made by SC in the Woliso impact area from 2002 to 2010. Then, the rationale, strategies and results from the three studies we conducted to estimate current and future financial returns to individuals and society from SC's investment in specific education and health initiatives.

1. Magnitude of investment

The cost component

SC worked in the Woliso impact area as a major catalyst agent, contributing to address pressing educational and health needs of the children and families living in very poor rural communities in Ethiopia. The collaboration with communities and local governments was essential to achieve some impressive results observed so many years after SC's support ended. The bulk of the 'costs' related to designing and implementing the initiative's strategies and producing the observed changes was, no question, incurred by SC.

However, there were also other costs incurred by the communities and governments, especially people's time (community members and government officers). In economic assessments these other costs are usually estimated to make up a more comprehensive figure for the cost side of the analysis. Given the context for this broad initiative any estimate on these other costs would be extremely challenging and unreliable. Therefore, we will use SC's estimated investment as the best approximation we have to the real costs of the work done and results produced in the Woliso impact area.

We are conscious this could produce slightly more positive benefit-cost ratios, since the costs will be slightly underestimated. To reduce this potential treat, we have diligently made more conservative assumptions in all estimation of the monetary value of the outcomes/benefits produced by SC's work, in collaboration with the communities and local governments.

Besides the more technical-methodological explanation presented above, there is a conceptual argument to justify the use of SC's investment as the main cost estimation for this economic analysis. The idea of including all the costs and efforts put in by SC and others would be the right approach if we were trying to answer the question of whether everyone's collective investment was "worth it" in the end. But the evaluation question we are seeking to answer is whether SC's contributions were worth making given the value of the outcomes and impacts achieved. This is not to say that SC claims all credit for them. And in fact, if they could affirm that the results are 100% due to their work, it would be a failure of the intended model, which was to engage in joint efforts and to be a major catalyst and enabler of change rather than the sole creator.

SC's overall investment

One would think finding out how much money was invested in the Sponsorship Program in Woliso would be a relatively easy task. Not really. After so many years had passed (about 17 years), financial information on specific expenditures was no longer available. A system crash several years ago in one of the computers holding key programmatic and financial information on Sponsorship projects at SC Ethiopia headquarters in Addis Ababa significantly contributed to this data loss situation.

After key support from SCUS staff in Fairfield (CT), we were able to gather information about Sponsorship programmatic budgets for Woliso from 2002 to 2010. We know budgets and expenditures are different entities. However, without

access to actual expenditures, budgets become our best choice to estimate how much SC invested in that impact area. We were more confident to use these figures after hearing from a senior SC officer who worked in Woliso since the beginning of the Program, who said that he did not recall any major discrepancies between what was budgeted and what was actually spent.

There is, however, one **important caveat**. Sometime in 2005, SC started a new Sponsorship impact area in Ethiopia in the Tigray region. Unfortunately, **the budget for Tigray was not separated from the Woliso budget** until the last year they officially operated in Woliso, in 2010. Therefore, all estimated expenses for the Woliso impact area from 2005 to 2009 are overinflated with resources that were spent somewhere else. SC staff was unable to estimate the proportion of resources invested in each impact area, given the time that had passed, and we could not identify any additional source to help us make an accurate estimation.

Without more specific parameters, the evaluation team estimated that SC’s investment in Woliso probably corresponded to a little less than two-thirds (63%) of the total investment made by SC in both impact areas. To make that estimate, we took into account the fact that SC’s records indicated that 100% of the 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2010 Sponsorship budgets were exclusive for Woliso. For 2005 to 2009, given the similar nature of programmatic interventions in Tigray, we estimated that the expenditures were split roughly in equal parts between the two impact areas.

Table 1 shows the estimated amount of support provided by SC per year to the Woliso impact area from 2002 to 2010. All the values have been adjusted to 2019 US dollars, taking into account inflation and exchange rate. As we can see, SC invested about 22.5 million US dollars (2019 value) over the course of their intervention in the Woliso impact area.

Table 1. Estimated SC investment in the Woliso impact area per year in 2019 US dollars

Year	SC Investment
2002	\$1,567,595
2003	\$1,331,563
2004	\$2,821,208
2005	\$3,101,417
2006	\$2,891,008
2007	\$3,474,468
2008	\$1,815,738
2009	\$1,850,835
2010	\$3,632,179
Total	\$22,485,214

Breakdown of SC’s investment

With one exception (2002), the Sponsorship budgets were broken down by:

- (i) **SC’s main programmatic areas** (Basic Education, Early Childhood Care and Development, School Health and Nutrition and Adolescent Development),
- (ii) **Other initiatives** (HIV/AIDS, Food Security, Economic Opportunities, Emergency/Refugee and Institutional Development), and

- (iii) **Overall non-programmatic support**¹⁴ that corresponds to expenditures to manage and support SC's Sponsorship operations in Woliso including people's time at SC Ethiopia HQ and at the local office, as well as miscellaneous expenses with travel, rent, telecommunications, office equipment and supplies, assets costing less than \$5,000.00, building repair & maintenance, insurance, vehicle operations, etc.

The estimated proportion of Sponsorship investment by programmatic area and non-programmatic support is shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1. SC's estimated investment in the Woliso Impact Area (2002-2010) by area of support

Table 2 presents a breakdown of the estimated investment by SC in Woliso according to the categories above. The 2002 figures were estimated by averaging the investment made in years 2003 to 2010.

Table 2. SC investment in Woliso IA by programmatic areas and non-programmatic support

Categories	Amount
<i>Basic Education</i>	\$ 9,126,011
<i>Early Childhood Care and Development</i>	\$ 2,190,441
<i>School Health and Nutrition</i>	\$ 3,752,349
<i>Adolescent Development</i>	\$ 1,958,661
<i>Other Initiatives (e.g., HIV/AIDS, Food Security, Inst. Dev., etc)</i>	\$ 951,758
<i>Non-Programmatic Support</i>	\$ 4,503,258
Total Investment (2002-2010)	\$ 22,482,478¹⁵

Additional databases provided more detailed information about how the budgets were (or were intended to have been) spent within some of the major programmatic areas. We were specifically interested to learn about how much resource was spent on (i) school building and renovation, (ii) installation and maintenance of waters schemes and sanitation

¹⁴ Corresponds to the addition of columns "Multi-Sectoral" and "Total Non-Sectoral" in the Sponsorship spreadsheets from 2003 to 2009. For the 2010 budget, it corresponds to column "Total Non-Program". The 2002 Sponsorship budget was not discriminated by programmatic area; we estimated the budget breakdown averaging the breakdown for years 2003 to 2010.

¹⁵ The small discrepancy of 264 dollars between the total by category (Table 2) and the total by year (Table 1) is due to residual differences in monetary conversion processes to 2019 US dollars.

facilities, (iii) training of education facilitators for the newly built schools, (iv) youth clubs and adolescent centers, (v) school health & nutrition trainings offered to students, teachers, parents and community, and (vi) school educational materials & equipment.

The datasets were not complete. There was no data available for 2002 and 2003 on any of the projects of interest, and for 2009 there was no data on investment in school building and renovation. We estimated the missing data by averaging the information we had available. To address the issue of possible larger variation in the years with missing data, we created a 95% confidence interval. Table 3 presents the estimated SC investment in each of those specific projects.

Table 3. SC estimated investment in projects of interest from 2002 to 2010 (includes 95% confidence interval)

Categories	2019 US dollars		
	Average	Upper (95% CI)	Lower (95% CI)
<i>School building & Renovation</i>	\$ 8,675,438	\$ 9,099,930	\$ 8,250,945
<i>Water Schemes</i>	\$ 4,007,780	\$ 4,473,609	\$ 3,541,950
<i>Sanitation Facilities</i>	\$ 719,063	\$ 784,860	\$ 653,267
<i>Facilitators' Training</i>	\$ 1,323,160	\$ 1,402,997	\$ 1,289,508
<i>Youth clubs and Adolescent Centers</i>	\$ 1,364,504	\$ 1,486,012	\$ 1,242,995
<i>School Health & Nutrition Trainings</i>	\$ 751,790	\$ 817,126	\$ 686,454
<i>School educational materials & equipment</i>	\$ 2,440,521	\$ 2,602,135	\$ 2,278,907

2. Study on Education Facilitators' Income Streams

During the course of several years in the Woliso impact area, SC trained about 130 recent high-school graduates to become education facilitators for the new schools they built. The communities were responsible for appointing the youth to participate in this initiative. Even though no general list of youth trained as education facilitators is available, there is evidence that there was a gender unbalance in the selection. In all kebeles visited by the evaluation team, the great majority of the facilitators was comprised of men.

The initial training encompassed 21 full days of intensive basic training. On the job support as well as several refreshing/continuous education training, including leadership skills, took place throughout the period of time SC worked in Woliso.

SC also established an agreement with the government to hire those facilitators after they received formal training as teachers through the teachers' training institutes. The government fulfilled its promise. All facilitators, after one to three years working in the new schools went on to pursue a formal degree as a teacher. SC provided support for the facilitators by paying their course fees and offering a stipend similar to the salaries SC was paying them to work in the schools.

Holding a government job in Ethiopia is one of the most sought-after employment opportunities for the local population. With a troublesome economy, having a stable income and a life-time secured job is a major improvement and insurance for a better future. Even though the teachers' salary is low, it is a much better alternative than

subsistence farming occupations with unreliable and smaller gains, which is still the reality for the vast majority of the Ethiopian rural populations. As mentioned by a former SC staff that still live in the Woliso area:

"There is a significant economic impact [from SC's support to the facilitators]. If these young adults had not been trained and remained in the community, they would be farmers. In this country, it is just a survival occupation; this is the lowest on the economic ladder. Basically, hand to mouth, subsistence. Those who are engaged in farming are mostly neglected in social status. Becoming a government employee is the highest status. Those who were trained by SC would by now be earning 5,000 to 6000 ETB/month, so maybe 72,000 ETB/year. For a farmer, 5 sacks of cereal per year. One sack would be 3,000 ETB, so total 15,000 ETB/year."

A major challenge in any study trying to answer the value for investment question is to estimate, with reasonable reliability, actual monetary returns from the investment made on social transformation efforts. In this RIE, the income already received by the facilitators after becoming civil servants and the stream of income still to be earned by them clearly provided a good opportunity to explore this aspect.

How we did it

In 9 of the 12 kebeles intentionally selected to be visited as part of the RIE, SC built schools and trained educational facilitators. It is estimated that for each of those kebeles, SC trained about 5 to 7 facilitators. Our evaluation team was able to locate and interview 19 of the former facilitators. An important part of the interview protocol included detailed questions about the income received by the former facilitators from the time they left SC's payroll and became government employees. The answers provided enough information for us to track their specific income and jobs over time until September 2019.

To build a counterfactual, we have explored extensively what would most likely be their occupation/profession have they not been trained as educational facilitators by SC. The unanimous answer was a subsistence farmer, while a couple of them even recognized they could have ended up as criminals. We have also asked about what has happened to their colleagues that did not have the opportunity of becoming facilitators. Once more the answer was very much unanimous: "subsistence farmer". We asked the interviewees as well as some knowledgeable key informants in the region about average farmers' income from 2004 to 2019 to use as the basis for our estimations. Some variation in the estimates made the evaluation team build two scenarios – one with a more conservative/lower farmers' income and one with a more positive/higher farmers' income.

Comparing average year income

The comparison between the average earnings in local currency (Ethiopian Birr – ETB) from facilitators and subsistence farmers was made using two scenarios. The first, pictured in Figure 2, considers farmers' income growing on a slower pace. As shown in the graph, the differences in income between the two groups are impressive. In 2004, while newly hired teachers made an average 4,440 ETB per year a subsistence farmer made 1,840 ETB. In 2019, former facilitators had an average income of 61,562 ETB while small farmers made only around 15,000 ETB.




Figure 2. SC supported teachers experienced life-changing income boosts relative to the livelihoods they would have otherwise had (more optimistic scenario for SC)

The second scenario, shown in Figure 3, considers a higher income for Ethiopian subsistence farmers over the years, which results in a smaller difference between the two groups. In some early years, subsistence farmers even had better income than the former facilitators (2004-2007 and 2009-2011). But for the past 7 years the income from the former facilitators has consistently increased in a much faster pace. In 2019, while subsistence farmers made in average 18,000 ETB/year, the former facilitators made 61,562 ETB/year.




Figure 3. SC supported teachers experienced life-changing income boosts relative to the livelihoods they would have otherwise had (less optimistic scenario for SC)

Net gain

To estimate the net gain former facilitators had in comparison to the probable life they would have otherwise had as subsistence farmers, we converted all unadjusted income from both groups to 2019 US dollars, taking into account inflation and exchange rates. Figure 4 shows the evolution of the average net gains for former facilitators considering the counterfactual of their probable life as subsistence farmers. Again, the estimate uses two scenarios for the size of SC's impact: (i) a "more optimistic" scenario (farmers' income considered lower) and (ii) a "less optimistic" (farmers' income considered higher).




Figure 4. SC supported teachers had important net gain from 2004 to 2019 when compared to the life they would probably have experienced (adjusted to 2019 US dollars)

In the scenario where the farmers' income was estimated a bit higher, the cumulative net gain from 2004 to 2019 was in average **5,142** US dollars per former Facilitator. On the other hand, in the scenario where the farmers' income was estimated a bit lower, the individual average cumulative net gain was as high as **9,673** US dollars. If we extrapolate these figures to all 130 teachers supported by SC, we obtain an overall net gain between **668,460** and **1,257,490** US dollars.

Future gains

The benefits resulting from the training and support provided by SC to the former facilitators will have a life-long effect, since these are stable jobs and provide retirement pensions. The life-expectancy for Ethiopians is 66.34 in 2019. The former facilitators were trained when they were quite young, around 16 to 18 years old. Most of them are now in their late 20's or early 30's. Therefore, we can expect additional 35 years of income stream from their jobs as civil servants.

To assess this stream of income, we estimated future income for farmers and SC supported teachers for the next 35 years, applying a discount rate of 2%¹⁶. The estimated total 35-year discounted gain per person was of **28,693** US dollars (2019 equivalent). Applying this average to all 130 SC trained teachers, brings us to a collective net gain totaling **3,730,090** US dollars (2019 equivalent).

¹⁶ Grantham Research Institute, London School of Economics (2018). What are social discount rates? (<http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/faqs/what-are-social-discount-rates/>)

Increased assets

In addition, government employees, such as teachers, are eligible to receive a plot of land to build a house in the Woliso woreda. As explained by a government representative in Woliso:

"They [former facilitators] also received a plot of land from the City of Woliso measuring between 105 to 200 squared meters, where they can build a house. Those plots of land have a 250,000 ETB minimum value but could go up to 400,000 ETB. You get a job, you request some land, and then after a while they are allocated it. Teachers get this too, and almost all of them received it. You can pass this on to the next generation."

The former facilitators from Goro woreda schools built by SC did not receive this benefit. They may receive in the future, but not at the moment. From the 130 SC trained facilitators, about two-thirds (87) worked in Woliso woreda schools and, therefore, received the plot of land. We can estimate that the collective gain in assets for those former facilitators was between **1,198,054** and **743,159** US dollars (2019 value).

Training and support cost

As Table 3 (above) showed, based on the available information from SC's records, the facilitators' training cost between **1,402,997** and **1,289,508** US dollars between 2002 and 2010. The cost includes the intensive initial training, several refreshing courses, and the support provided for facilitators to attend the Teachers' Training Institutes and obtain their teacher's degree.


It is interesting to note that SC's training prepared the facilitators to become leaders that but them better positioned to progress to better, more prestigious jobs. As explained by a former SC employee that has deep knowledge about the work done by SC:

"I can count, right now, about 10-20 teachers who were transferred and promoted to better jobs in the city – based on their skills and performance. They had a competitive advantage for this because they had better skills than the teachers who had simply gone through the regular teachers' training. Plus, they have been exposed to international cutting-edge knowledge and mindset (from SC's experts). They could not get this from the government textbooks. SC's training is a multisectoral approach, competency-based. It is something they can apply to their own living situation (unlike what you get from textbooks)."

The bottom line

Comparing the resources invested by SC in training and supporting young adults to become government employed teachers (some progressed to higher government positions) and the monetary returns already achieved and future estimated gains, we can state with confidence that this investment was worth it.

With an investment of about **US\$ 1.35 million**, the current and future monetary return for the former facilitators plus the estimate value for the plot of land received amount to, approximately, between **US\$ 5.1 and \$ 6.2 million**.



This means that for every dollar invested by SC provided a potential return of US\$ 3.80 in financial benefits to former facilitators in the least optimistic scenario and US\$ 4.60 for more optimistic scenario.

Table 4 synthesizes the cost as well as the current and projected collective financial returns and asset gains.

Table 4. The investment in training and supporting the facilitators has provided an almost four-fold monetary return

SC's Cost and Net Gain	2019 US dollars		
	Average	Upper range	Lower range
Cost to train and support facilitators	\$1,346,253	\$1,402,997	\$1,289,508
Total facilitators' estimated gains	\$5,699,502	\$6,176,636	\$5,141,771
<i>income current</i>	\$1,003,306	\$1,257,492	\$668,522
<i>income future</i>	\$3,730,090	\$3,730,090	\$3,730,090
<i>assets</i>	\$966,106	\$1,189,054	\$743,159
Total net and asset gain less cost	\$4,353,249	\$4,773,639	\$3,852,263

3. Returns to investment in education

The potential future economic return to children and adolescents (and their families) who, because of the availability of schools built by SC in their communities, ended up pursuing further education was another venue explored in the Value for Investment study for this RIE.

We have used the work by Psacharopoulos & Patrinos (2018)¹⁷ as our main reference for assessing the link between years of schooling and possible lifetime earnings resulting from SC's investment in education in the Woliso impact area. This article derives from a World Bank study that reviews and highlights the latest trends and patterns based on a database of 1,120 returns to investment in education estimates in 139 countries.

¹⁷ Psacharopoulos, G. & Patrinos, H. A. (2018) Returns to investment in education: a decennial review of the global literature, *Education Economics*, 26:5, 445-458.

We have also used the work by Desalegn (2018)¹⁸ to identify the most useful estimate for the average marginal private returns to a year of schooling, based on his study of “Returns to Education in Ethiopia” that uses the latest National Labor Force Survey from 2013.

It is worth noting that there is a wide range of estimates in the literature and questions about the validity of transferring a return on investment figure from one context to another are always at the table. Nonetheless, the numbers we have used for this analysis constitute the best estimate available and helped us provide a well-reasoned answer to the important question of potential individual economic benefits from more years of schooling.

Estimating additional years of schooling

During the site visits to the RIE sampled kebeles, the evaluation team conducted interviews with families that had children or adolescents who attended the schools built by SC between 2002 and 2010. A total of 45 interviews were completed either with the former students or their parents. The current age of the former students varied from 16 to 30 years old (mean age: 21).

Among other questions, the interviewers asked respondents to indicate (i) How much schooling did you or your child complete? and (ii) If Save the Children had not built the school, how much schooling do you think you or your child would have completed?. The number of years attending school was calculated based on the following parameters (Table 5):

Table 5. Parameters to calculate years of schooling

Grade completed	Years in school
College or university (completed)	15
College or university (incomplete)	13
Preparatory school	12
Technical and Vocational Education & Training	11
Secondary school (Grade 10)	10
Secondary school (Grade 9)	9
Second cycle (Grade 8)	8
Second cycle (Grade 7)	7
Second cycle (Grade 6)	6
Second cycle (Grade 5)	5
First cycle (Grade 4)	4
First cycle (Grade 3)	3
First cycle (Grade 2)	2
First cycle (Grade 1)	1
No formal education	0

The difference between the current educational status and the one the adolescents and young adults would have achieved in case SC had not built the school in their kebeles was calculated for each former student. **The average number of additional years in school for this sample was 4.5.** There was great variation among respondents (standard deviation = 5.1). About two thirds of the interviewees indicated they or their children obtained more years of schooling because SC built the school in their kebeles and, especially for the girls, that these schools had separate latrines.

¹⁸ Desalegn, Y. (2018) Returns to Education in Ethiopia, in: Heshmati, A. & Yoon, H. (Eds.) Economic Growth and Development in Ethiopia. Springer : Singapore.

The analysis steps

1. *Number of schools reached*: There were 20 rural schools built by SC in the Woliso impact area. There were also other 8 kebeles whose schools have been structurally remodeled or improved with support from SC. Since the association between improvements in structural quality of school buildings and possible increase in student access and permanence in schools could not be clearly established, we decided to be more conservative and only considered the **20 schools** built by SC in very poor rural areas for this analysis.

2. *SC's contribution to potential impact*: In almost all schools built by SC, the community, later on, added additional classrooms to increase the school coverage. Based on the sample of 9 schools visited by the evaluation team, we have estimated that SC built, approximately, **63% of the existing classrooms**. Therefore, in the following analysis we applied this percentual to any estimation of potential impact.

3. *Number of children reached*: Considering the sample of 9 schools visited by the evaluation team, the average number of students enrolled in a given year was 409 per school – we have averaged the number of students in both early and more recent years. Our estimate is probably more conservative, since enrollment has been higher for more years if compared to the few initial years when there was a smaller number of students in the newly built schools. We have also estimated that approximately 50 new students joined the schools every year. Most schools were built between 2003 and 2005, which provides an average of 14 years of existence for each school. We have established that, approximately, 1,109 students went through SC built schools from 2004 to 2019.¹⁹ When we apply SC's estimated contribution of 63% (see previous item), we obtain a total of 698 students that we could reasonably claim to have been directly helped by SC. By multiplying this number to the 20 schools built by SC, we reach a **total of 13,973 students** that we could reasonably claim to have been directly helped by SC to obtain more years of education in the long run.

4. *Number of years earning an income*: We have estimated that 21 would be a reasonable age for an individual to start earning an income. Life expectancy in Ethiopia is roughly 66 years. Therefore, we estimate an individual would receive an income for about **45 years**.

5. *Estimated annual income*: Again, to be more conservative, we decided to use the lowest estimate for the annual earnings of subsistence farmers in the Woliso and Goro woredas which, in 2019, was the equivalent of, approximately, **514 US dollars**.

6. *Estimated lifetime earnings for a small farmer*: By multiplying the number of years of possible earnings as a farmer (45 years) by their average annual income (514 US dollars), and applying a 2% discount rate for the value of future earnings, we obtained the lifetime estimated individual earning in **15,153 US dollars**.

7. *Marginal return*: The study by Desalegn (2018) concluded that the average marginal returns to an additional year of schooling in Ethiopia was **14.43%**. We interpreted this to mean that if a person invests in herself by going back to school for a year, she earns a 14.43% internal rate of return on the investment over the rest of her working life. If (and only if) her investment is equal to one year's farming income foregone, and her counterfactual scenario is a lifetime of farming, then we can say her future income is 14.43% higher than if she had stayed farming. Without this assumption, this percentage figure would not allow us to estimate the incremental increase in earnings for a person who stays in school compared to a person who doesn't.

8. *Additional income*: The estimated gain in the lifetime earnings of an individual per extra year of schooling (based on the income of a small farmer in Woliso) is 2,187 US dollars²⁰. If we multiply this result by the number of extra years of schooling (4.5 years) due to the access to the schools built by SC, we obtain **9,840 US dollars** as additional life-time earnings per individual. If we multiply this amount by the number of students potentially benefitted by SC until 2019 (13,973 students), this would produce the amazing number of, approximately, **137.5 million US dollars** of discounted


¹⁹ Formula = 409 students (in the first year) + (50 new students every year * 14 years)

²⁰ Formula = 15,153 USD (lifetime earnings of a small farmer) * 14.43% (average marginal returns to an additional year of schooling in Ethiopia)

future additional lifetime earnings. As a caveat, it is worth noting that this analysis rests on the assumption that the benefits of each incremental year of schooling are linear and additive.

The bottom line

SC invested, approximately, **11.3 million** US dollars in Basic Education and Early Childhood Care and Development activities that included building and renovating schools in the Woliso impact area. Our evaluation estimated that having access to the schools built by SC helped ensure additional **4.5 years** of schooling for the children and adolescents who attended those schools. The estimated collective future lifetime additional income for those children/adolescents would be **137.5 million** US dollars.



The ultimate conclusion here is that **for every dollar invested by SC in education there is a potential return of about 12 dollars in lifetime financial benefits** to the (now) young women and men who attended the schools built by SC.

A reasonable question to ask is whether the government would have built those schools if SC had not built them. As part of our investigation to find alternative explanations to the observed changes, we asked government representatives, families and community leaders about that possibility. They were unanimous to indicate that this possibility would be very unlikely. With one single exception – a large school in Woliso town that received two additional blocks – SC only built schools in rural and isolated areas that have been traditionally neglected by the government, mostly by lack of resources. In some kebeles, the local communities worked together to build additional school blocks, but we have accounted for that in our analysis.



Figure 61. Children playing in school grounds

4. Returns to investment in water and sanitation


This RIE has estimated that SC invested, approximately, **4.7 million** US dollars in building and maintaining water schemes and sanitation facilities such as latrines, showers and clothes-washing facilities in the kebeles covered by their interventions.

In our interview protocols, we asked families, school principals, community leaders, and government representatives about the general importance of the water schemes and sanitation facilities to their lives or the lives of people reached by those interventions. However, a full cost-benefit analysis for this question would require a large dataset that tracked the main benefits associated with easy access to clean water and proper sanitation facilities, which include: (i) health care savings (people seek less health care), (ii) reduced losses of productive days due to disease, (iii) time savings resulting from more convenient drinking-water and sanitation services, and (iv) values of premature deaths averted (based on discounted future earnings). No such dataset was available; nor was there enough budget or time to allow such a major primary data collection effort.

To get an approximate answer to the Value for Investment question, we turned to the strongest and most relevant previous research. A WHO study of the return on investment (ROI) in water and sanitation services in sub-Saharan Africa calculated that the return on investment in water and sanitation services in sub-Saharan Africa is estimated at **2.7 US dollars to every dollar invested**.²¹

To ensure we weren't overestimating the ROI, we factored in the observed loss of 41% of the water schemes created and maintained with support from SC due mainly to dry (e.g., end of expected lifetime of hand-dug wells).²² Although SC's investments also included latrines, shower, and clothes washing facilities, the water schemes were the largest part of their investment.

Taking into account these losses in water scheme functionality, we could still reasonably expect a return of **7.5 million US dollars of benefits from SC's 4.7 million US dollars investment in water and sanitation**. This equates to an approximate **return of 1.59 US dollars for every dollar invested**.



Caveat: It is important to note that this analysis rests heavily on an assumption that the SC investment is substantively similar to the mid-range of WHO-studied initiatives with regard to their: context, level of investment, cost of inputs, intervention approaches, baseline conditions, as well as nature and extent of effects.

²¹ WHO (2012). *Global costs and benefits of drinking-water supply and sanitation interventions to reach the MDG target and universal coverage*. Geneva, Switzerland, WHO.

²² During the site visits to the 12 selected kebeles for this RIE, the evaluation team found out that 33 of the 80 water schemes built with support from SC (about 40%) were no longer functional.